RI District Court and Traffic Tribunal Case Law

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Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008

Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008.pdf
Appeals Panel
09/10/2013
Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008 Colin B. Foote

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed the decision of the trial judge to impose an enhanced sentence under R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-24 (Colin B. Foote Act), was affected by error of law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the date of the fourth conviction (Feb 1, 2013) was more than eighteen months after the date of the first conviction (Jun 22, 2011). Here, the Court concluded the decision of the trial judge was affected by error of law because he interpreted the statute to apply when the first conviction and the fourth incident fell within an eighteen month period. “The Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Clarke, 974 A.2d 558, 571-72 (R.I. 2009). Section 31-27-24 states that every person “convicted” within an eighteen month period is subject to enhanced sentencing. Accordingly, the Court held that the enhanced sentence imposed by the trial judge was affected by error of law and remanded the case for appropriate sentencing.Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008.pdf

Appeals Panel
09/10/2013
Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008 Identification

Identification

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed the decision of the trial judge was affected by error of law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the town failed to successfully identify him at trial as the perpetrator of the charged violation. The Court held that there were enough facts on the record to infer that the person in court was the operator of the vehicle. Here, the Court concluded that the testimony of the citing officer that at the time he stopped the individual he identified him as the defendant, constituted an in-court identification. Further, the Court held that the defendant acknowledged he was the operator of the vehicle because he testified that the officer failed to issue him a summons and, in his testimony, said “I don’t believe I was going that fast . . . .” Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008.pdf