RI District Court and Traffic Tribunal Case Law

State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156 (2000).pdf

Following Defendant’s filing of a Motion to Suppress, the Superior court stayed proceedings and sent the case to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of liquor or drugs, death resulting, in violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.2. Defendant turned out of a gas station and collided with a motorcycle, killing the motorcycle’s operator. As law enforcement responded to the collision, an on-scene investigation ensued and defendant was arrested. After being taken to the police station, Defendant submitted to a breath test, which indicated Defendant’s BAC was .026. A drug evaluation expert performed a drug influence evaluation on Defendant and concluded that she was under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. The police asked Defendant to submit to a blood test to confirm which stimulant was in her system, and Defendant refused. The police then obtained a search warrant from a justice of the Superior Court to extract samples of Defendant’s blood and urine. The subsequent blood test revealed the presence of marijuana and cocaine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the introduction of the test at trial on the ground that her blood was drawn without her consent and that the Superior Court lacked the authority to issue a warrant for a blood draw. The Supreme Court agreed with the Defendant, citing its previous decision in State v. Timms, 505 A2.d 1132 (R.I. 1986), where the court held that actual consent was required for hospital personnel to obtain a defendant’s blood. After examining the language of the relevant statute, and examining similar statutes in over a dozen states, the Court concluded that the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-27-2.2 required that, once a suspect refused a blood or chemical test, a test should not be given, with or without a warrant. The Court further concluded that, pursuant to the warrant authority granted to the Superior Court, the Superior Court lacked the authority to issue a warrant for a blood draw. Accordingly, the court remanded the case back to the lower court.

RI Supreme Court
07/01/1997

State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997)

State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997).pdf

The State appealed a finding by the Appeals Panel of the Administrative Adjudication Court of Rhode Island (“AAC”) that upheld a dismissal of Defendant’s cited violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). An anonymous tipster reported that Defendant may have been driving under the influence, and an officer was dispatched to the area, armed with information from a police dispatcher that the vehicle’s registration had been suspended. The officer located the vehicle and, though he did not observe any erratic driving, pulled the vehicle over. After further investigation Defendant was placed under arrest for operating while under the influence of alcohol, operating a vehicle with a suspended registration, and operating with a suspended license. At the police station, Defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test, which he refused. At a trial at the Administrative Adjudication Court the Trial Judge found that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a stop in order to investigate for driver intoxication because the anonymous tip alone was not sufficient. The Defendant further argued that the suspended registration was a pretext for the real reason the police stopped him. The Supreme Court noted that, like in the United States Supreme Court decision in Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996), the “[s]ubjective intentions [of the arresting police officer] plays no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” The Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously stated in State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 723 (R.I. 1994), that “an arrest is not . . . fatally pretextual merely because . . . police officers have a dual motive for making the arrest.” Instead, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had held that motive alone could only invalidate searches and seizures in cases where it is doubtful that probable cause ever existed to justify the initial stop. Here, the Court found that there was probable cause to justify the stop because the vehicle’s registration was suspended. Accordingly, the police officer’s stop of Defendant was justified by probable cause, the State’s appeal was granted, and the case was remanded to the AAC.

RI Supreme Court
07/01/1997

State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997)

State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997).pdf

The State appealed a finding by the Appeals Panel of the Administrative Adjudication Court of Rhode Island (“AAC”) that upheld a dismissal of Defendant’s cited violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). An anonymous tipster reported that Defendant may have been driving under the influence, and an officer was dispatched to the area, armed with information from a police dispatcher that the vehicle’s registration had been suspended. The officer located the vehicle and, though he did not observe any erratic driving, pulled the vehicle over. After further investigation Defendant was placed under arrest for operating while under the influence of alcohol, operating a vehicle with a suspended registration, and operating a vehicle with a suspended license. At the police station, Defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test, which he refused. At a trial at the Administrative Adjudication Court the Trial Judge found that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a stop in order to investigate for driver intoxication because the anonymous tip alone was not sufficient. The Supreme Court found that neither Defendant nor the public at large had any reasonable expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle registration license plate, given that such plates and the information behind them were “within the control and custody of the state through the Registry of Motor Vehicles” and given that the license plates hang from the front and rear of one’s vehicle for “all the world to see.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the investigation into Defendant’s license plate was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the operation of a vehicle with a suspended registration was a misdemeanor offense (it has subsequently been decriminalized), the Court held that the officer had probable cause to stop the motor vehicle for that offense. Consequently, the State’s appeal was granted and the case was remanded to the AAC.

District Court

District Court
12/19/2019

David DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-20 (December 19, 2019)

David DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-20 (December 19, 2019).pdf

Defendant appealed a decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that Defendant may have been driving under the influence. Based on the vehicle registration number, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot at a different location. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he “had just come from D’Angelo’s.” Defendant argued that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant because the officer relied upon information from an anonymous tip. The District Court held that the statement given by a private citizen to the dispatch officer could be viewed as reasonably trustworthy because the caller, while unnamed, was identifiable and, therefore, not a “purely anonymous tipster.” Moreover, the District Court indicated that tips may no longer require validation at trial in Terry-stop cases because the Supreme Court of the United States did not require such validation in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014). The District Court concluded that the information contained in the tip, combined with corroborating evidence, was sufficiently reliable to give the officer reasonable suspicion for the stop. Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
12/19/2019

David DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-20 (December 19, 2019)

David DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-20 (December 19, 2019).pdf

Defendant appealed a decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that Defendant may have been driving under the influence. Based on the vehicle registration number, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot at a different location. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he “had just come from D’Angelo’s.” Before the Appeals Panel Defendant argued that “the State never proved [Defendant] had ‘operated’ his vehicle within the meaning of [the refusal statute].” Before the District Court, however, Defendant seemed to have abandoned that argument, arguing instead that “the State did not prove that [the arresting officer] had reasonable suspicion to believe he had operated a motor vehicle.” Defendant cited State v. Capuano, 591 A.2d 35 (R.I. 1991), for the proposition that “sitting at the controls of a vehicle does not constitute operating a motor vehicle.” The District Court, in dicta, despite noting that the basis for such a prosecution is the implied consent that is predicated on operating a motor vehicle, suggested that the State need not prove operation in a refusal prosecution; instead, the State must prove only that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant had been operating. On that issue, the Court found that his admission that he had driven, alone or combined with other facts, was sufficient to establish reasonable ground. The court explicitly declined to reach the argument that sitting behind the wheel with the engine running might constitute “operation.” Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
09/09/2019

James Harrington v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-32 (September 9, 2019)

James Harrington v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-32 (September 9, 2019).pdf

Defendant appealed a decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that a North Kingstown police officer performed an extra-territorial stop, which was not permissible at the time of the stop (prior to a 2016 amendment of General Laws § 12-7-19) . At trial, Defendant attempted to introduce a map into evidence to show that an extra-territorial stop took place, but the trial judge refused to review the map. Upon reaching the District Court, the case was remanded to allow Defendant to fully litigate the territorial jurisdiction issue. On remand, the trial judge allowed Defendant to admit one map into evidence, but refused to admit a second map on authentication grounds. Defendant offered no testimony as to where on the map the stop allegedly took place. The trial judge found that the map admitted into evidence was unreliable, showing only “where people from the South County Tourism Council believe boundaries to be,” and that it did not, without supporting testimony, “provide [the trial court] with information as it relates specifically to the facts of this case.” Accordingly, the trial judge relied upon the police officer’s testimony as to the location of the stop. The District Court held that the trial judge properly relied upon the officer’s testimony because Defendant failed to “present testimony identifying where, on the map, the violation occurred.” Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
01/17/2018

James Harrington v. State, A.A. No. 16-102 (January 17, 2018)

James Harrington v. State, A.A. No. 16-102 (January 17, 2018).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued, in part, that his appeal should be granted because the officers who stopped him were from North Kingstown and the moving violation and traffic stop occurred in East Greenwich, outside of the North Kingstown officers’ jurisdiction. Under the provisions of R.I.G.L. § 12-7-19 then in effect (the statute has since been amended), extra-territorial stops were only permissible where the officers making the stop would otherwise have the right to arrest a defendant, which is not the case for civil traffic violations such as the laned roadway violation alleged in this case. At trial, the Defendant sought to introduce a map of the area in which the stop occurred, but the trial magistrate chose not to review it, instead finding the arresting officer’s testimony regarding the stop being within his jurisdiction to be credible and sufficient to sustain the charge against Defendant. The Appeals Panel affirmed, but did not mention whether the trial magistrate erred by declining to review a map of the area in which the stop occurred. On appeal to the District Court, Defendant challenged the propriety of that evidentiary ruling. Because the Appeals Panel failed to address this issue of possible merit, the District Court remanded to the Appeals Panel for a decision on that issue.

District Court
03/16/2017

Robert Faulkner v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 16-128 (March 16, 2017)

Preliminary Suspension

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel involving an alleged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit”). The Appeals Panel held that the preliminary order suspending the defendant’s license was interlocutory in nature and not subject to immediate appeal. However, before the District Court heard this case on the merits, the matter was resolved with an admission to the charge by the defendant. Accordingly, the District Court determined that the defendant’s appeal was moot.

Robert Faulkner v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 16-128 (March 16, 2017).pdf

District Court
03/18/2015

Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015)

Collateral Estoppel

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the trial judge to dismiss the refusal case because a District Court judge had previously dismissed the related drunk-driving case, apparently on the grounds that the Officer’s testimony was not sufficiently credible. The Court noted that of the three required elements of estoppel, the first element of privity and second element of a final judgment on the merits were not at issue because the City of Pawtucket prosecuted the drunk-driving case on behalf of the State and because the dismissal of the drunk–driving charge ended the case. The Court held that the third element – the identity of the issues –was not established because the charges of drunken driving and refusal have different elements and different standards of proof. As such, the Court held that the State was entitled to proceed on the refusal citation despite the dismissal of the drunk–driving charge. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the Defendant.

Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015).pdf

District Court
03/18/2015

Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015)

Procedure

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the District Court erred by refusing to consider the impeachment value of the District Court transcript. The District Court, however, agreed with the Appeals panel that the trial judge did allow the Defendant to use the transcript in the Officer’s impeachment, noting that the trial judge told defense counsel she would permit him to use the transcript for impeachment and defense counsel actually did use the transcript in the cross-examination of the Officer. Since the trial judge specifically commented on the impeachment value of the Officer’s prior testimony, the District Court held that the Court did not commit an error. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the Defendant.

Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015).pdf

District Court
03/18/2015

Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015)

Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015).pdf

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficiently credible to prove the refusal case to the standard of clear and convincing evidence because, though there was evidence presented by the Officer that indicated he had reasonable grounds to believe the Defendant was under the influence, there were discrepancies in the testimony of the Officer that made his testimony not credible. The District Court noted that the Court’s role is limited to determine whether the Panel was clearly erroneous in its decision. The Court held that though the Officer had admittedly “made a mess” of his testimony in a District Court trial because, he claimed, he had not adequately reviewed his police report, the trial judge had the discretion to believe the testimony and, because the testimony was competent evidence, the trial judge was not clearly erroneous by relying on it. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the Defendant.

District Court
06/01/2015

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015)

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015).pdf

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the Appeals Panel erred because he agreed to take the chemical test and made a good faith effort to do so. The Trooper testified that, while the Defendant initially agreed to take the test, he did not cooperate with the instructions in order to give a sufficient sample. The Defendant testified that he tried to cooperate and take the test. The Court noted that to sustain the charge, it must find that the decision was supported by legally competent evidence. The Court held that because the trial magistrate relied on the video of the test and the Trooper’s testimony, which he found to be credible, to find as a matter of fact that the Defendant willfully failed to follow instructions, there was sufficient evidence to prove the refusal element by conduct. Accordingly, the Court upheld the decision to sustain the violation.

District Court
06/01/2015

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015)

Physical Inability to Submit to a Chemical Test

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that it was improper to subject him to sanctions for refusal because he was unable to provide a sufficient sample due to injuries to his back and head. The Court outlined that due process prohibits penalizing a defendant for failing to perform an act that he or she does not have the physical ability to perform. In such a situation, however, it is the motorist who bears the burden of proving such a physical inability “except where such inability is obvious.” The Court agreed with the Appeals Panel and held that because there was no obvious inability and because the medical report the Defendant submitted did not link the Defendant’s injuries to an inability to perform the breath test, the Defendant did not meet his burden of proof. Accordingly, the Court upheld the decision to sustain the violation.

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015).pdf

District Court
06/01/2015

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015)

Deficient Sample

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). In a case in which the Defendant blew into the machine and the machine registered a “deficient sample,” the Defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the machine had been certified and calibrated because the Trooper was unable to recall the machine’s serial number. The Court held that because there was only one machine at the barracks and the machine was found to be in good working order days before, the trial magistrate’s did not err in finding that the State proved the machine was in good working order. Accordingly, the Court upheld the decision to sustain the violation.

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015).pdf

District Court
06/01/2015

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015)

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015).pdf

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in finding that the Trooper had reasonable grounds to believe that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol because the Trooper never saw him drive. The Court here held that the Trooper had reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant had operated his vehicle because the Defendant himself had told the Trooper that the Defendant had driven. The Court noted in a footnote that the corpus delicti rule, which might prevent the introduction into evidence of this admission, does not apply in civil cases. Accordingly, the Court upheld the decision to sustain the violation.

District Court
06/01/2015

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015)

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015).pdf

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in finding there was a sworn report because the submitted report contained inaccuracies. The Court noted the prevailing law holding that the State is required to prove that a sworn report was created, thereby acknowledging that prior District Court opinions on this issue were no longer good law. The Court went on to hold that the State does not need to prove that the report is accurate in all significant particulars because Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345 (R.I. 1993), explained that the State is not bound by the contents of the sworn report. Accordingly, despite the inaccuracies in the sworn report, the Court upheld the decision to sustain the violation.

District Court
06/01/2015

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015)

Evidence

Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s improperly admitted the inspection report because it related to a different machine than the one used in the Defendant’s breath test. The Defendant relied on State v. Miller, N3-2009-0223A, 2010 WL 390915 (R.I. Super. 01/29/10), where a judge granted a motion to suppress the results of a chemical breath test because the serial numbers on the test machine and in the report were different. Here, the Court distinguished Miller, holding that here there was no ambiguity concerning which machine was used because there was only one machine at the barracks. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial magistrate’s evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and upheld the decision to sustain the violation.

Jared Bisordi v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2014-092 (June 1, 2015).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014

Collen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The District Court held that the decision of the Appeals Panel finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence was not clearly erroneous because the state presented five indicia that the defendant had operated under the influence, including: the defendant admitted to alcohol consumption, had watery and bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, was unsteady exiting the vehicle, and nearly hit a parked vehicle while attempting to pull over. Defendant had presented testimony by an expert witness stating that what appeared to be indicia of alcohol consumption were in fact manifestations of the defendant’s mental state. The District Court concluded that the expert testimony was immaterial to the charge of refusal to submit because a defendant may be penalized for refusing under § 31-27-2.1 as long as the officer observes sufficient indicia of intoxication to constitute reasonable grounds, even if it is later revealed that the indicia of intoxication were the result of some source other than alcohol or drug intoxication. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the decision of the Appeals Panel was not clearly erroneous but was supported by substantial evidence. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014

Collen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that the decision of the Appeals Panel should be reversed because she was unable to knowingly and voluntarily refuse to submit to a chemical test. However, the Court concluded that the defendant only raised this argument in passing and failed to allege either that § 31-27-2.1 requires a refusal to be made knowingly and voluntarily, or that a provision of constitutional law was violated. Accordingly, the Court declined to judge the validity of the defendant’s argument and sustained the violation. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014

Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed the trial magistrate applied the wrong evidentiary standard of proof because he stated “clear and convincing evidence is not a hard standard to meet.” The Court held that the magistrate’s statement was an expression of opinion and that the clear and convincing standard “would undoubtedly be viewed as ‘not hard’ in comparison to the criminal standard [of] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that the magistrate did not misapply the applicable standard of clear and convincing. Thus, the violation was sustained.Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014

Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed the magistrate erred in applying the wrong fact-finding standard because he applied a subjective standard when he considered “what was in [the officer’s] mind at the time of the stop.” The Court held that the magistrate did not err and applied the proper objective test because the Court must incorporate the personal knowledge and experience of the police officer when determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/15/2014

Joan DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-148 (April 15, 2014)

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27 2.1 (refusal to submit) and 1956 § 31-25-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle because the original basis for the stop was due to an unverified anonymous tip and the officer did not witness a traffic violation until after he followed the defendant. However, the Court held that the anonymous tip was irrelevant because the traffic stop was the result of the officer having observed the defendant leave her lane of travel in violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-15-11. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Joan DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-148 (April 15, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/15/2014

Joan DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-148 Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27 2.1 (refusal to submit) and 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed the decision of the Appeals Panel was clearly erroneous because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the motorist. After suggesting that the State might not be required to prove the existence of probable cause to arrest in a refusal case, the Court held that in this case probable cause existed to believe the defendant operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, swayed and used the vehicle for balance when exiting, was unable to keep the vehicle within the travel lane, and traveled with her hazard lights on. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.Joan DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-148 (April 15, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/15/2014

Bruce Bartels v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-164 Reasaonble Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27- 2.1 (refusal to submit) and 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (open container). The defendant claimed the citing officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe he was driving while intoxicated because the officer approached the defendant while he was outside the vehicle in a parking lot with a flat tire and “rummaging through the trunk.” However, the District Court held that the Appeals Panel did not err in concluding the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had operated the vehicle while under the influence because the defendant had admitted he had driven the vehicle, admitted he was coming from Foxwoods, and there were markings on the tire which suggested to the officer that the tire had gone flat while being driven. Furthermore, the officer testified that the location of the defendant was not within one-half mile of a drinking establishment. Therefore, the Court concluded that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant operated a vehicle under the influence and sustained the violation.Bruce Bartels v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-164 (April 15, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/15/2014

Bruce Bartels v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-164 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27- 2.1 (refusal to submit) and 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (open container). Defendant claimed the magistrate erred by admitting hearsay evidence because he allowed the citing officer to testify regarding statements the defendant had made about the incident. The District Court concluded the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s statements were not hearsay because they fell within Rule 801(d)(2)(A) as they were the statements of a party-opponent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals panel sustaining the violation. Bruce Bartels v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-164 (April 15, 2014).pdf

District Court
03/25/2014

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-071, Preliminary Breath Test

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of refusal to submit was in error because she consented to a PBT after arrest and, therefore, had fulfilled her obligations under R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 to submit to a chemical test. Section 31-27-2.1(d) states “any test . . . for the presence of alcohol which relies in whole or in part upon the principle of infrared light absorption is considered a chemical test.” The District Court held that the defendant did not fulfill her obligation of implied consent under § 31-27-2.1 because the PBT used to test the defendant utilized fuel-cell technology to determine the presence of alcohol and did not rely on infrared light. Accordingly, the District Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-071 (March 25, 2014).pdf

District Court
03/25/2014

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-071 Preliminary Breath Test

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed the state failed to prove what kind of PBT she took and that the trial judge improperly “pyramided inferences” when he found the PBT she used operated on fuel-cell technology. The District Court held that it was not improper for the trial judge to infer that the PBT the defendant used operated on fuel-cell technology because the distributor of PBTs testified that he issued a “Drager 6510” (which operates on fuel-cell technology) to the citing officer, instructed all departments to discard any PBT that was not a Drager 6510, and seized all other machines that were not Drager 6510s. Accordingly, the Court held that the Appeals Panel’s decision was not clearly erroneous where they held that the defendant used a PBT utilizing fuel-cell technology and sustained the violation against the defendant. Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-071 (March 25, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/15/2014

Bruce Bartels v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-164 Operation of Motor Vehicle

District Court
08/12/2014

Alec Cambio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-250 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Alec Cambio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-250 (August 12, 2014).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The arresting officer came upon the defendant sitting in the driver’s seat of his parked car in a convenience store parking lot, his head slumped over the steering wheel, talking to himself. A clerk at the store informed the officer the defendant had pulled into the parking lot approximately 30-60 minutes prior to the officer’s arrival. The arresting officer testified that the defendant had apologized for driving drunk, had watery, bloodshot eyes, had slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, and had performed poorly on field sobriety tests. The defendant challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to conclude that he had been operating under the influence because of the time between his alleged operation and the officer’s observations. After noting this issue had not been preserved for appeal, the Court held that, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the officer had more than reasonable suspicion to infer the defendant had been driving under the influence. Therefore, the decision of the Appeals Panel was not an error of law, in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision and upheld the conviction.

District Court
03/13/2014

Joshua Kolator v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-016 Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). The defendant pointed to uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of his arrest and argued that he was placed in custody at Newport hospital. The state argued that the defendant’s arrest took place in the ambulance in Middletown. The Court, maintaining that a person is arrested when a reasonable person would believe that they were not free to leave, credited the testimony of the officer in determining the time of the arrest. The Court held that the defendant was placed under arrest in Middletown because a reasonable person would believe they were not free to leave where the officer performed a field sobriety test prior to the defendant entering the ambulance, read the defendant his rights for use at the scene while in the vehicle, and commenced questioning. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

Joshua Kolator v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-016.pdf

District Court
03/13/2014

Joshua Kolator v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-016-Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Joshua Kolator v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-016.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant had bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, admitted to consuming two beers, and failed a field sobriety test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
01/28/2014

George Fayad v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-103-Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

George Fayad v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-103.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to ask him to submit to a chemical test. The arresting officer testified that the defendant had admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had watery eyes, slurred speech, and failed two field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision and held that these facts provided reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence.

District Court
01/28/2014

George Fayad v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-103-Credibility Determinations

George Fayad v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-103.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant argued that the arresting officer’s testimony establishing three events occurring at 1:38a.m. rendered the officer’s testimony incredible. The Court held that the trier of fact is entitled to make decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses. As such the magistrate’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony was not clearly erroneous. The Court affirmed the Appeals Panel decision and held these facts provided reasonable grounds to administer a field sobriety test.

District Court
04/12/2012

Kenneth Ribeiro v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0167 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the violation should have been dismissed because he was not arraigned within two weeks after the date the citation was issued as prescribed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the Traffic Tribunal. The Court held that a transgression of Rule 33 did not require dismissal absent a showing of prejudice. Here, the defendant failed to show that he had suffered prejudice as a result of not being arraigned within the two week time period. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Kenneth Ribeiro v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. 11-0167 (April 12, 2012).pdf

District Court
03/21/2012

Michael Petrarca v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No.11-33 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Michael Petrarca v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-33 (March 21, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that, as a result of an accident in which his head had gone “partially through the windshield,” he was unable to make a knowing and voluntary decision about whether to submit to a chemical test. The trial magistrate ruled that the defendant bore the burden of proving his inability to make a knowing and voluntary decision and held that the defendant had failed to meet that burden. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s burden-shifting approach was improper. The District Court agreed that the trial magistrate’s burden-shifting approach was improper, holding that the burden of proof always stays with the State, but nonetheless upheld the finding of violation. The District Court noted that the trial magistrate had found the testimony of the officers to be more credible than that of a trauma surgeon expert witness as to the issue of the defendant’s cognitive ability at the time of refusal. Holding that an appellate body “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Consequently, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
02/07/2012

Brendan Bieber v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-24 Telephone Call

Brendan Bieber v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-243 (February, 7 2012).pdf

Defedant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court held that the one hour and twenty minute delay in bringing the defendant to the station was because the police officer’s vehicle was hit. However, the Court held that the delay did nto violate the statute because the defendant was not prejudiced. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
10/10/2012

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 Reasonable Grounds

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 (October 10, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the offcer possessed reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating under the influence because the defendant admitting he consumed alcohol, had watery eyes, slurred speech, emitted a slight odor of alcohol, admitted the accident was the result of driving too fast, and failed to properly execute field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
10/10/2012

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No.12-094 Sworn Report

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 (October 10, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the officer never swore to a report. The District Court held that the existence of a sworn report is immaterial to a refusal case but is necessary only for the issuance of a pre-trial suspension. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
10/10/2012

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 Telephone Call

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 (October 10, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court, following State v. Quattrucci, 39 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 2012), emphasized that the right to a confidential phone call only attached when the purpose of the call is to speak to an attorney or arrange for bail. Here, the defendant never spoke to an attorney and he did not need bail. Thus, because the defendant only called his wife to pick him up and because the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice, the conviction was affirmed.

District Court
09/21/2012

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 (September 21, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the facts were sufficient—when measured against standards established in prior Supreme Court decisions—to affirm the appeals panel’s finding that the officer possessed reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had driven under the influence, as the defendant admitted he had consumed alcohol that night, had watery and bloodshot eyes, emitted the odor of alcohol, violated the traffic laws by speeding, and failed to properly execute field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
09/21/2012

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 Sworn Report

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 (September 21, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court noted that because an officer’s report was never notarized it was not a sworn report; however, the officer’s failure to create a sworn report was not fatal to the state’s efforts to secure a conviction for refusal to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
09/21/2012

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 Telephone Call

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 (September 21, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court, following State v. Quattrucci, 39 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 2012), emphasized that the right to a confidential phone call only attached when the purpose of the call is to speak to an attorney or arrange for bail. Here, the defendant was only calling his wife. Also, this court noted there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendant as even if the officer heard the contents of the defendant’s call, there was no evidence she revealed what she heard. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
09/05/2012

Dennis Lonardo v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No.12-47 Preliminary Breath Test

Dennis Lonardo v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-47 (September 5, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). The Court held that the officer had reasoanble grounds to request the defendant to submit to a preliminary breath test because the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, admitted he had consumed alcohol, and showed signs of impairment on the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
09/05/2012

Dennis Lonardo v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-47 Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

Dennis Lonardo v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-47 (September 5, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances the initial traffic stop of the defendant was lawful because the officer (who had a history of over sixty arrests for suspected D.U.I) witnessed the defendant enter into his vehicle and drive away after the officer observed the defendant sway from side to side and stumble while walking. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
12/20/2011

Adam Bussey v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0116 Right for Use at the Scene

Adam Bussey v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0116 (December 20, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because the defendant was spinning his tires and thus violating R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-1. The Court also found that giving the “Rights for Use At the Scene” is not an element of § 31-27-2.1. Thus, the officer reading the “Rights for Use at the Station” and “Right for Use At the Scene” at the police station satisfied the elements of a refusal charge. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the defendant’s conviction.

District Court
09/29/2011

Mark Kemp v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No.11-0055 Anonymous Tips

Mark Kemp v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0055 (September 29, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the officer did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion standard necessary for a stop because the defendant was stopped based solely on a face-to-face anonymous tip that the defendant was drunk and had been involved in an accident without the officer corroborating any of the information before conducting the stop. The District Court held that face-to-face anonymous tips must be evaluated for reasonable suspicion on an individual case basis and viewed in a light of the qualities of “veracity,” “basis of knowledge,” and “reliability.” Given the totality of the circumstances the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the information provided to him by the tipster because the tipster had a basis of knowledge, as he was connected to the incident both temporally and geographically, the tipster’s veracity was subject to the officer’s evaluation because he was able to observe the tipster’s behavior, and the tipster placed his identity at risk, which contributed to the reliability of the information. Accordingly, the Court held that the officer’s stop of the defendant was reasonable and sustained the violation.

District Court
09/29/2011

Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 Reasonable Suspcion to Stop

Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 (September 29, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court concluded that the decision of the Appeals Panel regarding the Fourth Amendment issue was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record, as an arrest made by an officer on the basis of departmental knowledge is validated in one of two ways: “(a) when an arrest has been made pursuant to a warrant, its validity must be examined—including a determination of whether the facts contained in the application constituted probable cause; (b) when a warrantless arrest has been made, it is the knowledge possessed by the officer (or officers, since this principle may operative collectively) who instigated the arrest, the ‘communicating’ officer, that must be evaluated.” Car stops based on departmental knowledge are generally warrantless, thus the second course applies here. The Court held that the arresting officer acted properly, but the prosecution did not meet its burden to show that the stop in the instant case was legally justified because it failed to show that the seizure was validated on the basis of the knowledge of the investigating or communicating officer, in this case the dispatcher. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
09/29/2011

Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 Anonymous Tips

Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 (September 29, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant asserted that he was stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion. The officer admitted at trial that he did not observe the defendant commit any traffic violations or observe any indicia of intoxication before he stopped the defendant and that the sole basis for the stop was in reliance on “departmental knowledge” allegedly provided by a witness who followed the defendant and informed the dispatcher that the defendant had been in an accident, was possibly intoxicated, and provided the make, model, and license plate. The District Court held that although the officer acted properly in stopping the defendant, the correct analysis under Fourth Amendment precedent for warrantless stops was to inquire whether the “communicating” officer possessed reasonable suspicion to instigate the stop. Here, the Court held that the state did not meet its burden in proving that the dispatcher had reasonable suspicion to instigate the stop because the state failed to prove that the alleged telephone call by the witness was ever made. After suggesting that the state’s failure to meet its burden was enough by itself to recommend reversal, the Court went on to note that following the line of analysis laid out in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the anonymous tip failed to meet the standards of “veracity, basis of knowledge, and reliability” because the information did not have any predictive value and the police only corroborated the make, model, and license plate of the defendant. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the violation against the defendant.

District Court
09/29/2011

Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the trial magistrate erred in his questioning of the officer. The District Court held that no objection was made during trial and, consequently, the issue was not preserved for review. However, even if the issue had been properly preserved for appeal the Court stated that the trial magistrate acted in accordance with Rule 614 of the Rules of Evidence as his questioning was primarily for clarification purposes. The Court went on to note that even if additional information was extracted from the witness, the trial judge did not make note of it on the record and, therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced. However, the Court reversed the violation on other grounds.

Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 (September 29, 2011).pdf

District Court
09/26/2011

Robert Mattley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0060 Telephone Call

Robert Mattley v. State of Rhode Island.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the right to a confidential phone call does not apply to those charged with a civil violation, and refusing to submit to a chemical test is a civil violation. However, the Court held that even if the defendant had a right to a confidential phone call there was substantial evidence that the defendant was given ample opportunity to make a phone call. The fact that the detective left out the word “confidential” did not prejudice the defendant, because there was no evidence that if the defendant had been told the phone call was confidential he would have acted any differently. Thus, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision that compliance with § 12-7-20 was supported by substantial evidence.

District Court
08/17/2011

Richard Dion v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-246 Right to Independant Medical Examination

Richard Dion v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2009-151; A.A. No. 2010-246 (August 17, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the officer violated his rights under R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-3 by not providing him a “reasonable opportunity” to obtain an independent medical examination and that a violation of § 31-27-3 should result in the dismissal of the charge of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1. Section 31-27-2.1(c)(3) requires that “the [defendant] had been informed of his or her rights in accordance with § 31-27-3.” (emphasis added). The District Court held that a refusal conviction only requires that the defendant be put on notice of the right to an independent medical examination and that the plain language of the statute does not require that the defendant actually be provided with a “reasonable opportunity” to obtain such an examination. The Court went on to note that even if § 31-27-2.1(c)(3) requires that the defendant be given a “reasonable opportunity” to obtain an independent medical examination for a refusal charge the defendant was afforded such an opportunity in this case because he was allowed to make a telephone call for thirty minutes to contact his physician, he was transported to the hospital for tests, and the tests conducted at the hospital were not performed at the direction of the officer. Further, even if § 31-27-3 did apply to a refusal charge and the officer’s conduct constituted a breach of that right, the defendant was not prejudiced and, therefore, the proper remedy would not be dismissal. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
04/14/2011

Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 Telephone Call

Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 (April 14, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that he was not allowed to make a confidential phone call. The Court held that the right to a confidential phone call referred to in R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20 does not apply to those charged with only civil violations. Additionally, even if the defendant was entitled to a confidential phone call, his right was not breached because the officer was not in the hospital room when the defendant made the call and the defendant failed to prove that hospital personnel were present in the room when the call was made. Furthermore, the Court noted that the proper remedy would not be dismissal even if the defendant had a right to a confidential phone call and it was breached. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
04/14/2011

Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 Reasonale Grounds/Probable Cause

Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 (April 14, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe he had operated a vehicle while under the influence. The officer never observed the defendant driving, but rather arrived at the scene of an accident at which the defendant was the only person helped out of his car. The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds because the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, lost his temper, had been involved in an accident, and had difficulty complying with requests from emergency personnel. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
04/14/2011

Mark Eldridge v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0221 Right to an Independent Medical Examination

Mark Eldridge v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0221 (April 14, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court held that the defendant’s “right” to an independent examination (§ 31-27-3) was not violated. When a defendant refuses a chemical test he or she must be given notice that an independent examination is available; however, the defendant does not need to be given an opportunity to get an examination. In State v. Langella, 650 A.2d 478 (R.I. 1994), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a single telephone call made by the defendant, satisfied the duty of the Police Department to provide him with a reasonable opportunity to have an independent medical examination. Here, the defendant was given notice and an opportunity to make a phone call. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision to sustain the refusal charge against the defendant.

District Court
04/14/2011

Mark Eldridge v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0221 Telephone Call

Mark Eldridge v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0221 (April 14, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court held that the defendant was not deprived of the “right” to a confidential phone call (§ 12-7-20) because the defendant did not have a right to a confidential phone call when charged with only a civil violation. However, the Court reasoned that even if the defendant had a right to a confidential phone call, he was awarded one in this case. Thus, the defendant was not prejudiced in any way, and the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
03/17/2011

Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 Right for Use at the Scene

Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 (March 17, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that there was ample evidence that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence because he admitted numerous times that he was the driver, had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, and looked as if he was going to fall asleep on the side of the road. The Court held that the officer complied with G.L. 1956 § 31-27-3 (Right to a Physical Examination) even though he failed to read the defendant his rights while at the scene of the accident because he immediately read the defendant his rights as soon as he was arrested, which was before the defendant was asked to take a chemical test. Thus, the Court affirmed the violation against the defendant.

District Court
02/18/2011

10-132 Identification

Identifying the Defendant

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that she was not properly identified as the operator of the vehicle. The District Court held that the defendant was identified by the officer of the vehicle and the defendant admitted that she was driving the vehicle. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial magistrate did not err and sustained the violation against the defendant.

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 (February 18, 2011).pdf

District Court
02/18/2011

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No.10-132 Rights for Use at Station

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 (February 18, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced when the defendant was told two different numbers in regards to a license reinstatement fee. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
02/18/2011

10-132 Preliminary Breath Test

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 (February 18, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that she had fulfilled her obligation under the implied consent law to submit to chemical test because she consented to a PBT after she had been arrested for suspicion of DUI. Section 31-27-2.1 defines a “chemical” test as a test that operates on the principle of infrared light absorption. The District Court held that the record was devoid of whether the PBT used to test the defendant operated on the principle of infrared light absorption. Consequently, the Court could not determine whether the defendant had complied with the requirements of § 31-27-2.1 by submitting to a “chemical” test. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Traffic Tribunal for further factual findings regarding the technology that the PBT utilized.

District Court
12/23/2011

Marsha Rooney v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-043 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering from a private road without yielding). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that she had operated a vehicle while under the influence. The District Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle while under the influence because the defendant admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol, appeared confused, was evasive in answering the officer’s questions, had mumbled speech, failed the walk and turn field sobriety test, and operated her vehicle erratically by failing to yield when exiting a parking lot. Accordingly, the Court held that the state established by clear and convincing evidence that there were reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the defendant was operating under the influence and sustained the violation. Marsha Rooney v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-043 (December 23, 2011).pdf

District Court
03/17/2011

Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that he had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the officer never observed the defendant drive, did not administer field sobriety test, and only observed the defendant standing outside of the vehicle when he responded to the scene. The District Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the officer observed the defendant standing “bloodied” next to a vehicle that had recently been in an accident, he admitted that he had been the driver of the vehicle, he admitted to consuming alcohol, he had water and bloodshot eyes, and he emitted an odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 (March 17, 2011).pdf

District Court
03/17/2011

Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation was in error because he was not under arrest at the time he was read the “Rights for Use at the Station/Hospital.” The Court held that the defendant was read the “Rights for Use at the Station/Hospital” after he had been arrested because he had been turned over to the police by the medical personnel and the officers considered the defendant to be under their control. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 (March 17, 2011).pdf

District Court
04/14/2011

Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that his refusal to submit was involuntary and that the officer failed to ascertain whether the emergency personnel had administered medication that affected his ability to understand or comprehend. The Court held that there was no evidence that suggested the defendant was administered medication or that his ability to understand or comprehend was affected. Further, the officer had no duty to inquire into whether any medication was administered to the defendant. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 (April 14, 2011).pdf

District Court
02/18/2011

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No.10-132 Sworn Report

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 (February 18, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer’s testimony at trial concerning an “affidavit” was sufficient evidence to satisfy the statutorily required “sworn report,” despite the different terminology that the officer used. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision and sustained the charge against the defendant.

District Court
02/18/2011

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 Rights for use at Station

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 (February 18, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the defendant was properly informed of the penalties associated with a refusal to submit to a chemical test by the “Right for use of Station” even though the seventy-five dollar license reinstatement fee was not specifically enumerated therein. The reinstatement of a suspended license is optional, and, therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of the specific amount of the fee. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant.

District Court
02/18/2011

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 Collateral Estoppel

Collateral Estoppel

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply because the defendant impliedly waived her right to argue the issue of whether or not she was the operator of the vehicle by taking the stand and testifying that she was, in fact, the operator. Despite the defendant’s contention that the state failed to establish that she was the operator of the vehicle in prior proceedings, the defendant’s testimony serve as an implied waiver of her right to argue that issue. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

Leslie Haley v. State of Rhode Island DC, A.A. No. 10-132 (February 18, 2011).pdf

District Court
03/17/2011

Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 Operation of Motor Vehicle

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that he had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the officer never observed the defendant drive, did not administer field sobriety test, and only observed the defendant standing outside of the vehicle when he responded to the scene. The District Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the officer observed the defendant standing “bloodied” next to a vehicle that had recently been in an accident, he admitted that he had been the driver of the vehicle, he admitted to consuming alcohol, he had water and bloodshot eyes, and he emitted an odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 (March 17, 2011).pdf

District Court
11/09/2011

11-0013 Preliminary Breath Test

Patricia Sargent v. State of Rhode Island DC A.A. No. 11-0013 (November 9 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the officer should have been precluded from asking her to submit to a chemical test at the station because she had already refused to take a preliminary breath test (“PBT”) at the scene. The District Court rejected the defendant’s arguments and held that the defendant’s refusal of a PBT did not prevent the officer from subsequently requesting the defendant to submit to a chemical test of her breath. The Court went on to note that the language of § 31-27-2.1(a) stating “[n]o more than two (2) complete tests, one for the presence of intoxicating liquor . . . shall be administered,” did not restrict the number of tests that could be solicited. Additionally, the officer complied with the “none shall be given” language of § 31-27-2.1(b) because the defendant was not given a test after she refused. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
11/09/2011

Patricia Sargent v. State of Rhode Island DC A.A. No.11-0013 Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Tests

Defendant appealed the decision if the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The District Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence without including the testimony about the field sobriety test (FST). The state decided to not include the FST because the defendant claimed she failed the FST due to her back problems. The Court noted that the state was not required by law to not include the FST results. However, the state relied on the defendant nearly getting into an accident, having watery and blood shot eyes, smelling of alcohol, and exhibiting a lack of steadiness to prove the defendant was operating her vehicle under the influence. Also, the Court found that it was immaterial whether or not the defendant has an innocent explanation for why she appeared under the influence. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Patricia Sargent v. State of Rhode Island DC A.A. No. 11-0013 (November 9 2011).pdf

District Court
10/18/2011

Stephen Beauregard v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0104 Right to an Independent Medical Examination

Stephen Beauregard v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0104 (October 18, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court held that the defendant’s right to an independent medical examination was not violated because the defendant never expressed a desire to have one. The defendant was informed of his rights and given notice. The statute does not require the state to prove the officer provided the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to get an independent medical examination. However, the Court went on to state that even if a reasonable opportunity was necessary, in this case, the state demonstrated that the officer did give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to get an independent medical examination. In State v. Langella, 650 A.2d 478 (R.I. 1994) one phone call was enough to satisfy that a defendant was given reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent medical examination. Thus, because the defendant was given one phone call, the Court found that the defendant was given a reasonable opportunity. Accordingly, the violation against the defendant was sustained.

District Court
10/18/2011

Stephen Beauregard v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0104 Telephone Call

Stephen Beauregard v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-0104 (October 18, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court held that the right to a confidential phone call does not apply to defendants charged with only a civil violation. However, the Court went on to note that even if the defendant did have the right to a confidential phone call, it was not violated because the defendant was awarded one phone call and the officer was a few feet away. Lastly, even if that was not considered a confidential phone call, the Court held that the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20 (Right to a Confidential Phone Call) does not warrant a dismissal in this case.

District Court
02/22/2011

Dennis DeCorpo v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0052 Telephone Call

Dennis DeCorpo v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0052 (February 22, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1(refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20 (right to a confidential phone call) does not apply to civil violations. Further, even if it did apply, the defendant’s right to a confidential phone call was not breached. Moreover even if the defendant did have a right to a confidential phone call and it was breached, the proper remedy would not be dismissal. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
06/09/2010

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010) Reasonable Grounds

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). Defendant argued that the Officer did not have reasonable grounds to warrant a second chemical test to determine the presence of drugs or a controlled substance. The Panel noted that the Officer observed the Defendant operating his vehicle erratically at twice the posted speed limit during inclement weather. After stopping the Defendant the Officer observed that he smelled of alcohol, had “glassy” eyes, was driving in the opposite direction of his intended location, failed two field sobriety tests, and was in possession of two bottles of pills. The Panel held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant was impaired by alcohol or drugs, and after a breathalyzer test ruled out alcohol as the cause of the Defendant’s impairment, the Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the cause of the Defendant’s impairment was prescription or illicit drugs. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

District Court
02/09/2010

City of Warwick v. Eric Alhborg, A.A. No. 09-152 Reasonable grounds/Probable Cause

City of Warwick v. Eric Alhborg, A.A. No. 09-152 (February 9, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence and request that he submit to a chemical test because the defendant had committed motor vehicle violations, emitted an odor of alcohol, had slurred speech, glossy eyes, and admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. Accordingly, the Court found that the factual findings of the trial magistrate were not clearly erroneous and the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in finding a violation of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Thus, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
03/02/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Kyle Losek, A.A. No. 08-167 27(a)

Dismissal

The Coventry town solicitor dismissed the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and the state appealed to the Appeals Panel which affirmed the dismissal. Here, the state appealed the decision of the Traffic Tribunal Appeals Panel. Citing to the case of State of Rhode Island v. Mark Shallcross, A.A. No. 2008-159 (March 2, 2009), the court held that the Attorney General’s authority to prosecute refusal cases does not preempt the filing of a Rule 27(a) dismissal form by a police or municipal prosecutor. Furthermore, the Attorney General’s authority to prosecute refusal cases is not exclusive. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel dismissing the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Kyle Losek, A.A. No. 08-167 (March 2, 2009).pdf

District Court
11/19/2009

Matthew Cohen v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-84 Sworn Report

Matthew Cohen v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-84 (November 19, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Pursuant to Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993), the District Court held that testimony regarding an officer’s sworn report may correct a defect in that report or the absence of the report from the evidence. Here, there was no evidence that the arresting officer ever produced a sworn report. Consequently, an element of the violation was not proven. Accordingly, the District Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Panel and dismissed the charge against the defendant.

District Court
06/09/2009

City of Warwick v. Nicole Cianci A.A. No.09-202 Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Warwick Police failed to comply with the defendant’s request to produce certain documents. The Court held that by making multiple discovery requests and filing a motion to compel, the defendant did all that was required of her under Rule 11 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure to procure the requested material. The defendant was not required to subpoena the Warwick Police under Rule 12. Furthermore, dismissals have been warranted for less egregious behavior than ignoring a discovery order for 19 months. Therefore, the Court reversed the Appeals Panel majority and dismissed the charge against the defendant, holding that the trial magistrate’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion.

City of Warwick v. Nicole Cianci A.A. No. 09-202 (June 9, 2009) McLoughlin, J.-.pdf

District Court
11/03/2009

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-66 Rights for use at Scene/Station

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No.: 09-66 (November 3, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant contended that the “Rights” cards in general, and its mention of the right to a confidential phone call, created an impression that he had the right to the advice of counsel before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test. The Court held that the language of the “Rights” cards is easily reconciled with the rule in Dunn v. Petit, 388 A.2d 809 (1978) that there is no right to counsel at the moment of the decision as to whether or not to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
11/03/2009

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-66- Opportunity to Make a Phone Call

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No.: 09-66 (November 3, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the right established by R.I.G.L § 12-7-20 to make a phone call within one hour of the arrest is exercised when the defendant makes a phone call; it is not necessary that the defendant actually make contact with an attorney. Here, the defendant was provided with this opportunity by the arresting officers. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
11/03/2009

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-66- Inability to “Cure” a Refusal by Subsequently Submitting

Inability to Cure a Refusal by Subsequently Submitting

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that there was no statutory mechanism in Rhode Island allowing a defendant to cure an initial decision to refuse a chemical test. Further, as of the time of the hearing, there was no controlling precedent from the R.I. Supreme Court on the issue. Additionally, the Court declined to fashion such a curative measure when the General Assembly had yet to take on the issue. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No.: 09-66 (November 3, 2009).pdf

District Court
07/02/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Michelle Hojeily, A.A. No. 09-00086 Right for use at Station

State of Rhode Island v. Michelle Hojeily.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the arresting officer was not required to reread the “Rights for Use at Station” form to the defendant before a second chemical test (blood test) was administered because the form had been read to the defendant before the first administered chemical test (breathalyzer). Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
12/03/2009

Abel Pedroso v. RITT, A.A. No.09-133 Credibility

Abel Pedroso v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-133 (December 3, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). After producing a deficient sample, the trooper instructed the defendant how to properly take the test for a second time. The defendant then failed to blow into the mouthpiece as instructed and the trooper advised the defendant that he would be charged with refusal. After a review of the entire record, the Court held that there was substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to sustain the charge against the defendant. Since the decisions of the trial judge and the Appeals Panel were not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
07/01/2009

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, A.A. No. 09-113 Rights for use at Station

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, A.A. No. 09-113 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that there was substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that there was no confusion or prejudice where the arresting officer read the defendant and another defendant their rights at the same time. Since the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed that decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
07/01/2009

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, A.A. No. 09-113 – Counstitutional Issues

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, A.A. No. 09-113 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protections against an unreasonable “search” of defendant’s breath did not apply here because the defendant refused to submit to a breath test, and no such test was administered. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
01/13/2009

Richard Porter v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-113- Rights for use at Scene/Station

Richard Porter v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-113 (January 13, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that there was substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that there was no confusion or prejudice where the arresting officer read the defendant and another defendant their rights at the same time. Since the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
11/03/2009

Marcus Thomas v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-66 Rights for Use at Station

District Court
06/30/2009

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 Sworn Report

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 (June 30, 2009) Rahill, J..pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), § 31-15-11 (laned roadways), and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the state’s failure to introduce the arresting officer’s sworn report into evidence was of no consequence pursuant to Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345 (R.I. 1993). Since the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charges against the defendant was not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
06/30/2009

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), § 31-15-11 (laned roadways), and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by trial magistrate’s failure to allow the defendant’s counsel to review the arresting officer’s field sobriety test pocket reference guide. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 (June 30, 2009) Rahill, J..pdf

District Court
06/30/2009

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No.09-00023-Coercion by Officer

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 (June 30, 2009) Rahill, J..pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), § 31-15-11 (laned roadways), and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the defendant was not coerced into refusing to submit because he independently chose to refuse to submit where he wanted to get out of jail and thought that refusing would get him out of jail. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
06/30/2009

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), § 31-15-11 (laned roadways), and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that defendant was “clearly placed under arrest,” as required by §31-27-2.1 because he was restrained in handcuffs and driven to the police department in the back seat of a cruiser. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

Town of Bristol v. Frank Polverino A.A. No. 09-00023 (June 30, 2009) Rahill, J..pdf

District Court
11/17/2009

James Hovey v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-61-Coercion by Officer

James Hovey v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-61 (November 17, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-21 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that even if the officer had said to the defendant “You don’t want to take the test do you?”, that statement does not rise to the level of coercion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against defendant.

District Court
07/30/2009

Robert Malo v. RITT, A.A.No. 09-102-Constructive Refusal to Submit

Robert Malo v. RITT, A.A. No. 09-00102 (July 30, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that an officer has no obligation to wait for a defendant to speak to an attorney before charging a defendant with refusal to submit. Furthermore, the defendant’s delay in giving a definite answer as to whether or not he would take a chemical test constituted a constructive refusal to submit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
07/15/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Deborah Casey A.A. No. 09-0040- Dismissal 27(a)

Dismissal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant was found guilty after a trial of refusal to submit to a chemical test. After sentence was imposed, the prosecutor attempted to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 27(a). When the trial court refused to accept the dismissal the defendant filed an appeal. The District Court held that a Rule 27(A) does not permit a dismissal after a final judgment has been entered. Since the decision of the trial magistrate rejecting the prosecutor’s attempt to dismiss the case was not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed the charge against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Deborah Casey A.A. No. 09-0040.pdf

District Court
03/27/2009

Joann Maiorano v. RITT A.A. No.09-20 Jurisdictional Issues

Joann Maiorano v. RITT A.A. No. 09-20.pdf

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s dismissal of the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-21 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that a Warwick Police Officer who started following the defendant’s car in Warwick did not have the jurisdiction to make an arrest in West Warwick. The District Court held that when a driver’s poor conduct takes place over a span of two jurisdictions, the officer can effectuate a proper arrest in a jurisdiction outside the borders of their own as long as conduct warranting the traffic stop took place in the arresting officer’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, since the defendant was clearly in Warwick when the officer began to monitor her conduct, the arrest in West Warwick was proper. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
08/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the defendant was driving erratically, reasonable suspicion to stop existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
12/03/2008

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions). The Court held that where the defendant came to a screeching halt in an intersection and then cross over the double yellow line, there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 (December 3, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/12/2008

John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-6 (yielding to emergency vehicles). The Court held that where the defendant was driving erratically, crossed over the double yellow line, and crossed into the breakdown lane, reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant existed. Furthermore, the icy, slushy road conditions did not affect the reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 (August 12, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/05/2008

Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99, Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the defendant drove erratically by abruptly cutting across a lane onto an exit without using his directional, crossed over the cement chatter strip, stopped on the exit ramp, and then speed up once the arresting officer pulled behind him, there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. Furthermore, the fact that the other charges for motor vehicle violations which created the reasonable suspicion were dropped, does not destroy the reasonable suspicion for the stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 (August 5, 2008).pdf

District Court
10/24/2008

Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 Probable Cause

Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 (October 24, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

John McLoughlin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the officer testified that the defendant failed field sobriety tests and, based on an objective analysis, believed that the defendant was under the influence, probable cause to arrest existed. Furthermore, the defendant’s subjective state of mind at the time of the officer’s observations is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John McLoughlin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test are admissible for probable cause purposes. Furthermore, where the defendant failed field sobriety tests of physical dexterity as well as the HGN, probable cause for arrest existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/12/2008

John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 Probable Cause

John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 (August 12, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-6 (yielding to emergency vehicles). The Court held that where the defendant was driving erratically, crossed over the double yellow line and then into the breakdown lane, had slurred speech and emitted a strong smell of alcohol on his breath, reasonable grounds to stop the defendant existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
08/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 Arrest Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the officer’s testimony was not “sworn” because he did not say he was swearing under oath or raise his right hand. The Court held that the “sworn report” referred to in § 31-27-2.1 is entirely separate from the testimony of the officer and the actual prosecution of a refusal to submit. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether or not the officer raised his right hand or said he was swearing to his testimony at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

John McLoughlin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the pre-adjudication suspension of a driver’s license when an officer makes a sworn report is completely separate from the prosecution for refusal to submit to a chemical test. Therefore, any deficiencies in the report do not require dismissal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John McLoughlin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/05/2008

Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the arresting officer’s sworn report was admitted for the limited purpose of showing compliance with procedural law, and neither for the truth of the matter asserted nor to determine guilt or innocence. Therefore, the admission of the sworn report was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 (August 5, 2008).pdf

District Court
02/11/2008

Brian Priest v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 07-107 Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the decision of the trial court, which dismissed the charge of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer’s sworn report pertains only to the preliminary suspension of the driver’s license and not to the hearing on the merits. Therefore, the failure to file the arresting officer’s sworn report is not grounds for dismissal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the case for a new trial. Brian Priest v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 07-107 (February 11, 2008).pdf

District Court
12/15/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Jason Brown, A.A. No. 08-17 Right to Appeal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that since the Appeals Panel decision was mailed on February 1 and the defendant appealed that decision on February 12, the appeal was not timely because it was not within the ten day statutory period for an appeal. Furthermore, even though the state failed to raise this issue, the Court has the authority to raise it sua sponte. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal because it lacked the authority to hear the matter.State of Rhode Island v. Jason Brown, A.A. No. 08-17 (December 15, 2008).pdf

District Court
01/07/2008

Samuel Livermore v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-61 Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-3-18 (failure to display a registration plate), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-5 (operating without insurance). The arresting officer gave detailed testimony describing the defendant failing all three field sobriety tests. Defendant’s only evidence to rebut the officer’s testimony was the testimony of a passenger with a limited view of the defendant who stated that the defendant was “doing alright” when performing the tests. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charge. Furthermore, only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.Samuel Livermore v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-61 (January 7, 2008).pdf

District Court
07/23/2008

Richard Dilorio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-20 Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). Defendant contends that the trial judge gave weight to the state’s evidence and did not give weight to his own evidence. However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.Richard Dilorio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-20 (July 23, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

John McLouglin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argues that he was not given an opportunity to make a confidential phone call. However, the officer testified that the defendant was afforded the right to make a confidential phone call, but asked the officer to enter the room to answer the questions of the person defendant was talking to. The Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses and, accordingly, affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendantJohn McLoughlin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/12/2008

John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-6 (yielding to emergency vehicles). Defendant argued that the arresting officer was not credible because there were inconsistencies in his testimony and he could not remember the name of the Notary Public who notarized his affidavit. However, the Court held the only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 (August 12, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 RIghts for Use

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the officer read the defendant the Rights for use at Scene/Station cards and suggested that the defendant make a phone call before submitting to the test, defendant was in fact afforded a right to make a confidential phone call. Furthermore, the officer’s attempt to answer the defendant’s confusing line of questions regarding his rights did not vitiate the information provided on the Rights cards. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the officer read the defendant the Rights for use at Scene/Station cards and suggested that the defendant make a phone call before submitting to the test, the defendant was in fact afforded a right to make a confidential phone call. Furthermore, the officer’s attempt to answer the defendant’s confusing line of questions regarding his rights did not vitiate the information provided on the Rights cards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/05/2008

Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the defendant was informed of his rights by a reading of the Rights for use at Scene/Station cards, and where he then declined to make a phone call, the defendant was in fact afforded an opportunity to make a confidential phone call. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 (August 5, 2008).pdf

District Court
06/05/2008

State of Rhode Island v. George Schoof, A.A. No. 08-15 Missing/Incomplete Transcript

Missing or Incomplete Transcript

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the decision of the trial court which sustained the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where a technological malfunction caused a substantial portion of the trial record to be unavailable and where the Court was unable to conduct a meaningful review of the matter, the proper remedy was to remand the matter for a new trial. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Appeals Panel dismissing the charge against the defendant and remanded the matter for new trial.State of Rhode Island v. Geoge Schoof, A.A. No. 08-15 (June 5, 2008).pdf

District Court
10/24/2008

Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant argued that the trial judge and Appeals Panel lacked the constitutional authority to enter valid judgments against the defendant because they were appointed prior to the enactment of Article X, Section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution and in a manner inconsistent with that section. The Court held that Article X, Section 4 should not be applied retroactively and all judges and magistrates lawfully appointed prior to the enactment of that section have the authority to enter valid judgments. Furthermore, the magistrates at issue have been legally appointed under Article IX, Section 5 and R.I.G.L. § 8-8.2-1. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the appeals panel sustaining the charges against the defendant. Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 (October 24, 2008).pdf

District Court
10/24/2008

Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that the field sobriety tests did not violate the defendant’s 5th Amendment right against self incrimination because the tests are not “communication” or “testimony” and the defendant consented to them. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charges against the defendant.Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 (October 24, 2008).pdf

District Court
10/24/2008

Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that where the defendant was arrested but only charged with civil offenses and not a criminal offense, the defendant is still an “arrested” person under § 31-27-2.1. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charges against the defendant.Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 (October 24, 2008).pdf

District Court
02/11/2008

Brian Priest v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 07-107 27(a)

Dismissal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed the charge of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that Rule 27(a) of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules does not apply to a town solicitor making a recommendation for dismissal. Therefore, the refusal charge should not be dismissed in this case based on Rule 27(a). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the case for new trial.Brian Priest v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 07-107 (February 11, 2008).pdf

District Court
07/23/2008

Richard Dilorio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-20 Double Charge

Double Charging

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). Defendant claimed that he was not informed that he could be charged with driving under the influence after he refused to submit to a chemical test and, therefore, the charge of violating §31-27-2.1 should be dismissed. However, the Court held that neither case law nor state statute supports this contention. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.Richard Dilorio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-20 (July 23, 2008).pdf

District Court
12/03/2008

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions). Defendant argued that he was advised of incorrect penalties for his refusal to submit to a chemical test. The Court held that the issue was resolved in Such v. State, 950A.2d 1150 (R.I. 2008) and simply refers the reader to that case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 (December 3, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/12/2008

John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-6 (yielding to emergency vehicles). Defendant argued that he was advised of incorrect penalties for his refusal to submit to a chemical test. The Court held that the issue was resolved in Such v. State, 950A.2d 1150 (R.I. 2008) and simply refers the reader to that case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against defendant.
(Note: In Such v. State of Rhode Island, 950A.2d 1150 (R.I. 2008), the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that a budget bill which added a $200 assessment to the refusal statute (§ 31-27-2.1) was not intended to negate the penalties in the refusal statute. Instead, the Court ruled that both the budget bill and the refusal statute would be operative in assessing the penalties for violating §31-27-2.1.)John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 (August 12, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/05/2008

Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the defendant raised the same issue as that which was raised in Such v. State of Rhode Island, 950A.2d 1150 (R.I. 2008). That decision renders the issue moot in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against defendant.
(Note: In Such v. State of Rhode Island, 950A.2d 1150 (R.I. 2008), the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that a budget bill which added a $200 assessment to the refusal statute (§ 31-27-2.1) was not intended to negate the penalties in the refusal statute. Instead, the Court ruled that both the budget bill and the refusal statute would be operative in assessing the penalties for violating §31-27-2.1.)Eric McNamara v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 09-99 (August 5, 2008).pdf

District Court
08/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the officer read the defendant the Rights for use at Scene/Station cards and suggested that the defendant make a phone call before submitting to the test, defendant was in fact afforded a right to make a confidential phone call. Furthermore, the officer’s attempt to answer the defendant’s confusing line of questions regarding his rights did not vitiate the information provided on the Rights cards. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

District Court
12/03/2008

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65- Reasonable grounds/ Probable Cause

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 (December 3, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions). The Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest because the defendant came to a screeching halt and then crossed over the double yellow lines, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, had slurred speech, had an open beer can in his vehicle, and failed the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the violations against the defendant.

District Court
12/03/2008

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65- Credibility

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 (December 3, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions). The defendant argued that he was not intoxicated and his medication caused him to appear to be intoxicated. Furthermore, the bartender where the defendant had been drinking on the night in question corroborated that he was not intoxicated. However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.

District Court
08/29/2008

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64-Preliminary Breath Test

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the results of the defendant’s preliminary breath test were used solely for the purpose of establishing probable cause and were not prejudicial to the finder of fact. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
08/29/2008

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No.08-64- Right to Independent Medical Examination

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the officer’s reading of the Rights for Use at Scene and Station were sufficient to inform the defendant of his right to an independent medical examination. Here, the defendant chose not to make a phone call and presented no evidence that he requested an independent medical examination. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
08/29/2008

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64-Opportunity to make a Phone Call

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the officer’s reading of the Rights for Use at Scene and Station were sufficient to inform the defendant of his right to make a phone call for the purpose of obtaining bail money. Defendant chose not to make a phone call and was denied bail solely upon his inability to post the cash required for his release. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
08/29/2008

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No.08-64-Reasonable Grounds/ Probable Cause

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that where the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath, fumbled when producing paperwork, swayed when exiting the vehicle, and failed field sobriety tests, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
08/29/2008

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64-Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that where the defendant was speeding and crossed over the double yellow line three times, there was reasonable suspicion to stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
08/29/2008

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. 08-64 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the trial magistrate’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a continuance in order to prepare for the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s alleged marijuana possession constituted harmless error, because the trial magistrate was not influenced by the marijuana evidence in deciding to sustain the charge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

District Court
03/13/2007

Dina Ricciardelli v. State, A.A. No. 06-107 Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that in determining whether reasonable suspicion to stop existed, the totality of the circumstances must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable police officer. Here, because the defendant’s car was stopped in a travel lane of a city road, she drove off when she saw the officer, and had a disheveled appearance, there was reasonable suspicion to stop her. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and sustained the charge against the defendant.Dina Ricciardelli v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 06-107 (2007).pdf

District Court
01/25/2007

John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). The Court held that where the defendant was stopped at a green light, partially over the white line, slumped over the steering wheel, emitted a moderate odor of alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests, the officer had reasonable grounds to request the defendant to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant. John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 (January 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
11/08/2007

John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that where the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, and failed the two field sobriety test that were administered, reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 (November 8, 2007).pdf

District Court
10/25/2007

R. Jason Gulati v. RITT, A.A. No. 07-12 Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that although the officer’s sworn report was not signed, the trial court did not commit any error because it based its decision to sustain the charge on the evidence adduced at trial, namely the sworn testimony of the officer, not the sworn report. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant. R. Jason Gulati v. RITT, A.A. No. 07-12 (October 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
08/06/2007

State of Rhode Island v. Rufus Bothers, A.A. No. 07-103 Rights for Use at Scene

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that although the trial court did not dismiss the charge on the grounds that the Rights for use at Scene Card was not introduced into evidence, the Appeals Panel did invoke this rationale and therefore, this Court must review the Panel’s reasoning. Furthermore, the Court held that recitation of the Rights Cards is not statutorily mandated and that the defendant was sufficiently informed of his right to an independent medical examination where the officer verbally informed him of this right. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision to dismiss the charge against the defendant and remanded the matter for a new trial.State of Rhode Island v. Rufus Bothers, A.A. No. 07-103 (August 6, 2007).pdf

District Court
10/23/2007

State of Rhode Island v. Marc Barsamian, A.A. No. 07-148 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the decision of the trial court dismissing the charge of violating R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), in this, the lead case and related cases. Defendants argued that the Rights for use at Scene and Station forms did not correctly inform them of the penalties that would be imposed for a refusal to submit. They argue that a statute increasing the penalty of license suspension from three-to-six months to six-to-twelve months was repealed by implication, causing the Rights forms to be inaccurate. The Court held that a license suspension is a penalty which must be included among the refusal penalty warnings. Furthermore, the Court held that the statute in question was not repealed by implication and, therefore, the Rights cards correctly informed the defendants of the penalties associated with a refusal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the cases to the Traffic Tribunal with instructions that the charges be reinstated and the matters be assigned for rearraignment.
*Note: the related cases decided along with this decision are: Charles Chatterley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 07-145 and Douglas Monroe v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 07-146. These cases were subject to one opinion issued by the Traffic Tribunal Appeals Panel under the name of a fourth appellant, Michael Galvin.
State of Rhode Island v. Marc Barsamian A.A. No. 07-148 (October 23, 2007).pdf

District Court
11/08/2007

John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced when the prosecution did not provide the defense with the arresting officer’s notes on the back of the Rights form, which only included the defendant’s basic information. Accordingly, dismissal was not warranted, and the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 (November 8, 2007).pdf

District Court
01/25/2007

John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). The Court held that where the defendant was read the Rights for use at Scene and Station forms and made three confidential phone calls to his attorney, there was sufficient evidence that defendant was afforded the right to make a confidential phone call in accordance with § 12-7-20. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charges against the defendant.John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 (January 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
11/08/2007

John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 Phone Call

Inability to Cure a Refusal by Subsequently Submitting

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that the defendant’s rights were not substantially prejudiced by the officer’s presence in the room while defendant made his confidential phone call because the prosecution did not use any information obtained by the officer during the defendant’s call. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 (November 8, 2007).pdf

District Court
01/25/2007

John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 Inability to Cure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). The Court held that Rhode Island law does not allow a defendant to cure a refusal by subsequently agreeing to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, where the defendant refused but subsequently agreed to submit to the test, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against him.John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 (January 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
01/25/2007

John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 Constructive Refusal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). The Court held that the nature of the chemical test required that it be administered within a reasonable time. Defendant’s attempt to delay the test until his attorney arrived constituted a constructive refusal to submit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 (January 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
11/08/2007

John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 Findings of Fact

Trial Judge’s Findings of Facts

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that the trial judge must articulate the findings of facts with sufficient particularity so that an intelligent review may be made. Here, the Court held that the trial judge had done so, considering a majority of the Appeals Panel stated that an intelligent review could be made. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 (November 8, 2007).pdf

District Court
10/25/2007

R. Jason Gulati v. RITT, A.A. No. 07-12 Right to Appeal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the summons was defective, however, the Court held that the defendant waived his right to appeal that issue by failing to raise it at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant. R. Jason Gulati v. RITT, A.A. No. 07-12 (October 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
01/25/2007

John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 Right to Attorney

Right to Counsel

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). The Court held that defendants are only afforded the right to make a confidential phone call and there is no right to counsel prior to the administration of a breathalyzer test. Therefore, the defendant’s argument that no attorney was present when he was charged with refusing to submit is unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 (January 25, 2007).pdf

District Court
02/07/2007

Julie Longtin Sinapi v. RITT, A.A. No 06-92 Right to Attorney

Right to Counsel

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by her inability to reach her attorney where the defendant was afforded the opportunity to make a phone call because there is no right to counsel regarding the decision of whether to refuse or agree to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charge against the defendant.Julie Longtin Sinapi v. RITT, A.A. No 06-92 (February 7, 2007).pdf

District Court
01/05/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Salema, A.A. No. 06-99 Telephone Call

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Salema, A.A. No. 06-99 (January 5, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the officer read the defendant the Rights forms, she was sufficiently informed of her right to a confidential phone call. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
01/05/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Salema, A.A. No. 06-99 Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the presence of the arresting officer, ten feet away from the defendant, when she was making the phone call did not prejudice the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant was not using the phone for the purpose of contacting an attorney and the state did not obtain any information from the phone call for use at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Erin Salema, A.A. No. 06-99 (January 5, 2006).pdf

District Court
02/28/2006

Michael Rollings v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 00-75 Rights for Use

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that it was undisputed that the defendant was read his rights at the scene and at the station. Since the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.Michael Rollings v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 00-75 (February 28, 2006).pdf

District Court
03/20/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No. 03-124 State’s Right to Appeal

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No. 03-124 (March 20, 2006).pdf

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel which reversed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant for the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant argued that the state had no right to appeal because it did not qualify as a “person” under § 31-41.1-9(a). The Court held that the state falls within the definition of “person” under § 31-41.1-9(a) and, therefore, has the right to appeal a decision by a lower court based on State v. Resmini, A.A. No. 01-99 (R.I. Dist. Ct. 2003), State v. Lynch, A.A. No. 02-18 (R.I. Dist. Ct. 2003), and State v. Cunha, A.A. No. 01-07 (R.I. Dist. Ct. 2001).

District Court
03/20/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No.03-124 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No. 03-124 (March 20, 2006).pdf

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant for the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The state argued that probable cause existed because the defendant was seated behind the steering wheel with the key in the ignition in the “on” position, appeared to be asleep in a car that had just been in an accident, emitted the odor of alcohol from her breath, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech. The Court held that “all that is needed at the arrest phase is for one of the reasonable interpretations of the facts and circumstances to establish probable cause,” citing Pound v. State, A.A. No. 02-40, 15-16 (R.I. 03 ) quoting State v. Bruno, 709 A.2d 1048 (R.I. 1998). The District Court held that “based on the mosaic of facts surrounding the circumstances available to the officer,” one reasonable interpretation of the facts pointed to the probability that the defendant had operated the vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and thus, held that probable cause existed. Accordingly, the District Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Panel and reinstated the decision of the trial judge finding the defendant guilty of the violation.

District Court
03/20/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No. 03-124 Sworn Report

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No. 03-124 (March 20, 2006).pdf

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test.) Section 31-27-2.1(b) states the requirements for immediate license suspension in connection with a refusal to submit charge and allows the trial magistrate to suspend a license on receipt of a “report” by a law enforcement officer. Section 31-27-2.1(c) states the basis for sustaining a refusal charge and allows the trial magistrate to sustain the charge after finding that the officer making a “sworn report” had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant operated under the influence. The defendant argued that the “report” referred to in § 31-27-2.1(b) is the same as the “sworn report” mentioned in § 31-27-2.1(c). The District Court held that the “reports” were different and the conviction of § 31-27-2.1(c) was not dependent on filing a report pursuant to § 31-27-2.1(b). Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

District Court
08/24/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No.06-25 – Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25 (August 24, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial court’s decision to dismiss the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering a private road or driveway). The Court held that a police officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Here, court held that the officer made a lawful stop because he witnessed the defendant driving erratically and almost collided with a police vehicle. Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the case back to the trial magistrate.

District Court
08/24/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25-Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25 (August 24, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the violations of a R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering a private road or driveway). The Court held that probable cause to arrest is determined by the totality of the circumstances pursuant to State v. Castro, 891 A.2d 848, 853 (R.I. 2006). Here, the District Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest because the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, and failed two field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the case back to the trial magistrate.

District Court
02/28/2006

Michael Rollings v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 00-75 Rights for Use at Station

District Court
01/12/2006

Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84- Reasonable grounds/Probable Cause

State of Rhode Island v. Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84 (January 12, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The Court held that although the trial judge referred to the standard being used as reasonable suspicion, he did in fact apply the proper reasonable grounds standard. The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds because the defendant drove erratically, crossed over the double yellow line, emitted the odor of alcohol on his breath, had red watery eyes, had difficulty producing his registration, had three empty beer cans in his car, and failed the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violations against the defendant.

District Court
01/12/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84- Credibility

State of Rhode Island v. Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84 (January 12, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the officer because of inconsistencies between his testimony and his report. However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.

District Court
01/12/2006

Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84 – Physical inability to submit

Physical Inability to Submit to a Chemical Test

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-15-1 (right half of road). Following Porcaro v. R.I.T.T., A.A. No. 01-12 (DeRobbio, C.J.), the Court held that the burden of proof is on the motorist to show that he or she was physically incapable of submitting to a chemical test. Absent an obvious incapacitating injury, the defendant must provide expert testimony corroborating the injury and the injury’s effect on taking a chemical test. Here, the evidence offered by the defendant was vague and only showed the existence of an injury, not how the injury would prevent him from taking a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charges against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84 (January 12, 2006).pdf

District Court
08/15/2006

State of Rhode Island v. John Davis, A.A. No. 06-48-Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

State of Rhode Island v. John Davis, A.A. No. 06-48 (August 15, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-2 (manner of turning at intersection) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). The District Court held that where the defendant failed to stop at two stop signs, made a wide turn, and moved into the lane of oncoming traffic, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations against the defendant.

District Court
08/15/2006

State of Rhode Island v. John Davis, A.A. No. 06-48-Reasonable Grounds/Probabale Cause

State of Rhode Island v. John Davis, A.A. No. 06-48 (August 15, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-2 (manner of turning at intersection) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). The District Court held that where the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath, admitted that he had consumed six beers, stumbled when exiting the car, failed one field sobriety test and said he could not perform two other field sobriety tests because of his bum knee, the officer had probable cause to arrest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
02/28/2006

Michael Rollings A.A. No. 00-75 Reasonable Grounds/ Probable Cause

Michael Rollings v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 00-75 (February 28, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant because the defendant was speeding, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath, and admitted to consuming alcohol. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
08/24/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25- Credibility Determinations

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25 (August 24, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial court’s decision to dismiss the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and §31-17-5 (entering a private road or driveway). Defendant argued that all of the elements of R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and that the state failed to meet its burden. The District Court held that there was sufficient evidence in the record showing that the officer had asked the defendant to submit to a chemical test. Further, the fact that the officer wrote “refused to sign” on the Rights for Use at Station form and the defendant admitted on the record that he did not take the chemical test was sufficient evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial magistrate.

District Court
02/02/2006

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103 Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103 (February 2, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the dismissal of a laned roadway violation charge of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 was not grounds for dismissal of the refusal charge. The officer’s observation of the defendant crossing the double yellow line was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, even though the charge of violation of § 31-15-11 was dismissed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
02/02/2006

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103-Coercion by Officer

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103 (February 2, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the trooper’s testimony that he did not coerce or try to persuade the defendant in any way in making his decision whether or not to submit to the chemical test was sufficient evidence to affirm the trial court’s decision. The plaintiff failed to provide even a scintilla of evidence pointing to coercion. Since the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
02/02/2006

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No.05-103-Credibility Determinations

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103 (February 2, 2006).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the officer because of inconsistencies between his testimony and his report. However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.

District Court
02/02/2006

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that having a Special Assistant Attorney General provide the final argument following questioning by a Rule 9 law student did not violate Rule 2 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, which provides that the tribunal shall provide for the fair administration of civil trials. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against the defendant.

David Dunigan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 05-103 (February 2, 2006).pdf

District Court
05/11/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Erich Augenstein, A.A. No. 05-62 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrates decision to grant the state’s motion for a continuance of the appeal. The District Court held that defendant’s appeal was a request for interlocutory review because no final judgment was entered and, therefore, was not permitted under the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure. Furthermore, the motion for continuance did not affect defendant’s rights in any way. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

State of Rhode Island v. Erich Augenstein, A.A. No. 05-62 (May 11, 2006).pdf

District Court
08/24/2006

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25- Identification

Identifying the Defendant

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-17-5 (entering a private road or driveway). Defendant argued that he was not properly identified in court and the reversal by the Appeals Panel was unwarranted. The District Court held that the trial magistrate’s decision was clearly erroneous because in his testimony the defendant identified himself as the person taken to the police station on the night in question and the arresting officer identified the defendant in court as the driver of the vehicle. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the case back to the trial magistrate.

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25 (August 24, 2006).pdf

District Court
11/08/2005

Alan Lunsmann v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-55 Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the defendant was driving erratically and the police received two anonymous tips, there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against the defendant. Alan Lunsmann v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-55 (November 8, 2005).pdf

District Court
11/08/2005

Alan Lunsmann v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-55 Anonymous Tips

Alan Lunsmann v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-55 (November 8, 2005).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The issue in this case was whether a tip received by police provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle for suspicion of driving under the influence. Here, the District Court concluded that there was a sufficient basis to create reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because two anonymous callers provided information that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence; the callers provided information such as the make, model, license plate, and direction of travel of the defendant’s vehicle, which allowed the police to identify the vehicle immediately; and the police observed the vehicle turn “kind of erratically” into the driveway of a school. The Court went on to note that there was a sense of urgency that did not allow the officers an opportunity to follow the car to make independent observations without placing the driver, or other drivers, in danger if the tip was accurate. Additionally, the intrusion of the stop was minimal, because, if the driver had not shown indicia of intoxication, then he would have been released. Consequently, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Alan Lunsmann v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-55 (November 8, 2005).pdf

District Court
11/08/2005

Alan Lunsmann v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-55 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant made a motion for stay of administrative sanctions from the District Court’s decision sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), pending action by the Supreme Court on defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Court held that in order to grant a stay the moving party must make a strong showing that it will prevail on the merits of the appeal, suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted, no substantial harm will come to other interested parties, and a stay will not harm the public interest. The defendant failed on all four issues and accordingly, the Court denied the motion.

District Court
11/17/2005

State of Rhode Island v. Laurence H. Banigan, III. 04-40- Anonymous Tip

State of Rhode Island v. Laurence H. Banigan, III, A.A. No. 04-40.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because the officer corroborated the anonymous tip when he observed the defendant lose his balance on his motorcycle. Accordingly, the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against the defendant was affirmed.

District Court
07/13/2005

James Carr v. RITT, A.A. No. 03-101 Availability of Breathalyzer Machine/ Operator

Availability of a Breathalyzer Machine/ Operator

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) . The District Court held that there is no requirement that the arresting officer show a defendant that a breathalyzer machine and operator were available at the time of refusal in order to sustain the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

James Carr v. RITT, A.A. 03-101 (July 13, 2005).pdf

District Court
10/18/2005

Jimmie Boisvert v. RITT, A.A. No. 05-61-Penalty

Penalty

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-47-9 (operation without proof of insurance). The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he operated his vehicle without insurance and held that the trial court acted within its statutorily proscribed discretion by suspending the defendant’s license for four months. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the violations against the defendant.

Jimmie Boisvert v. RITT, A.A. 05-61 (October 18, 2005).pdf

District Court
10/18/2005

Jimmie Boisvert v. RITT, A.A. No. 05-61- Coersion by Officer

Jimmie Boisvert v. RITT, A.A. 05-61 (October 18, 2005).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (operation without proof of insurance). The defendant claimed that the arresting officer coerced him into refusing the test by telling him that if he refused then he would only go to court a few times and the charge would be dismissed. To the contrary, the officer testified that over his ten years of policing he has never offered any legal advice. The Court held this was substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support the trial magistrate’s decision that the defendant was not coerced by the arresting officer. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against the defendant.

District Court
12/21/2005

Pavel Kovner v. RITT, A.A. No.05-13 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Pavel Kovner v. RITT, A.A. No. 05-13 (December 21, 2005).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the arresting officer possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest where the defendant crossed the double yellow line multiple times and drove into the curb. The fact that defendant was not charged with that exact arrestable offense is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against defendant.

District Court
12/21/2005

Pavel Kovner v. RITT, A.A. No. 05-13 Jurisdicitional Issues

Pavel Kovner v. RITT, A.A. No. 05-13 (December 21, 2005).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that although the officer stopped the defendant over the boundary line in another jurisdiction, the officer had probable cause for arrest based on events that he observed within his jurisdiction, including crossing the double yellow line multiple times and driving into a curb. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
04/21/2004

Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant claimed that the citing officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and further contended that because he was not penalized for violating § 31-20-9 it could not constitute a basis for the stop. However, the District Court held that reasonable grounds existed to stop the defendant because the officer observed the defendant violate § 31-20-9 when he failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. Furthermore, after stopping the defendant, the officer observed indicia of intoxication, sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence, because the defendant slurred his speech, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, had bloodshot and watery eyes, was unsteady on his feet, and failed field sobriety tests. The failure of the magistrate to impose a penalty for violating § 31-20-9 does not affect whether reasonable grounds existed for refusal to submit. Accordingly the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 (April 21, 2004).pdf

District Court
04/21/2004

Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant claimed that the officer’s testimony was not credible and that, therefore, the Appeals Panel erred in failing to overturn his conviction. However, the District Court held that only the fact-finder may asses the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, the Court held that the Appeals Panel’s decision was not clearly erroneous and sustained the violation against the defendant.Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 (April 21, 2004).pdf

District Court
04/21/2004

Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 Constructive Refusal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant claimed that the actions of the police resulted in an “involuntary constructive refusal” charge because he was denied bail on the night of his arrest and, therefore, denied the ability to obtain exonerating evidence. However, the District Court held that the Appeals Panel’s decision was not clearly erroneous because there was evidence on record that the defendant was properly informed of the rights and penalties pursuant to § 31-27-2.1. Furthermore, the Court found that there were no facts to support the defendant’s theory of “involuntary constructive refusal.” Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 (April 21, 2004).pdf

District Court
04/21/2004

Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 Appeal

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant claimed that the state had no right to appeal because the defendant was exonerated on December 1, 2001, 4 days before an amendment on December 5, 2001, to Rule 21 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, that allowed the state a right to appeal. However, the District Court held that the amendment to Rule 21 did not establish the state’s right to appeal, but only clarified the state’s right to appeal. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 (April 21, 2004).pdf

District Court
03/24/2004

Sharon Gagne Smith v. RITT, A.A. No. 03-123 Missing Transcript

Missing or Incomplete Transcript

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). Defendant failed to submit a transcript of the hearing for review to the Appeals Panel. The District Court held that the Appeals Panel’s decision sustaining the violations against the defendant was not clearly erroneous because they were unable to adequately review the record for errors of fact or law due to the defendant’s failure to submit a transcript of the hearing. Additionally, after determining that the Appeals Panel had not erred, the Court reviewed the record and listened to the electronic recording of the hearing and determined that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by the evidence of record. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violations against the defendant. Sharon Gagne Smith v. RITT, A.A. No. 03-123 (March 24, 2004).pdf

District Court
05/20/2004

State of Rhode Island v. Samang Phim, A.A. No. 003-125 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

State of Rhode Island v. Samang Phim, A.A. No. 003-125 (May 20, 2004).pdf

Defendant was charged with violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The trial court held that the defendant could not knowingly and voluntarily refuse to submit because of his inability to understand English and dismissed the charge. Upon the State’s appeal of the dismissal, the Appeals Panel then remanded the case to the trial court for lack of findings of fact and law to support its decision. Defendant now appeals the decision of the Appeals Panel. Here, the Court held that the Appeals Panel did not abuse its discretion when remanding the case. The record shows that the trial magistrate did not provide sufficient findings of fact or law to support the dismissal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the finding of the Appeals Panel that the decision of the trial magistrate was not supported by substantial, probative, and reliable evidence. The Court then reversed the order of the Appeals Panel remanding for a new hearing. The Court held, unless the same trial magistrate is available, the case must be remanded for a new trial.

District Court
06/11/2004

April Kuzdeba v. RITT, A.A. No. A.A. No. 02-82 Constitutional Issues

April Kuzdeba v. RITT, A.A. No. 02-82 (June 11, 2004).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trail magistrate’s dismissal of the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that it was not improper for the state to ask what the trial magistrate would expect the state to prove in future cases. The Court held that this would not warrant a reversal even if it were improper. Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

District Court
02/02/2004

State of Rhode Island v. Louis Vinagro, A.A. No. 02-71 Appeal

State of Rhode Island v. Louis Vinagro, A.A. No. 02-71 (February 2, 2004).pdf

The state appealed a decision of the Appeals Panel affirming the dismissal of a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that it did not posses the authority to hear the appeal because the state filed for appeal outside of the ten-day statutory appeals period and did not file for an extension. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

District Court
06/11/2004

April Kuzdeba v. RITT, A.A. No. 02-82 Reasonable Grounds/ Probable Cause

April Kuzdeba v. RITT, A.A. No. 02-82 (June 11, 2004).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s dismissal of the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the trial magistrate erred by choosing an incorrect legal standard, requiring the state to introduce evidence that the defendant was incapable of safely operating a vehicle. The Court held that the correct legal standard is whether the circumstances available to the arresting officer were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The Court held that there was reasonable suspicion for the officer to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant had watery and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and emitted an odor of alcohol on her breath. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations against the defendant.

District Court
11/30/2003

State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134 Anonymous Tips

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel dismissing the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 3-8-9 (transportation of an alcoholic beverage by a minor). The state claimed that the Appeals Panel’s decision to suppress the officer’s testimony that a group of children informed him that the defendant had a gun, because it amounted to an anonymous tip, was in error. Here, the District Court held that the Appeals Panel erred in holding that the information provided to the officer amounted to an anonymous tip because the officer knew who was providing the information, and had also observed the informants interact with the defendant. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer knew whether the informants were capable of providing reliable information. However, the Court went on to hold that the trial judge’s suppression was harmless error and sustained the dismissal of the violations against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134.pdf

District Court
11/30/2002

State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134 Reasonable Grounds

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel dismissing the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 3-8-9 (transportation of an alcoholic beverage by a minor). The state claimed that the decision of the Appeals Panel upholding the dismissal on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence was in error. Additionally, the state claimed that the trial judge applied the wrong standard because she interchanged reasonable suspicion and reasonable grounds. The officers had testified that the defendant looked disheveled, had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol, and had slurred speech. The District Court held that the trail judge’s decision that the officer lacked reasonable grounds was not in error because her decisions regarding credibility were supported by competent evidence on the record as she watched the video tape of the defendant’s stop multiple times, went to the scene of the stop, and considered to the officer’s testimony. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial judge’s application of a reasonable suspicion standard was immaterial and amounted to harmless error. Reasonable grounds is the proper standard for assessing a refusal case, and because reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than reasonable grounds, the state was not prejudiced when it failed to prove on a lesser standard that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence. Accordingly, the Court upheld the dismissal of the violations against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134.pdf

District Court
11/30/2002

State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134 Procedure

Procedure

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel dismissing the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 3-8-9 (transportation of an alcoholic beverage by a minor). The state claimed that the trial judge abused her discretion because she denied the state’s request, near the end of the trial, for a two-week continuance in order to obtain a toxicology report by a witness from the Department of Health regarding the liquid inside an alcoholic container. The District Court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion because she attempted to balance the state’s request in the middle of the trial with the concerns of a busy court calendar and the right of the defendant to a prompt hearing. Furthermore, the state was not prevented from proving that the substance was an alcoholic beverage because the state could have presented testimony by the officer as to whether the beverage inside the container was alcoholic or consented to a one-week continuance, but elected to forgo its opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the Court upheld the dismissal of the charges against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134.pdf

Appeals Panel

Appeals Panel
07/06/2022

State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas A. San Martino, No. T22-0006 Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

State of Rhode Island v. Joshua Ribeiro T20-0008 (January 15, 2021).pdf

The Defendant appealed a Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violations of “Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test” and G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3, “Refusal to Submit to Preliminary Breath Test.” The Defendant argued that, because the speeding charge that was the predicate for the traffic stop was dismissed, the charge could not be sustained. At the trial, an officer testified that he saw a vehicle pass his position traveling in excess of the posted speed limit, which was 25 miles per hour. The officer then testified that a police radar indicated that the vehicle was traveling at 43 miles per hour. The Officer testified to having conducted a traffic stop and identified the Defendant as the driver. The officer testified that based on his training and experience, he believed the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol because the Defendant had “moderately bloodshot eyes,” “slightly slurred speech,” and “an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath.” During the stop, the Defendant consented to perform field sobriety tests after telling the officer that he had not been drinking. The Officer testified that the Defendant was having a hard time maintaining his balance and requested that he perform a walk and turn test. During the walk and turn test the Officer “observed six out of the eight possible clues of impairment that officers are trained to look for while a motorist is performing the test.” The Officer “observed three out of the four possible clues of impairment” when the Defendant was performing the One Leg Stand Test. Due to these reasons the Officer asked the Defendant to submit to a “preliminary breath test,” which the Defendant declined. The defendant was arrested for suspicion of a DUI and ultimately refused to submit to a chemical test. At trial the Defendant argued that the state failed to show reasonable suspicion to make the stop as they had not shown proof that the radar had been. Additionally, the Defendant argued that because the stop was not justified, any violation that occurred afterwards would not be justified either. The Trial Magistrate dismissed the speeding charge but sustained the refusal charges, and the Defendant appealed.

The Appeals Panel noted that an officer is “required to have specific and articulable facts providing reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred.” The Appeals Panel held that reasonable suspicion had been met because, although the officer had not testified to the calibration of the radar, he testified to his observation regarding the defendant’s speed, which would be an articulable fact sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Further, the Panel noted that reasonable suspicion to request a chemical test is satisfied “when that individual exhibits tangible indicia of alcohol consumption through his or her speech, physical appearance, and performance on field sobriety tests.” The Appeals Panel held that the officer’s testimony regarding his observations of the scene and the Defendant’s physical appearance, along with the officer’s training, was sufficient to justify the request for the chemical test. The Appeals Panel sustained the charged violations. State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas A. San Martino, No. T22-0006 (July 6, 2022).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/15/2021

State of Rhode Island v. Joshua Ribeiro T20-0008 Motion to Vacate

Motion to Vacate

The Defendant Appealed the Trial Magistrate’s decision denying his motion to vacate his prior plea to the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1, Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test. The Defendant pled guilty to the charged violation at the pre-trial conference and was sentenced accordingly. The defendant was granted a “conditional hardship license” that would allow him to drive to and from work, as he had indicated that he was “an assistant paint manager at Sherwin Williams.” 18 months later, the Defendant filed what he fashioned as “a motion for post-conviction relief” asking the court to vacate the prior plea because he was seeking a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and the conviction prevented him from obtaining it. The defendant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not properly advised of that consequence of the plea. The Trial Judge denied the motion to vacate, finding that it was untimely. Additionally, the Trial Judge held that he did not have the authority to determine whether counsel was effective. The Defendant appealed, arguing that he was not out of time to file for post-conviction relief because the “discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations.”

Rule 20 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure imposes a one-year time limit on some but not all motions to vacate. Without addressing this issue directly, the Appeals Panel upheld the Trial Judge’s decision that this motion was untimely because it was filed outside of that one-year timeframe. Additionally, the Appeals Panel upheld the finding that the Defendant’s guilty plea was “knowing and voluntarily” as he presented no evidence “in an affidavit or otherwise to indicate that he explained his future career path to counsel or that he was misinformed about the circumstances and consequences of pleading guilty.” For these reasons, the Appeals Panel denied the motion to vacate and sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
04/28/2021

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Sousa T21-0006 (April 28, 2021)

Probable Cause

The Defendant appealed a Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1, “Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test.” At trial, a Trooper testified that he observed a vehicle “unable to maintain its lane because it swerved into the second lane from the first lane.” The Trooper followed the car and continued to observe swerving in and out of lanes. He decided to make a traffic stop and identified the Defendant as the Driver. The Trooper noticed a “closed box of Macallan whiskey” in the vehicle and observed the Defendant struggle to get into the glove box in order to provide documentation. He also observed “bloodshot watery eyes, slurred speech and detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the interior of the vehicle.” The Defendant was asked to step out of the vehicle, at which time the Trooper smelled alcohol emanating from his breath. The Defendant completed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, but subsequently refused all other field sobriety testing. Due to the Troopers belief that the Defendant was under the influence, he placed him under arrest and read him his “rights for use at the scene.” The Defendant was transported to the station, where he asked for water due to his diabetic condition and refused to submit to a chemical test. The Defendant testified that he was unfamiliar with the vehicle because he did not drive it frequently, that he was not feeling well at the time of the stop due to medication he had been taking, and that he had not been drinking that day. Lastly, a witness testified that he was with the Defendant on the night in question, that he had not seen the Defendant drink that night, that the Defendant had shared that he was not feeling well, and that he saw no reason the Defendant should not have driven home. At the close of the trial the Trial Magistrate found the defendant guilty of the charged violation. The Defendant appealed, arguing that the Trooper had imposed a “more likely than not standard” in determining whether to place the Defendant under arrest.

Although the language of § 31-27-2.1 requires proof that an officer have “reasonable grounds” to believe that a motorist was driving under the influence in order to request submission to a chemical test, and further requires that a motorist must be under arrest before being asked to submit to a chemical test, the Appeals Panel suggested that, “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, the standard for administering a chemical test is reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver is operating under the influence of alcohol.” Here, the Trooper testified that he observed the Defendant swerving, that the Defendant had trouble opening his glovebox, and that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol coming from his breath. The Appeals Panel sustained the charged violations, finding that those facts provided sufficient factual support for the Trial Judge’s determination that the Trooper had reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Sousa T21-0006 (April 28, 2021).pdf

Appeals Panel
06/08/2021

State of Rhode Island v. Justin Woodford, No. M21-0002 (June 8 2021)

State of Rhode Island v. Justin Woodford, No. M21-0002 (June 8 2021).pdf

Defendant appealed a Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of “Obedience to stop signs.” A patrolman testified that he observed a vehicle fail to come to a complete stop at a stop sign at an intersection. The officer initiated a traffic stop and identified the Defendant as the driver. Further the officer testified that he ran a performance check and learned that the Defendant had previously been cited for the same violation at the same location. The patrolman issued a ticket. The Defendant denied the allegation, claiming that he had been particularly cautious due to the prior violation. The Trial Magistrate found him guilty. The Defendant appealed, arguing that the decision was biased but failed to elaborate any further.

The Appeals Panel noted that “it is well-settled that ‘[t]he task of determining the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly the function of the trial justice when sitting without a jury.’” (citing DeSimone Electric, Inc. v. CMG, Inc., 901 A.2d 613, 621 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Walter v. Baird, 433 A.2d 963, 964 (R.I.1981)). The Panel found that the Trial Judge did not abuse his discretion when finding the patrolman credible and sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
10/27/2021

State of Rhode Island v. Boffi No. T21-0011 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the magistrate of the R.I. Traffic Tribunal sustaining violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I. G.L. 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (open container) after a car accident. On the refusal charge, the R.I. Traffic Tribunal appeals panel found no error in the Trial Magistrate’s conclusion that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe appellant had been operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Here, the Defendant’s admission that he had consumed five glasses of wine, the smell of alcohol on his breath, his bloodshot and watery eyes, the fact that a sports bottle containing what appeared to be wine, and the fact of a motor vehicle accident all supported the officer’s reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the appeals panel found the Trial Magistrate’s decision was not erroneous on the refusal to submit charge. The appeal was denied and the violation sustained.State of Rhode Island v. Boffi No. T21-0011 (October 27, 2021).pdf

Appeals Panel
10/27/2021

State of Rhode Island v. Boffi No. T21-0011 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Defendant appealed the decision of the magistrate of the R.I. Traffic Tribunal sustaining violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I. G.L. 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (open container) after a car accident. On the refusal charge, the R.I. Traffic Tribunal appeals panel found no error in the Trial Magistrate’s conclusion that the Defendant made a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the chemical test. The Defendant introduced the testimony of a physician to describe the potential impact of a concussion on a motorist’s ability to speak coherently and make informed decisions. The Trial Magistrate, noting that the physician did not observe the Defendant on the date in question, found the testimony unpersuasive. Deeming this a “credibility determination,” the Appeals Panel was unwilling to disturb the Trial Magistrate’s findings. Therefore, the appeals panel found the Trial Magistrate’s decision was not erroneous on the refusal to submit charge. The appeal was denied and the violation sustained.State of Rhode Island v. Boffi No. T21-0011 (October 27, 2021).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/29/2019

State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019)

State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019).pdf

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that a customer had departed who may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Based on the vehicle’s description, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he had just come from D’Angelo’s. Defendant was ultimately arrested for suspicion of DUIand refused to submit to a chemical test. On appeal, Defendant argued that the charge could not be sustained because the officer did not actually observe Defendant operating the vehicle.

Under § 31-27-2.1, a police officer may direct a motorist to submit to a breathalyzer test if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Bruno, 709 A.2d 1048, 1050 (R.I. 1998). The Appeals Panel suggested that Defendant could properly be found to be operating the motor vehicle based upon the fact that he was “in actual physical control of the vehicle.” Alternatively, the Appeals Panel found that the totality of the facts in the case, including Defendant’s acknowledgement that he had just come from D’Angelo’s and the absence of any mention of or evidence of another driver, was sufficient to support reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant had operated the motor vehicle. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

NOTE: On appeal, the District Court explicitly refused to address the Appeal’s Panel’s suggestion that physical control of a motor vehicle can constitute operation for the purposes of this statute, a suggestion that appears to run counter to the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Capuano, 591 A.2d 35 (1991), that a motor vehicle must be in motion to constitute operation for this purpose.

Appeals Panel
03/29/2019

State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019)

State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019).pdf

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that a customer had departed who may not have paid for his food and who may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Based on the vehicle’s description, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he had just come from D’Angelo’s. Defendant was ultimately arrested for suspicion of DUI and refused to submit to a chemical test. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a motor vehicle stop.

The Appeals Panel concluded that the D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee’s call, combined with the detailed description of Defendant and his vehicle, provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision as not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

Appeals Panel
04/30/2019

State of Rhode Island v. James Harrington, T15-0040 (April 30, 2019)

Evidence

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). A North Kingstown police officer conducted a traffic stop which resulted in a citation under § 31-27-2.1. Following multiple appeals, Defendant’s case was remanded to the trial magistrate for further factual findings on the issue of the location of the violation. Defendant attempted to introduce two maps to show that the stop took place outside of North Kingstown, but the trial magistrate excluded one of the maps (Map B). Moreover, the trial magistrate accorded little weight to the admitted map (Map A). On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred since Map A established that the violation occurred outside of North Kingstown and, therefore, the violation should have been dismissed.

Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 15 provides that the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence govern all proceedings before the Traffic Tribunal. Although relevant evidence is admissible, “the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial [magistrate].” See State v. Grayhurst, 652 A.2d 491, 504 (R.I. 2004). Moreover, the Appeals Panel “will not conclude that a trial [magistrate] abused his or her discretion as long as some grounds to support the decision appear in the record.” Id. at 505.

Here, the trial magistrate did not err in excluding Map B because Defendant did not supply any evidence demonstrating the authenticity of the map. Also, the trial magistrate did not err in according Map A little weight because Defendant failed to demonstrate that the map was a fair and accurate representation of the area. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. James Harrington, T15-0040 (April 30, 2019).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/10/2019

State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019)

North Providence Police Department v. Charles Galatis, No. T17-0004 (May 11, 2018).pdf

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 33-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). A police officer responded to the scene of a reported accident whereby a parked vehicle was struck. Following a series of standardized field sobriety tests, Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station where he refused to submit to a chemical test. At trial, Defendant testified that while he was signing the Rights for Use at the Station form, he was under the impression that any penalties stemming from his refusal could be negotiated due to the use of the word “can” within the form. But the trial magistrate was unmoved and sustained the charged violation.

On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not properly informed of the penalties resulting from his refusal due to the language used in the Rights for Use at the Station form. More specifically, Defendant asserted that the use of the word “can” rather than “shall” led Defendant to believe that the penalties could be negotiated. But, pursuant to § 33-27-2.1, a driver need only be informed of his rights and the associated penalties for refusal and, therefore, a driver’s subjective belief is irrelevant. Also, the Panel stated that whether a driver was adequately informed of his rights and the associated penalties is a “factual determination within the exclusive discretion of the trial judge or magistrate.” As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in determining that Defendant was adequately informed because Defendant testified that he was aware that he would face potential penalties, including losing his license. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019).pdf

Appeals Panel
05/11/2018

North Providence Police Department v. Charles Galatis, No. T17-0004 (May 11, 2018)

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed a decision by a Magistrate of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate the default judgment entered on a charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (Refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Defendant failed to appear for a subsequent pre-trial conference, and as result, the Magistrate entered default judgment. Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate, but the Magistrate denied Defendant’s motion, reasoning that Defendant mixing up his court date was not enough to meet the “excusable neglect” standard for vacating default judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the reason he failed to appear for the hearing on his Motion to Vacate met the standard necessary to show “excusable neglect.” The Appeals Panel, however, found that the record lacked sufficient evidence to satisfy a finding of “excusable neglect.” Specifically, the Appeals Panel found that Defendant’s calendaring error was not sufficient to warrant a finding of excusable neglect. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the Trial Judge’s entering of default judgment and denied Defendant’s appeal.

Appeals Panel
08/22/2017

State of Rhode Island v. L.F., No. T16-0021 (August 22, 2017)

Discovery

The Providence Police Department appealed the trial judge’s decision dismissing Defendant’s charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01(c)(iii) (possession of marijuana, one ounce or less, 18 years or older). At a scheduled trial date Defendant sought a continuance to request a police report. The trial judge granted the continuance and set a new trial date. In the interim, the Defendant, through his attorney, mailed a discovery request to the Providence Police Department and received no response. On the new trial date, after finding that the Providence Police Department had enough time to supply an answer to the discovery request and failed to so, the trial judge dismissed the charges pursuant to Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 11. The Appeals Panel noted that Rule 11(b) “requires that the court issue an order for discovery.” Because there was no record of any such order issued by the court, let alone a Motion to Compel filed and granted by the court, the Appeals Panel concluded that there was no violation of Rule 11, making dismissal by the trial judge premature. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel granted The Providence Department’s appeal and remanded the case for trial.

State of Rhode Island v. L.F., No. T16-0021 (August 22, 2017).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/22/2017

State of Rhode Island v. L.F., No. T16-0021 (August 22, 2017)

Discovery

The Providence Police Department appealed the trial judge’s decision dismissing Defendant’s charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01(c)(iii) (possession of marijuana, one ounce or less, 18 years or older) based upon an alleged discovery violation. The Defendant, through his attorney, had mailed a discovery request to the Providence Police Department. The Appeals Panel noted that, “[u]nder Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules, service must be made to the proper party to the litigation.” The Appeals Panel reasoned that because the Providence Police Department was not represented by counsel at trial, the Defendant’s discovery request should have been served directly upon the “prosecuting law enforcement officer,” whom it deemed to be the officer who had written the summons. The Appeals Panel also suggested that, because the discovery request was sent by regular mail rather than personally served by hand upon either the prosecuting law enforcement officer or his office, service was not proper under Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 27. The Appeals Panel granted The Providence Department’s appeal and remanded the case for trial.

State of Rhode Island v. L.F., No. T16-0021 (August 22, 2017).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/10/2017

Michael Rhodes v. Town of Burrillville, A.A. No. 16-45 (August 10, 2017)

Evidence

Defendant appeals the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that his arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment and that all evidence collected as a result of his arrest should have been suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant was pulled over in the early morning for crossing a painted line, failure to use his turn signal, and failure to stop at a stop sign. The Officer employed “high-risk protocol” during the traffic stop. The defendant was ordered out of the vehicle and onto his knees while the officer trained his gun on the defendant. The defendant was searched, cuffed and placed in the rear of the cruiser. The officer then searched the defendant’s vehicle. Afterwards, the officer uncuffed the defendant and began asking him questions as part of the officer’s investigation of driving under the influence of alcohol. The Appeals Panel held that the arrest was illegal; however, the panel held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to Refusal cases because these cases are civil in nature. Defendant appealed this decision, arguing that the exclusionary rule should apply to traffic tribunal trials. The District Court agreed that the arrest was illegal and that the constitutionally based exclusionary rule did not apply. However, the District Court held that R.I.G.L 1956 § 9-19-25 mandates the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence because, by its explicit language, it applies to all actions in state courts. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Michael Rhodes v. Town of Burrillville, A.A. No. 16-45 (August 10, 2017).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/30/2016

State of Rhode Island v. James Harrington, No. T15-0040 (August 30, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. James Harrington, No. T15-0040 (August 30, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.2 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1996), the court held that the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the driver was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in order for the driver to be required to submit to a chemical test. Defendant was pulled over for crossing a fog line. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer smelled alcohol emanating from the defendant, the defendant admitted to having three beers, the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, and the defendant has slurred and mumbled speech. The Appeals Panel held that these facts, in combination, satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
04/21/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Kaba, No. T15-0032 (April 8, 2016)

Procedure

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant was taken into custody under a suspicion of driving under the influence. At the police station, Defendant agreed to take a chemical test, but initially failed to supply enough air into the breathalyzer. The officer gave Defendant a second opportunity to give a sufficient breath sample, but Defendant refused to take the test unless the officer informed him of when the breathalyzer was last calibrated. The test was then terminated, and Defendant was charged with the aforementioned violation. Defendant argued that the trial judge exceeded his role as a neutral fact finder by soliciting responses which assisted the State in meeting its burden of proof. A trial judge “has the discretion to elicit testimony that will clarify any confusion caused by prior examination.” See State v. Figueras, 644 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Giordano, 440 A.2d 742, 745 (R.I. 1982)). Even if a trial judge exceeds that discretion, “the error is harmless if the [judge’s] overall demeanor is neutral and impartial.” See id. at 294. Here, the trial judge raised questions about details that were not mentioned on direct or cross examination, including what sounds the breathalyzer machine made and what those sounds suggested. But the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge did not exceed his role as a neutral fact finder because the trial judge’s overall demeanor remained natural and impartial throughout the trial. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Kaba, No. T15-0032 (April 8, 2016).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/08/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Kaba, No. T15-0032 (April 8, 2016)

Discovery

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant was taken into custody under a suspicion of driving under the influence. At the police station, Defendant agreed to take a chemical test, but initially failed to supply enough air into the breathalyzer. The officer gave Defendant a second opportunity to give a sufficient breath sample, but Defendant refused to take the test unless the officer informed him of when the breathalyzer was last calibrated. The test was then terminated, and Defendant was charged with the aforementioned violation. Defendant argued that a negative inference should have been drawn against the State because the video surveillance provided to Defendant lacked audio and failed to depict the refusal. Rule 11(e) of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules provides that a discovery “request shall be made only within fourteen (14) days after the first appearance or at such reasonable later time as the court may permit.” Here, Defendant’s discovery request was almost two months past the deadline, and Defendant failed to present any evidence to justify the delay. Furthermore, Defendant asserted that the State failed to preserve video evidence of the refusal. “Speculative assertions as to the existence of documents do not suffice to sustain a motion for spoliation of evidence.” See Tri-County Motors, Inc. v. Am. Suzuki’s Motor Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Defendant’s conclusion that the video was improperly withheld or destroyed was merely an assertion that was not supported by “even a scintilla of evidence that another video exist[ed].” As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision to not draw a negative inference against the State was not affected by error of law. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Kaba, No. T15-0032 (April 8, 2016).pdf

Appeals Panel
02/04/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016).pdf

The Defendant appealed the hearing magistrate’s decision to issue a preliminary license suspension at the arraignment on the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that language in the sworn report was misleading and contradicted statutory language found in §31-27-2.1. Specifically, the Defendant argued that the sworn report indicated an immediate license suspension would follow from the refusal to submit a chemical test when the actual procedure is to first have the sworn report received and reviewed by a magistrate prior to any license suspension. The Panel found, however, that a thorough review of the sworn report is not required by the statutory language and that the language in the sworn report was not misleading in this regard.

Appeals Panel
02/04/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016).pdf

The Defendant appealed the hearing magistrate’s decision to issue a preliminary license suspension at the arraignment on the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Panel found that this interlocutory order was not appealable because the order did not fall within one of the enumerated statutory exceptions found in R.I.G.L. § 9-24-7 nor would it cause irreparable harm before a final determination was issued. Additionally, the Panel noted that even if the order were subject to a proper interlocutory appeal the Defendant did not follow the proper procedure to appeal, which would require a petition for certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See Pier House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corp., 689 A.2d 1069, 1070 (R.I. 1997). Therefore, the Panel denied and dismissed the appeal.

Appeals Panel
02/04/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016)

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the hearing magistrate’s decision to issue a preliminary license suspension at the arraignment on the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Panel found that this interlocutory order was not appealable because the order did not fall within one of the enumerated statutory exceptions found in R.I.G.L. § 9-24-7 nor would it cause irreparable harm before a final determination was issued. Additionally, the Panel noted that even if the order were subject to a proper interlocutory appeal the Defendant did not follow the proper procedure to appeal, which would require a petition for certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See Pier House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corp., 689 A.2d 1069, 1070 (R.I. 1997). Therefore, the Panel denied and dismissed the appeal.

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016).pdf

Appeals Panel
05/04/2016

City of Woonsocket v. Alan DeBlois, No. T13-0017 (May 4, 2016)

Discovery

The City of Woonsocket appealed the decision of the trial court granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to a chemical test”) based on the City’s destruction of a booking video. The City argued that defendant did not meet his burden to prove that the City had destroyed the video in bad faith. In State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180 (R.I. 1994), the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted a three-prong test from U.S. v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), that laid out when police destruction of evidence constituted a violation of defendant’s due process rights in criminal proceedings. However, the Appeals Panel adopted the analysis of civil evidence spoliation set forth in Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744 (R.I. 2000) and Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1999) to apply to civil violation cases. The Appeals Panel noted that it had previously followed criminal standards of evidence destruction in Garcia, but the court now would follow civil evidence spoliation from Tancrelle. Under Tancrelle, the doctrine of evidence spoliation states that the intentional or negligent destruction of evidence “may give rise to the inference that the evidence was unfavorable to that party” but that bad faith is not a required element of proof to allow the inference. In Farrell, if a party can show bad faith then a dismissal may be granted against the party who destroyed the evidence. The Appeals Panel, applying both tests, held that the defendant failed to produce evidence of bad faith. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Goulart, M., filed a concurring opinion, noting that he would apply the Garcia standard in Traffic Tribunal cases because they are “quasi-criminal” in nature.

City of Woonsocket v. Alan DeBlois, No. T13-0017 (May 4, 2016).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/27/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that the officer did not have probable cause required by § 31-27-2.1 to arrest the defendant for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. In State v. Perry, 731 A.2d 720 (R.I. 2000), the court held that the arresting officer was authorized to request that the defendant submit to a chemical test even though the officer did not witness the defendant operate his vehicle under the influence of alcohol, holding that the arresting officer only needed reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated the vehicle. Id. Defendant in this case admitted that he had visited various bars and pulled over into the parking lot because “he had too much to drink.” Accordingly, the decision of the trial court finding reasonable grounds was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
07/27/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that the officer did not have a right to be on the premises. Defendant was in the parking lot of a bar with his vehicle running and the keys in the ignition. The officer had responded to a call from the bar owner of a suspicious vehicle parked in the parking lot after the bar was closed. In State v. Cook, 440 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1982), the court noted that police are often called upon to perform “community caretaking functions” that have nothing to do with the apprehension and conviction of alleged criminals. These scenarios require the officer to investigate when the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect something amiss. Id. Here, the officer responded to a call and at first inquired about the defendant’s condition. During this caretaking function the officer, the officer began to suspect the defendant had operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The Appeals Panel held that the officer had the right to investigate as part of the officer’s “community caretaking functions.” Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
07/27/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that the officer did not give the defendant an immediate opportunity to contact and be examined by a physician of his choosing. Defendant was read his rights at the scene and then arrived at the station 23 minutes later. In State v. Poole, 197 A.2d 163 (R.I. 1964), the court held that a forty-five minute time delay between the defendant being notified of his right to be examined by a physician and the defendant’s opportunity to contact a physician did not violate the immediacy requirement. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
08/25/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Nevitt, No. T15-0043 (August 25, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Nevitt, No. T15-0043 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-26-5 (“duty in accident resulting in highway fixtures”). Defendant argued that the officer violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. A witness called 911 forty minutes after he witnessed a car hit a telephone poll, and the officer responded. The officer found a vehicle matching the witness’s description. The officer then ran the plate number and determined that the defendant owned the vehicle. The officer went to the nearby address and, after no one answered the officer’s knock at the front door, the officer went into defendant’s back yard where the officer saw the defendant inside the house. The officer then requested that the defendant come outside and talk. The Appeals Panel held that the officer had an objective, compelling reason to make that request. In State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302 (R.I. 2011), the court held that exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The officer had a reasonable belief that her assistance was required to avert a crisis, that crisis being the defendant’s potential need for medical assistance, because the officer had a reasonable belief that someone required medical attention. The Appeals Panel found that the officer had an obligation to find the potentially injured person. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
08/25/2016

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Nevitt, No. T15-0043 (August 25, 2016)

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Nevitt, No. T15-0043 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-26-5 (“duty in accident resulting in highway fixtures”). Defendant argued that there was not enough evidence to establish that defendant had been operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. A witness called 911 forty minutes after a driver had struck a telephone pole. After the officer responded, the witness told the officer that the driver was operating a Chevrolet. The officer searched the surrounding area and found a Chevrolet in a parking lot that matched this description. After the officer ran the license plate, she identified the defendant as the owner. The officer then went to the defendant’s nearby house, where the defendant admitted that he had consumed three beers and had struck a telephone poll. The officer also testified that the defendant slurred his words and walked with an unsteady gait. Following State v. Perry, 731 A.2d 720 (R.I. 2000) and State v. Menge, T15-0036 (2016), the Appeals Panel held that the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the officer was authorized to request that the defendant to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
08/25/2016

Town of Hopkinton v. Daniel A. Buck, No. T15-0037 (August 25, 2016)

Town of Hopkinton v. Daniel A. Buck, No. T15-0037 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.2 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-22-21.1 (“presence of open alcoholic beverage”). Defendant argued that the violations should have been dismissed because of a “perjured affidavit.” In his sworn affidavit the officer wrote that the defendant displayed “clues in all three (field sobriety) tests.” His trial testimony revealed that the defendant only displayed clues in two tests. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the court held that allegations of negligent or innocent mistake are insufficient to attack the validity of an affidavit. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. The Appeals Panel held that defendant had offered no offer of proof that the discrepancy was intentional or in a reckless disregard for the truth. The trial court had found credible the officer’s explanation that the discrepancy was a mistake because the officer may having been “typing too fast.” Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Appeals Panel
08/25/2016

Town of Hopkinton v. Daniel A. Buck, No. T15-0037 (August 25, 2016)

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.2 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-22-21.1 (“presence of open alcoholic beverage”). Defendant argued that the trial record was incomplete. At trial, the defendant attempted to play a video of the defendant at the police station. After several failed attempts to get the CD to play, the magistrate played the video on his personal computer off the record. The defendant contends that this video contained something that would change the outcome of this case and that it is important that the Appeals Panel view this video. Defendant contends that Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89 (1st Cir. 1990), allowed the defendant to supplement the record with the video tape. The Appeals Panel found that Rivera also provides that if the Defendant fails his duty to furnish an appellate court with the raw materials necessary in the due performance of the appellate task then the court may scrutinize the merits of the case insofar as the record permits. Since the Defendant failed to move the video into evidence after the trial court viewed the video, the defendant failed in his duty to preserve the issue for appeal. Therefore, the Appeals Panel proceeded based only on the facts provided by the record. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Town of Hopkinton v. Daniel A. Buck, No. T15-0037 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Appeals Panel
05/13/2015

Town of Barrington v. William Mathews, C.A. No. T13-0081 (May 13, 2015)

Town of Barrington v. William Mathews, C.A. No. T13-0081 (May 13, 2015).pdf

The Town of Barrington appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Here, the Defendant alleged that his right to be seen immediately by a physician was delayed because although he told the Officer twice that he wanted to be examined the Officer never allowed him to call a physician. Instead, the Officer simply released the Defendant after his arraignment by a bail commissioner, which took place nearly three hours after his arrest. The Town argued that the “immediate” timeframe mentioned in the refusal statute does not create a strict timeline. The Panel held that even a broad interpretation of “immediately” would not render the trial magistrate’s holding erroneous because the Officer never afforded the Defendant the right to an examination. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the violation.

Appeals Panel
01/17/2014

Town of Barrington v. Stephen Day, C.A. No. T13-0011 Rights for Use at Scene

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that the officer failed to testify at trial, by more than a bare assertion, which specific rights were read to him at the scene before he refused to submit, and further, that the rights for use card was not submitted into evidence. The Court held that in order to satisfy the requirements of § 31-27-3, the actual rights for use at the scene card must be admitted into evidence unless the officer is capable of reciting the language of the card from memory. Here, the requirements of §31-27-3 were not fulfilled because the card was not submitted and the officer made only a bare assertion that he had read the defendant the rights for use card at the scene. Accordingly, the Court held that the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous and dismissed the charge against the defendant.Town of Barrington v. Stephen Day, C.A. No. T13-0011 (January 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/17/2014

Town of Barrington v. Stephen Day, C.A. No. T13-0011 Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial. However, the Court held that there is no such right to a jury trial for an infraction of the motor vehicle code. A defendant is only entitled to a jury trial if they would have had such a right at the time the Constitution was adopted or if the offense is of a nature that requires a jury trial. See Calore Freight Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Trans., 576 A.2d 1214 (R.I. 1990). Therefore, because the motor vehicle code did not exist at the time the Constitution was adopted in 1842, nor did any similar statute then exist, and the fines imposed under the motor vehicle code are definite and without discretion, the defendant had no right to a jury trial on the charge of violating R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-2-2.1. However, the Court went on to dismiss the charge against the defendant on other grounds. Town of Barrington v. Stephen Day, C.A. No. T13-0011 (January 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/21/2014

City of Woonsocket v. Tristan R. Fraser, C.A. No. T13-0027

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1(b) (refusal to submit). The District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on a related charge, which stemmed from the same incident, because the Woonsocket Police failed to comply with a discovery request to produce the booking and rights video from the night of the arrest. Here, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred in disregarding the District Court’s ruling and sustaining the charge of violating § 31-27-2.1. The Appeals Panel held that the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal are different courts and have different jurisdictions and procedural rules. The defendant failed to follow the Traffic Tribunal’s procedures for requesting the booking and rights video tape. Accordingly, the trial judge was not required to give weight to the District Court’s ruling and, therefore, did not err in sustaining the charge against the defendant.City of Woonsocket v. Tristan R. Fraser, C.A. No. T13-0027 (January 21, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/02/2014

Town of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. T12-0019-Preliminary Breath Test

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the trial judge improperly inferred that the preliminary breath test that was administered to her operated on fuel-cell technology rather than infrared light absorption. The Court held that it was reasonable for the trial judge to infer that the PBT that the officer administered to the defendant utilized fuel-cell technology because the state’s expert witness testified that all PBTs issued by the Department of Health operated on the principle of fuel-cell technology and that all Rhode Island police were instructed to use only PBTs that had been issued by the Department of Health. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge.Town of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. T12-0019 (May 23, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
02/03/2014

Town of Narragansett v. Laura Imswiler, C.A. No. T13-0012 Sworn Report

Town of Narragansett v. Laura Imswiler, C.A. No. T13-0012 (February 3, 2014).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the decision of the trial judge was affected by error of law because the state failed to produce a sworn report where the officer did not swear to his initial report before a notary and a second report, sworn to three months after the arrest, was not admitted into evidence. The first element of § 31-27-2.1 requires “a sworn report stating that a law enforcement officer possessed reasonable grounds to suspect the arrestee of driving under the influence.” The Court held that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, must be interpreted literally. The Court held that the state failed to establish the first element of § 31-27-2.1 because the officer did not swear to the first report before a notary and that the second report was not properly submitted into evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous because, absent proof of a sworn report, the state was not able to prove one of the required elements. Thus, the Court granted the defendant’s appeal.

Appeals Panel
06/23/2014

State of Rhode Island vs. John O’Hara, C.A. No. T13-0079 Sworn Report

State of Rhode Island vs. John O’Hara, C.A. No. T13-0079 (June 23, 2014).pdf

The State appealed the trial judge’s decision dismissing the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test). At trial, the Trooper testified that he created two sworn reports in connection with Defendant’s arrest for failure to submit. The notary discovered an error in the first report and directed the Trooper to discard the report and complete a second. The Trooper testified he swore to the contents of both reports in front of the notary. However, on cross-examination the notary testified that he could not recall whether the Trooper swore to the second report, despite the notary having signed it. Defendant’s counsel moved to dismiss the case at the close of the trial on the grounds that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Trooper created a sworn report. The State appealed, arguing the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous and was an error of law. The Appeals Panel deferred to the wide latitude the trial judge enjoys in weighing evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Here, the trial judge had not been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the Trooper swore to the report, a finding of fact that the Panel will not second guess. Therefore, the decision was not clearly erroneous. Also, because a sworn report is necessary to sustain a charge of refusal to submit, there was no error of law. Accordingly, the Panel affirmed the dismissal and denied the State’s appeal.

Appeals Panel
04/17/2014

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)

Dismissal

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges. The re-filing went to trial and resulted in conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss the charges was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the special prosecutor’s dismissal was with prejudice and that the City was required to move to vacate or appeal the initial dismissal before re-filing the charges. The Appeals Panel noted that the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal of a civil case in Superior Court is governed by Super R. Civ. P. 41(a), and under that rule a prosecutor’s voluntary dismissal is without prejudice absent an affirmative statement of prejudice or stipulations between the parties. The Appeals Panel applied the reasoning of Super R. Civ. P. 41(a) to Traffic Trib. R. P. 26(a), which allows the prosecuting officer to terminate the charges and held that there is a presumption that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice. The Panel held that the filing of an appeal, which under the rule can only be filed by an “aggrieved party” was inapposite because the City, which dismissed the charges, was not an aggrieved party. The Panel held that the filing of a Motion to Vacate would be inappropriate because no order had been entered; the role of the Tribunal in a decision by a party to dismiss is administrative only and functions simply to memorialize the dismissal for purposes of record keeping. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/17/2014

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)

Procedure

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/17/2014

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)

Procedure

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/17/2014

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the City to re-file the charges was made upon unlawful procedure. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate was bound by the special prosecutor’s dismissal under Rule 26(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and therefore should have applied the “law of the case” doctrine to prevent the City from re-filing the charges. The Panel explained that the “law of the case” doctrine stands for the proposition that once a judge has made an interlocutory decision, a second judge confronted with the same issue should not disturb the first ruling. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 683 (R.I. 1999). The Panel explained further that Rule 26(a) allows for termination of the prosecution by the prosecutor, and at no time in the Defendant’s case did any magistrate make any interlocutory decision. The Panel held that the “law of the case” doctrine did not apply to the facts and procedure of the case. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate did not make an error of law in allowing the City to re-file the charges.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/17/2014

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that a District Court order associated with the DUI prosecution of the Defendant required the Pawtucket Police to destroy all police records that tied the defendant to the events underlying the two charges sustained by the Tribunal and that, as a result, the Pawtucket Police could not re-file the charges. The Panel reviewed the plain language of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12(a)(1), “Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated,” and explained that the statute requires only records of identification be destroyed. The Panel then reviewed the trial record and found no evidence that the Police used any record of identification as a basis to identify Defendant as the operator of the vehicle. Instead, identification was made by in-court testimony of the arresting officer. The Panel explained that defendant’s assertion that the Police could not rely on records of identification ordered destroyed by the District Court order was immaterial to the matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the Police to re-file the charges was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/17/2014

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that various conflicts of interest by the Pawtucket Police Department amounted to a violation of his due process rights that should have resulted in a dismissal of the charges. The Panel looked to various Rhode Island, Connecticut, and U.S. precedent to explain that to succeed on a claim of bias under the Due Process clause, as an initial matter, the defendant must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity by the decision maker. Furthermore, in an administrative proceeding like the Traffic Tribunal, Due Process requires the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner in front of a neutral decision maker. Finally, the defendant must show not only prosecutorial misconduct, but also that the misconduct resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendant. The Panel then looked at the record and found that the defendant made only general accusations of impropriety and failed to identify any specific misconduct committed by the Pawtucket Police Department. Moreover, the defendant did not impute any misconduct to the trial magistrate and did not show that the alleged misconduct resulted in any unfair prejudice. The Panel held that the Defendant did not overcome the presumption that he received a full hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. The Panel explained that it was satisfied that the requirements of due process were met and held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law or an abuse of discretion

Appeals Panel
02/27/2014

State of Rhode Island v. Gail Dion, C.A. No. T13-0005 (February 27, 2014) Inability to Cure

Inability to Cure a Refusal by Subsequently Submitting

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1, “Refusal to submit to chemical test.” Defendant argued that her responses to the Trooper’s request to submit to a chemical test—“no, not at this time” and “not right now, not at this time”—did not constitute a refusal because her answer indicated she would be willing to submit to the test at a later time. The Panel held that the plain language of 31-27-2.1 does not allow for a suspect to postpone submitting to a chemical test. The Panel found that each independent answer to the Trooper’s request constituted an unequivocal refusal. Additionally, the Defendant argued that the Trooper had the obligation of informing her that she would not be allowed to take the test at a later time. The Panel noted the trial magistrate found that the Defendant had been read her “rights for use at the station.” The Panel indicated it was satisfied that Defendant had been advised of her rights and of the penalties of refusing under 31-27-2.1 and sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Gail Dion, C.A. No. T13-0005 (February 27, 2014).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/09/2013

State of Rhode Island v. Clayton Hardon, C.A. No. T12-0068 (January 9, 2013) Reasonable Grounds

State of Rhode Island v. Clayton Hardon, C.A. No. T12-0068 (January 9, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Defendant argued that the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe he had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the Officers located Defendant approximately two hours after the accident occurred. The Panel explained that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has never required evidence to show that an accident was recent. Rather, the Panel explained, an officer has reasonable grounds based on a totality of the circumstances. Here, the Officers arrived at the scene of an overturned fire truck and found no one present. Two hours later, the Defendant walked out of the woods, and the Officers observed the Defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, had slurred speech, emitted an odor of alcohol. The Defendant admitted to consuming three alcoholic drinks at some unspecified time and admitted that he lost control of the vehicle. Based on the circumstances, the Panel held that the Officers had reasonable grounds to infer the Defendant had been operating under the influence at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
09/09/2013

Town of Richmond v. Bruce Bartels, C.A. No. T13-0021 (September 9, 2013) Reasonable Grounds

Town of North Kingstown v. Joan DiOrio, C.A. No. T12-0078 (August 22, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31- 27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (presence of alcoholic beverages while operating or riding in a motor vehicle). Defendant challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to ask the defendant to submit to a chemical test where the defendant was approached by the officer while he was outside the vehicle in a parking lot. The court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to infer that the defendant had been operating a vehicle while under the influence because the defendant stated that he had been driving, he was observed “rummaging through the trunk” of the vehicle, marks on the defendant’s tires that suggested the vehicle had been operated recently, and there were “no establishments within a half mile of the parking lot where [the defendant] could have consumed alcohol after the vehicle was parked.” Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate.Town of Richmond v. Bruce Bartels C.A.T13-0021.pdf

Appeals Panel
08/22/2013

Town of North Kingstown v. Joan DiOrio, C.A. No. T12-0078 (August 22, 2013) Identifying the Defendant

Identifying the Defendant

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-15-11 (laned roadway). The Panel rejected the Defendant’s argument that the identity of the operator was at issue because the Officer did not immediately make contact with the operator of the vehicle in question, but rather briefly stopped to speak to the operator of a second vehicle stopped a hundred yards away from the Defendant’s vehicle. The Panel noted that the Defendant was the only person in the vehicle at the time she was stopped, that she was seated in the driver’s seat, and that the Officer made an in-court identification of the Defendant. The Panel held that identity was not at issue. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

Appeals Panel
08/22/2013

Town of North Kingstown v. Joan DiOrio, C.A. No. T12-0078 (August 22, 2013) Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Town of North Kingstown v. Joan DiOrio, C.A. No. T12-0078 (August 22, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant argued the Officer did not have probable cause to arrest. The Panel explained that when asking a suspect to submit to a chemical test, an Officer needs reasonable grounds to suspect the operator is under the influence and, if the operator refuses, an Officer may charge her with refusal. The Panel held that because the Officer observed that the Defendant drifted back and forth between lanes, had difficulty maintaining her balance when exiting the vehicle, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and admitted to drinking alcohol, the Officer had reasonable grounds to ask the Defendant to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

Appeals Panel
01/31/2013

T12-0064 Reasonable Grounds/ Probable Cause

Town of Bristol v. Melissa Malik, C.A. No. T12-0064 (January 31, 2013).pdf

The Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal appeals panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant had been operating her motor vehicle while under the influence when the officer observed appellant had bloodshot and watery eyes, mumbled and slurred words, and emitted a very strong odor of alcohol. Thus, the Court affirmed the refusal charge against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
01/11/2013

Town of Middletown v. Joshua Kolator, C.A. No. T12-0070 Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s factual findings regarding the defendant’s time and manner of arrest were supported by credible and competent evidence, because the defendant had been placed under arrest at the time the officer read the defendant his rights for use at the scene in the ambulance. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation againsnt the defendant.

Town of Middletown v. Joshua Kolator, C.A. No. T12-0070 (January 11, 2013).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/11/2013

Town of Middletown v. Joshua Kolator, C.A. No. T12-0070 Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s factual findings regarding appellant’s time and manner of arrest were supported by credible and competent evidence because an officer read the appellate his rights for use at the scene in an ambulance, and the judge found he was then placed into custody at that time. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Town of Middletown v. Joshua Kolator, C.A. No. T12-0070 (January 11, 2013).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/09/2013

Town of Richmond v. Bruce Bartels C.A.T13-0021 Operation of Motor Vehicle

Appeals Panel
08/22/2013

City of Newport v. Colleen Lawrence, C.A. No. T13-0007 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to request to submit to a chemical test where the defendant had stated that she was on prescription medication prior to performing field sobriety tests. The Court held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence because he observed the defendant almost hit a parked vehicle while attempting to pull over, she had a strong odor of alcohol on her person, she had bloodshot watery eyes, and she stepped into traffic while almost losing her balance. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation against the defendant.City of Newport v. Colleen Lawrence, C.A. No. T13-0007 (August 22, 2013).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/19/2013

City of Providence v. Christina Machado, C.A. No. T13-0019 (August 19, 2013) Reasonable Grounds

City of Providence v. Christina Machado, C.A. No. T13-0019 (August 19, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (refusal to submit to preliminary breath test) and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Defendant claimed that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe she had operated a vehicle while under the influence. The officer never observed the defendant driving, having arrived at the scene of an accident in which the defendant was involved, and did not perform any field sobriety tests. The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds under the “totality of the circumstances” because the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, had slurred speech, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, and admitted to consuming two alcoholic drinks earlier in the evening. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

Appeals Panel
08/19/2013

City of Providence v. Christina Machado, C.A. No. T13-0019 (August 19, 2013) Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (refusal to submit to preliminary breath test) and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued the Officer did not effectuate a legally valid arrest because the Officer allowed Defendant to be transported in the ambulance to the hospital without handcuffs while the Officer remained at the scene to complete his investigation. The Panel held that the trial magistrate’s factual findings regarding appellant’s time and manner of arrest were supported by credible and competent evidence because the Officer read the appellate her “rights for use at the scene” in the ambulance, stated that she was “under arrest,” and stated that he would meet her at the hospital. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Christina Machado, C.A. No. T13-0019 (August 19, 2013).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/08/2013

Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013)

Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). At trial, the Officer testified that he initially watched two vehicles leave the South Beach parking lot, one traveling at sixty-eight miles-per-hour and the second (Defendant’s vehicle) traveling at sixty-two miles-per-hour, in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone. Before stopping Defendant’s vehicle, however, the Officer pursued but lost the first vehicle, then went back to locate Defendant’s vehicle, a silver Mitsubishi with “wavy graphic lines.” The Defendant argued that the Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because the Officer improperly identified his vehicle as the vehicle the Officer saw speeding. The Panel noted that the trial judge concluded that the Officer had reasonable and articulable grounds to stop the Defendant’s vehicle because the Officer specifically described Defendant’s vehicle as the silver Mitsubishi with “wavy graphic lines” that he scanned traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. The Panel held that the trial judge sustained the charge based upon legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
08/08/2013

Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013)

Penalty

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a) (prima facie limits) and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate improperly considered the Defendant’s age in imposing the sentence. The Defendant argued that comments by the judge suggested that the judge intended to exceed the minimum penalties because the Defendant was a minor not yet eligible to drink. Specifically, the Defendant pointed to the following statements by the judge: “You’re not in the same position that someone over the age of 21 is in who comes in here and… [asks me to] impose the minimums. I treat you differently because of the fact that you’re not even yet [21]… [Y]ou were speeding, but it sounds to me, after you realized how fast you were going… [and] after you saw the police officer, you exercised better judgment and slowed down.” The Panel noted that the judge imposed the minimum fines and community service hours, and suspended the Defendant’s privilege to operate in Rhode Island for eight months, a penalty less severe than a full suspension. The Panel held that the judge considered the totality of the circumstances and decided to impose a penalty that was authorized under the refusal statute. The Panel held that the penalties were not in excess of the trial judge’s authority and did not prejudice the rights of Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations and penalties.

Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/01/2013

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013)

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision constituted reversible error of law because the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the police department offered the Defendant an opportunity to make a confidential phone call. The Panel noted that the Defendant had been read his rights for use at the scene and at the station. The Panel noted that after being read his rights (which included informing the Defendant he had a right to a phone call), the Defendant declined to make a phone call. Additionally, the Panel noted that the Police then offered the Defendant another opportunity to make a phone call, which the Defendant refused. The Panel explained that the statute does not require the police to use the word “confidential” when informing a suspect about his or her right to make a phone call. Rather, the Police are simply required to provide a degree of confidence to the suspect when a phone call is made. The Panel held that the Police did in fact offer the Defendant an opportunity to make a phone call. However, the Panel dismissed the charge due to the lack of a sworn report.

Appeals Panel
08/01/2013

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013)

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the Officer did not have reasonable grounds to ask him to submit to a chemical test. The Panel noted that the Officer testified that the Defendant had bloodshot watery eyes, thick-tongued speech, smelled of alcohol, and had to support himself on his vehicle when attempting to stand. The Panel explained that under the totality of the circumstances, the trial magistrate ruled on competent evidence that the Officer had reasonable grounds to ask the Defendant to submit to a chemical test. However, the Panel dismissed the charge due to the lack of a sworn report.

Appeals Panel
08/01/2013

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013)

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Specifically, the Defendant argued that the arresting Officer did not swear to the veracity of his report before a notary, in violation of the statute. At trial, the Officer testified that although the report had been notarized before trial, he was not present at the time it was notarized and he did not swear to its veracity. The Panel explained that the plain language of the statute requires the existence of a “sworn report.” The Panel held that because the Officer did not swear to the veracity of the report in the presence of a notary, the State could not satisfy the requirements of the statute. Accordingly, the Panel dismissed the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
06/05/2013

Town of North Smithfield v. George Fayad, C.A. No. T13-0003 (June 5, 2013)

Town of North Smithfield v. George Fayad, C.A. No. T13-0003 (June 5, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to ask him to submit to a chemical test. The arresting officer testified that the defendant had admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had watery eyes, slurred speech, and failed two field sobriety tests, and had approached the officer’s cruiser at a high rate of speed, nearly hitting the cruiser. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the trial judge’s decision and held that these facts provided reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence.

Appeals Panel
06/05/2013

Town of North Smithfield v. George Fayad, C.A. No. T13-0003 (June 5, 2013)

Town of North Smithfield v. George Fayad, C.A. No. T13-0003 (June 5, 2013).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant argued that the arresting officer’s testimony about time frames rendered the officer’s testimony incredible. The panel held that the trier of fact is entitled to make decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses. As such, the magistrate’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony was not clearly erroneous. The Panel affirmed the magistrate’s decision and sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

T11-0049 Field Sobriety Tests

Field Sobriety Tests

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous because the officer deviated from his training when he administered the field sobriety tests and did not comply with NHTSA guidelines. The Court held that although field sobriety tests should be administered as closely as possible with NHTSA guidelines to ensure reliability, the officer’s failure to follow the NHTSA standards was relative and the tests should not be deemed unreliable due to incorrect instructions because the trial court determined that the deviations were minimal and that the defendant exhibited four clues of intoxication. The Court noted that it lacked the authority to assess the credibility of witnesses and it must defer to the trial judge’s decision that the deviations were not substantial or prejudicial to the defendant. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-27-2.1.

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Telephone Call

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that she was denied her right to a confidential phone call because the officer entered the room while she was speaking with her attorney. The Court held that the defendant’s right to a confidential phone call was not violated because the officer left the defendant in the room for fifteen minutes while she spoke with her attorney and he only entered the room because the defendant summoned him in to ask him a question. Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant had voluntarily waived her right and sustained the violation of § 31-27-2.1.

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Preliminary Breath Test

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that because she submitted to a PBT at the scene she should not have been requested to submit to another test at the station. The Court held that the language of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 only refers to the “actual” test given at the station and the language of the statute was not intended to include PBTs. Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant had not been prejudiced and sustained the violation of § 31-27-2.1. Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
02/06/2012

City of Providence v. Dennis P. Lonardo, C.A. No. T11-0063 Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). Defendant argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because the officer did not observe the defendant commit a traffic violation. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because the officer observed the defendant stumble and sway from side to side while walking down a side walk, enter and exit a liquor store, then get into a vehicle and drive away. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.City of Providence v. Dennis P. Lonardo, C.A. No. T11-0063 (February 6, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
02/06/2012

City of Providence v. Dennis P. Lonardo, C.A. No. T11-0063 Preliminary Breath Test

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). Defendant claimed that the officer failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had reasonable grounds to request that the defendant submit to a PBT and, further, that the officer failed to testify specifically as to the defendant’s performance on the field sobriety tests. The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant operated under the influence because, in addition to observing the defendant stumble and sway from side to side while walking down the side walk, enter and exit a liquor store, then proceed to get into a vehicle and drive, the defendant had red and bloodshot eyes, he emitted an odor of alcohol, and he admitted to consuming alcohol. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.City of Providence v. Dennis P. Lonardo, C.A. No. T11-0063 (February 6, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
01/17/2012

Town of North Smithfield v. Thomas Casperson, C.A. No. T11-0034 Anonymous Tips

Town of North Smithfield v. Thomas Casperson, C.A. No. T11-0034 (January 17, 2012).pdf

The state appealed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). The state argued that the officer did have reasonable grounds to stop the defendant based on a tip from a private citizen stating that the defendant was driving erratically, he was all over the road, and he almost sideswiped a car. The Court held that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to the stop the defendant because the officer did not independently corroborate the information provided by the informant nor did he observe the defendant commit a traffic violation. Further, the Court noted that even though the caller was not anonymous, the reliability of the information was not proven because the informant had not previously provided information to the police and she only relayed that the defendant was possibly intoxicated and the make, model, license plate, and location of the defendant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the charges against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
01/17/2012

Town of North Smithfield v. Thomas Casperson, C.A. No. T11-0034 Fellow-Officer Rule

Fellow-Officer Rule

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because he observed the defendant travel at a high rate of speed and swerve into the break down lane. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-17-2.1. Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to request the defendant to submit to field sobriety tests. The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to request that the defendant submit to field sobriety tests because the officer observed the defendant travel at a high rate of speed and swerve into the breakdown lane, the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, she emitted an odor of alcohol, she admitted to the consumption of alcohol, and she had difficulty retrieving the requested documents. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-17-2.1. Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that the officer’s stop and detention of her constituted a de facto arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and investigate for suspicion of DUI because the officer observed the defendant travel at a high rate of speed and swerve into the breakdown lane, the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, she emitted an odor of alcohol, she admitted to the consumption of alcohol, and she had difficulty retrieving the requested documents. Further, the Court noted that there was nothing on the record that suggested the officer’s detention of the defendant was unusual in either duration or scope. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-27-2.1. Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/26/2012

Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that her refusal to submit was not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because she was not fluent in the English language. The Court held that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily refused because before she made the decision to refuse to submit she was read the Rights for Use at the Station form several times, she asked the officer questions pertaining to the Rights for Use form, and she had the opportunity to speak with counsel. Further, the Court noted that the defendant’s bare assertion that she did not understand should not result in the dismissal of the violation. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-27-2.1.Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/28/2011

City of Woonsocket v. Lamphone Voravongsa, C.A. No. T11-0065 Telephone Call

City of Woonsocket v. Lamphone Voravongsa, C.A. No. T11-0065 (December 28, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the officer’s presence during a confidential phone call did not prejudice the defendant and did not warrant dismissal because the defendant was speaking in another language, and the officer could not understand what the defendant was saying. Accordingly, the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call and, thus, the violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
12/28/2011

City of Woonsocket v. Lamphone Voravongsa, C.A. No. T11-0065 Reasonable Grounds

City of Woonsocket v. Lamphone Voravongsa, C.A. No. T11-0065 (December 28, 2011).pdf

The Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal appeals panel affirmed the magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (Refusal to Submit to A Chemical Test). This panel found that the officer had reasonable grounds to ask the defendant to submit to a chemical test, because the defendant smelled like alcohol, slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and performed poorly on the walk and turn test. Thus, this panel affirmed the violation.

Appeals Panel
08/24/2011

City of Woonsocket v. Adam Bussey, C.A. No. T11-0033 (August 24, 2011) Rights for Use at the Scene

City of Woonsocket v. Adam Bussey, C.A. No, T11-0033 (August 24, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-1 (care in starting from stop), and § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in sustaining the refusal charge when the Officer read the “rights for use at the scene” at the Woonsocket Police Department rather than at the scene of the initial traffic stop. The Officer testified that due to heavy traffic, numerous pedestrians, narrowed roads due to snow banks and sidewalks covered in ice and snow, he determined it would not be safe to conduct a field sobriety test at the scene. Instead, the Officer placed the Defendant under arrest for failing to produce a drivers license and for obstruction in violation of §§ 31-10-27 and 11-32-1. Thereafter, the Officer drove a quarter mile away to the police station where he conducted field sobriety tests, part of which the Defendant failed, at which point the Officer read the rights for use at the scene and placed the Defendant under arrest for suspicion of DUI. The Panel held that, because the scene of the DUI investigation shifted to the police station, the Officer read the Defendant his rights for use at the scene immediately after the arrest, as required by the statute. The Panel also explained that the Defendant did not provide any evidence demonstrating prejudice by the timing of the reading of his rights. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

Judge Almeida dissented, writing that because the Officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI at the scene of the traffic stop, the Officer was obligated to arrest and read the Defendant his rights for use at the scene immediately, the delay of which constituted prejudice to the Defendant.

Appeals Panel
05/11/2011

Town of South Kingstown v. Mark Kemp, C.A. No. T11-0011 (May 11, 2011) Anonymous Tips

Town of South Kingstown v. Mark Kemp, C.A. No. T11-0011 (May 11, 2011) Anonymous Tips.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion necessary for a stop because the defendant was stopped based solely on a face-to-face tip from an unknown informant that the defendant was drunk and had been involved in an accident. The Panel noted that the RI Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle based solely on an anonymous tip that the operator is driving under the influence is unconstitutional. State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 1997). The Panel held that, because the Officer’s first words to the Defendant upon stopping him were to ask whether the Defendant had hit another vehicle, the Officer’s intent in making the stop was to investigate the hit and run. Noting the distinction between an unnamed citizen informant and an anonymous informant, the Panel then considered whether this unnamed citizen informant could have furnished reasonable suspicion in the mind of the Officer. Citing federal case law, the Panel noted that a face-to-face informant is considered more reliable than a telephone informant because it exposes the citizen to criminal liability for making a false accusation. The Panel emphasized that the informant had personally witnessed the alleged accident, that the informant provided a detailed description of the Defendant’s vehicle before it drove by and then pointed it out to the Officer, and that exigent circumstances in the interest of public safety justified the Officer’s decision to stop the Defendant before he disappeared into the night. The Panel held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Officer was justified in relying on the informant’s tip despite the failure of the Officer to obtain the identity of the tipster. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
11/15/2011

Town of Bristol v. James R. Marchand, C.A. No.T11-0016 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion and denied the defendant the right to a fair and impartial hearing. The Court held that the trial magistrate abused his discretion because he made conclusory statements regarding his determination of the defendant’s guilt and the credibility of the state’s witness before the defendant had an opportunity to present his case in chief. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the defendant had been prejudiced by the trial magistrate’s abuse of discretion and remanded the case for further proceedings.Town of Bristol v. James R. Marchand, No. T11-0016 (November 15, 2011).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/27/2011

Town of Smithfield v. Stephen Beauregard, C.A. No. T11-0014 Right to an Independant Medical Examination

The state appealed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that he was denied his right to an independent medical exam because he was not released from the police station until after his arraignment the following morning. The Court held that it was the duty of the defendant to invoke his right to an examination. The Court held that the defendant was not denied his right to an exam because there was no evidence on record that the defendant ever made his desire to receive an independent medical examination known to the police while he was in custody. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation and remanded the case for further proceedings.Town of Smithfield v. Stephen Beauregard, C.A. No. T11-0014 (April 27, 2011).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/27/2011

Town of Smithfield v. Stephen Beauregard, C.A. No. T11-0014 Telephone Call

Town of Smithfield v. Stephen Beauregard, C.A. No. T11-0014 (April 27, 2011).pdf

The state appealed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) in favor of the defendant. The Court held that the trial judge erred when he dismissed the violation because the defendant suffered no prejudice by the officer’s presence when he attempted to contact his lawyer. Since the defendant was not able to reach his attorney and the defendant only offered a myriad of hypothetical situations relying on “vague, speculative, or conclusory allegations[,]” he failed “[t]o establish actual prejudice[.]” The state’s appeal was granted and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204, 1238 (P.A. 2002) (citing, United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996)).

Appeals Panel
04/19/2011

Town of South Kingston v. Marsha Rooney, C.A. No. T11-0009 Credibility Determinations

Town of South Kingston v. Marsha Rooney, C.A. No. T11-0009 (April 19, 2011).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that they lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgments for that of the hearing magistrate’s concerning the weight of evidence on questions of fact. Also, the Court reasoned that there was ample evidence for the officer to believe that the defendant was operating her vehicle under the influence because she was driving erratically, she emitted an odor of alcohol from her breath, her eye’s were glossy, and she admitted to consuming alcohol. Thus, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
06/09/2010

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010) Due Process

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). After submitting to two breath tests, Defendant was asked to submit to a blood test, which he refused. Defendant argued that he denied his due process rights when the police asked him to submit to a second chemical test because the “Rights for the Use at Station” form’s language – “I request you submit to a chemical test” – fails to inform a suspected impaired driver that he or she must submit to more than one chemical test. The Defendant argued that, in order to satisfy due process, the language should be changed to track § 31-27-2.1, which allows for the administration of two chemical tests. The Panel explained that the use of the singular article “a” is used because the form is read before a single chemical test for either alcohol or drugs is administered. The Panel noted that there is no statutory or constitutional requirement that suspected impaired drivers be told they may be subjected to multiple tests. The Panel noted that the Officer read the Defendant the Rights for Use at the Station form before both tests and that the Defendant was fully apprised of the consequences of refusing to submit to the second test and willingly refused. The Panel held that none of the Defendant’s due process rights were violated and accordingly sustained the charged violations.

Appeals Panel
06/09/2010

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010) Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). Defendant argued that his due process rights were violated when the State failed to deliver in discovery copies of the Officer’s initial recorded statements or initial written narrative because the statements had a material bearing on his guilt or innocence. The Panel explained that, in order to demonstrate a due process violation based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence under the “tripartite” test adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 185 (R.I. 1994), a defendant must show: (1) the evidence possessed exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed; (2) the Defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means; and (3) the failure to preserve the exculpatory evidence amounted to bad faith on the part of the state. Id. The Panel explained that the Defendant failed to satisfy all three prongs of the test because: 1) there had been no showing that the evidence would exonerate or cast any doubt on the credibility of Officer’s trial testimony; 2) the final written report differed only in grammatical changes and revisions indicating the type of medication the defendant was regularly taking at the time of arrest; and 3) there was no showing of bad faith because the police regularly destroy initial field notes before submitting their final reports. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision did not prejudice the due process rights of the Defendant and sustained the charged violations.

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/08/2010

Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T10-0089 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge imposing sanctions for the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27.2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) subsequent to the decision of the Appeals Panel to remand for further proceedings. Following the decision of the Appeals Panel remanding the case, but before the trial judge imposed sanctions, the defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel to the District Court. While awaiting review by the District Court, the trial judge imposed sanctions pursuant to the Appeals Panel’s order. The defendant argued that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because the case had already been appealed to the District Court. The Court held that the defendant’s appeal to the District Court was premature because its decision to remand the case for further proceedings was not a final order. Therefore, the order of the trial judge imposing sanctions was not in excess of his jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T10-0089 (December 8, 2010).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/08/2010

Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T10-0089 Appeal

Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T10-0089 (December 8, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge imposing sanctions for the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27.2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) on remand from the decision of the Appeals Panel. The defendant argued that the state did not have the right to appeal the original decision of the trial judge and, therefore, the decision of the trial judge to dismiss the violations should not have been overturned. The Court held that the state had the authority to appeal the decision of the trial judge to the Appeals Panel pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Traffic Tribunal. Further, the Court noted that the defendant’s reliance on State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150 (R.I. 2009), in support of his contention that the state did not have the right to appeal was misguided because Robinson did not apply to appeals from the Traffic Tribunal to the Appeals Panel but held only that, at the time, there was no statutory authority for the state to appeal a decision of the Appeals Panel to the District Court. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

Appeals Panel
01/20/2010

City of Warwick v. James Morgan, C.A. No. T09-0103 Reasonable Grounds

City of Warwick v. James Morgan, C.A. No.T09-0103 (January 20, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test”) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol given the totality of the officer’s observations of the defendant’s driving and physical appearance. Since the Court cannot engage in an inquiry as to the credibility of witnesses it must defer to the trial judge’s findings which stated that the officer observed the defendant cross the divider lines and swerve into the breakdown lane. Therefore, the violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
01/20/2010

City of Warwick v. James Morgan, C.A. No. T09-0103 Right for Use at the Scene

City of Warwick v. James Morgan, C.A. No.T09-0103 (January 20, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test) and R.I.G.L. § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). The Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the officer’s failure to read him his rights before proceeding to the field sobriety tests. The defendant had refused to submit to the chemical test after the officer read him the “Right for Use at the Scene” and the “Rights for Use at the Station” forms. Therefore, the charged violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
10/13/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Francisco Espinal, C.A. No. T10-0049 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-12-12 (power of local authorities) and the violation of Rhode Island Airport Corporation Regulation 2.2.2 (permitted use at the airport). The Court held that the defendant’s contention that the Traffic Tribunal has no authority to hear the case was without merit. Under § 8-8-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws the Traffic Tribunal has the power “to hear, in addition to those cases specifically listed in the statute, “all violations in relation to motor vehicles, littering and traffic offenses, except those traffic offenses committed in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” The Airport is not in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Unites States, and therefore, the Traffic Tribunal judge who sustained the charged against the Appellant, had the authority to do so. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Francisco Espinal, C.A. T10-0049 (October 13, 2010)..pdf

Appeals Panel
09/22/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Preliminary Breath Test

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that after she refused the preliminary breath test it was a violation of her rights for the officer to request that she take a second test in the barracks. The Cour disagreed and held that the “none shall be given” language in § 31-27.2.1 is clearly in contemplation of a refusal of an actual breath test and that there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature contemplated it applied to a preliminary breath test. See Almeida v. United States Rubber Co., 107 A.2d 330, 332 (R. I. 1954). “[I]t is clear that[,] the only test pondered by the legislature in drafting § 31-27.2.1 is the ‘official’ breath test conducted at a police station[;] if the legislature deems it appropriate for police to administer a test at the station after one has been administered at the scene, it would make little sense to hold that police cannot request for a motorist to submit to that test, simply because he or she refused a PBT.” Accordingly, the violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
09/22/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent T10-0056 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the trial judge took improper judicial notice on the issue of whether the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call because the judge relied on his own personal experiences instead of making credibility determinations based on the evidence presented at trial. The Court held that the trial judge relied on the officer’s testimony that he could not hear any of the defendant’s conversation to determine whether the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call and did not take improper judicial notice when he stated that he was familiar with the NCO room at the police barracks because he did not supply evidence of an essential element. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf

Appeals Panel
09/22/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that she had operated a vehicle under the influence because she informed the officer that her medical condition affected her performance on the field sobriety tests. The Court held that reasonable grounds existed for the officer to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant exhibited numerous indicia of intoxication in addition to her performance on the field sobriety tests, including that she had bloodshot and watery eyes, she had an unsteady gate when exiting the vehicle, she drove erratically and nearly collided with the officer’s vehicle, and she emitted an odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf

Appeals Panel
09/22/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that, despite the defendant’s argument that the officer’s reasonable suspicion was faulty as her medical condition rendered her unable to perform field sobriety tests, “reasonable suspicion can be based on the officer’s observation of the motorist’s vehicle while in operation; such as swerving from lane to lane or other ‘erratic movements of [the vehicle.]’” State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1996); State v. Bruno, 709 A.2d 1048, 1050 (R.I. 1998). Since the field “sobriety tests were just one factor used by [the officer] to make his determination that [the defendant] was intoxicated,” the violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
09/22/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Probable Cause

State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that, the officer was speaking in general terms and was not referring particularly to the defendant when he mentioned that sometimes he had doubts at the scene about whether the defendant was indeed under the influence of a controlled substance. The fact that he requested a preliminary breath test was “no[t] a factual support for Appellant’s contention that her medical condition gave [the officer] second doubts as to her level of intoxication.” Therefore, the charged violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
06/30/2010

Town of North Providence v. Peter Exarchos, C.A. No. T10-0119 Constructive Refusal to Submit

Town of North Providence v. Peter Exarchos, C.A. No. T10-0119 (June 30, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that, although the defendant did not verbally refuse to take a breathalyzer test, the defendant did not cooperate when the officer made the request. Therefore, the defendant’s silence when asked to take the test was construed as a constructive or conditional refusal, which holds the same legal effect as a verbal refusal. Since the defendant did not cooperate when asked to submit to a breathalyzer, the Court sustained the violation.

Appeals Panel
08/25/2010

City of Warwick v. Michael Petrarca, C.A. No. T10-0033 Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that “[t]he State, in presenting [the officer’s] informed and experience observations of Appellant’s demeanor, alertness and responsiveness, met its burden. If there was something medically defective with Appellant regarding his motor skills, or cognitive ability to understand what was read to him from the Rights form, it most certainly laid ‘peculiarly with him.’ Therefore, the burden of proving as much did as well.” Since the state proved all the necessary elements and the defendant was unsuccessful in refuting the state’s assertions, the defendant suffered no prejudice. Accordingly, the violation was sustained.

Noonan, M Concurring. Concurs with the majority opinion that the decision of the trial magistrate should not be disturbed. However, he believes that the court walks a dangerous line by shifting the burden of proof with regard to statutory elements on a motorist who is the target of a state endorsed prosecution. According to Rule 17 of Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedures, “[t]he burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to a standard of clear and convincing evidence.” Combining the rules of procedure with the shifting burden test promotes uncertainty to those who appear before the tribunal. When we have a clear rule like Rule 17, adopting this mixed approach is improper.

City of Warwick v. Michael Petrarca, C.A. No. T10-0033 (August 25, 2010).pdf

Appeals Panel
08/25/2010

City of Warwick v. Michael Petrarca, C.A. No. T10-0033 Credibility

City of Warwick v. Michael Petrarca, C.A. No. T10-0033 (August 25, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that, the trial magistrate’s findings turned on a credibility determination and it would be impermissible for the Appeals Panel to second guess the trial judge’s “impressions as he… observe[d] [the officer’s and the doctor’s testimony][,] listened to [their] testimony [and]…determine[d]…what to accept and what to disregard[,]…what…[to] believe[] and disbelieve[].” Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 206 (R.I. 1993). Since the defendant presented no new evidence besides that presented at trial to support his argument that he did not knowingly and voluntarily refuse to submit to the chemical test, the Court found no error of law by the trial court and sustained the violation.

Appeals Panel
08/25/2010

City of Warwick v. Michael Petrarca, C.A. No. T10-0033 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for suspicion of DUI and, as a result, the violation should be dismissed because the initial arrest was unlawful. The Court held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the officer observed that the defendant’s vehicle had struck a utility pole, the defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat of the vehicle, his face and clothes were bloodied, he emitted an odor of alcohol, he had bloodshot and watery eyes, and a witness informed the officer that the defendant had been coming from a bar in Coventry, R.I. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. City of Warwick v. Michael Petrarca, C.A. No. T10-0033 (August 25, 2010).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/21/2010

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 Right to Appeal

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds). Defendant claimed that the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant operated the vehicle because the officer testified that he did not observe the defendant driving. The Court held that the defendant did not properly raise the issues for appeal because the defendant merely stated the issue and did not provide a meaningful discussion or brief the issues. Following, 788 A.2d 1129, 1131 n.1 (R.I. 2002), the Court held that “[s]imply stating an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in focusing on the legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.” Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/04/2010

Town of North Kingstown v. Brendon Beiber C.A. No. T08-0098, Opportunity to make a phone call

Town of North Kingstown v. Brendon Beiber, C.A. No. T08-0098 (June 4, 2010).pdf

The state appealed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20 (right to use telephone) was ambiguous on its face and that when an arrestee is not given a phone call within the statutorily proscribed time period of one hour, dismissal of the charges should not be mandatory. Here, the delay was caused by two other motorists colliding with the arresting officer’s vehicle. Thus, it was physically impossible to afford the defendant an opportunity to make a call within a one hour period. Further, the arresting officer acted reasonably, given the exigent circumstances, by affording the defendant an opportunity to make a call as early as physically possible. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial judge and sustained the violation against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
02/01/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Seth Bettez, C.A. No. T09-0061 Rights for Use at the Station

State of Rhode Island v. Seth Bettez, C.A. No. T09-0061 (February 1, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer’s reading of the “Rights for Use at Scene” and “Rights for Use at Station” was sufficient to inform the defendant of the penalties which would result from refusing to submit to the chemical test even though the suspension of the defendant’s commercial driver’s license was not specifically enumerated on the “rights” forms. The rights forms list the loss of the base operator’s license as a consequence of a refusal and, therefore, the forms sufficiently informed the defendant of the loss of any supplemental driving privileges. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
02/01/2010

Seth Bettez, C.A. No. T09-0061 Preliminary Breath Test

State of Rhode Island v. Seth Bettez, C.A. No. T09-0061 (February 1, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). The Court held that the arresting officer had formulated the requisite reasonable belief that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol because the defendant had crossed the yellow divider line, was speeding, had bloodshot watery eyes, had slurred speech, and he emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath. Unlike § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), § 31-27-2.3 does not require the defendant to be informed of the penalties which will result from a refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
10/27/2010

State of Rhode Island v. Christopher Taro T10-0025 Right for Use at the Scene

State of Rhode Island v. Christopher Taro*.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the defendant’s argument that he was prejudice by the trial judge’s failure to suppress the state’s evidence of his refusal because the officer failed to Mirandize him prior to any inquiries regarding the motor vehicle accident was without merit. The officer’s request that the defendant submit to the chemical test was based on his observations that the defendant had bloodshot eyes, slurred his speech, and smelled of alcohol. Once the process of detainment for the drunken driving charges commenced, the defendant was Mirandized by the officer. Furthermore, no one factor is dispositive, nor does a potential procedural violation warrant the suppression of other relevant evidence. Therefore, the charged violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
04/21/2010

T09-0120 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that the defendant had voluntarily refused to submit to the chemical test even though there was evidence that the defendant had been given some medication because the state met its burden of proving that the defendant was coherent and, further, the state did not have a duty to inquire as to whether an individual is on medication. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

Appeals Panel
04/21/2010

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 Operation of Motor Vehicle

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating the motor vehicle based on the facts as they were known to him because when the officer arrived at the scene the defendant was walking from the scene of the accident and another officer testified that when he arrived at the scene the defendant was inside the vehicle. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
04/21/2010

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 Penalties

Penalty

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that the plain and clear language of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 permits the trial judge to impose a penalty of a ten month license suspension. Since the sentence imposed is within the statutory requirements the sentence does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the violation was sustained.

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/21/2010

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 Reasonable Grounds

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Reasonable Grounds
Defendant appealed the trial court decision sustaining a charge of violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“Refusal to submit to chemical test”). The Court held that the prosecution proved by clear and convincing evidence that the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was driving while intoxicated prior to asking him to submit to a chemical test. The officer testified that based on his experience the defendant “had [the] same characteristics that [he had] seen before when [somebody is] intoxicated.” See State v. Pineda, 712 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1998) (listing factors of intoxication, including detection of an odor of alcohol on the driver’s breath, bloodshot eyes, physical damage to the driver’s vehicle). Defendant failed to refute the officer’s testimony. Therefore, the trial magistrate had reliable, probative, and substantial evidence which shows that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was intoxicated. Accordingly, the charged violation is sustained.

Probable Cause to Arrest
Defendant appealed the trial court decision sustaining a charge of violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“Refusal to submit to chemical test”). The Court held that, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant even though there was no warrant because “under the totality of the circumstances, the arresting officer possesse[d] sufficient trustworthy facts and information to warrant a prudent officer in believing that the suspect has committed or was committing an offense.” Stave v. Guzman, 752 A.2d 1, 4 (R.I. 2000). Furthermore, the experience of the police officer can be considered when determining probable cause. State v. Flores, 996 A.2d 156, 161 (R.I. 2010). Since the officer personally observed of the defendant’s personal appearance and combative demeanor, coupled with the officer’s professional experience and training with respect to DUI investigations, under the facts and circumstances known to him he had probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant had committed it. State v. Perry, 731 A.2d 720, 723 (R.I. 1999).

Appeals Panel
04/21/2010

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 Telephone Call

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that the defendant was given the opportunity to make a confidential phone call despite the presence of emergency personnel in the room. Since there was reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record evidencing that the defendant exercised his right to a confidential phone call and the integrity of the defendant’s communications were not violated, the violation was sustained.

Appeals Panel
05/13/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No. T09-0025 Opportunity to Make a Phone Call

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Appeals Panel
04/01/2009

Michelle Hojeilly, C.A. No. T09-0014 Right for use at Station

Michelle Hojeilly, C.A. No. T09-0014 (April 1, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the violation should not be sustained because the officer failed to re-read the Rights for use at Station form before administering a chemical blood test. The Appeals Panel held that there was no rule, case, or statute requiring a second reading of the Rights for use at Station form before administering a subsequent chemical blood test where the Rights for use at Station form is read to the defendant before administering a breath test. Additionally, a second reading of the identical Rights for use at Station form would impose an additional, unnecessary requirement for law officers. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate.

NOTE – This case was decided in the District Court on appeal, which affirmed the holding of the Appeals Panel.

Appeals Panel
04/29/2009

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-152-Rights for use at Scene/Station

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-0152 (April 29, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-21 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the “Rights for Use at Scene” and “Rights for Use at Station” are sufficient to inform a defendant of his rights, even though the rights associated with civil and criminal charges are slightly different. The Court held that both “rights” cards were read to defendant and the defendant indicated that he understood them. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

Appeals Panel
04/29/2009

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-152- Opportunity to Make a Phone Call

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-0152 (April 29, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that §12-7-20 affords a defendant an opportunity to make a phone call, but not the right to the presence of counsel when making the decision of whether or not to submit to a chemical test. The Court held that although no counsel was present, the defendant was afforded the opportunity to make a call to an attorney and chose not to. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

Appeals Panel
04/29/2009

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-152-Inability to Cure a Refusal by Subsequently Submitting

Inability to Cure a Refusal by Subsequently Submitting

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the defendant did not have the ability to “cure” a refusal to submit by subsequently submitting to a chemical test. The Court held that even though the defendant testified that he eventually agreed to submit to a chemical test, this did not cure his previous refusal to do so. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the violation against the defendant.

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-0152 (April 29, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/16/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Craig Huntley, C.A. No. T09-0092 (December 16, 2009) Reasonable Grounds

State of Rhode Island v. Craig Huntley, C.A. No. T09-0092 (December 16, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27 2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). Defendant argued the decision of the trial magistrate was clearly erroneous because the officer did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant was operating under the influence. Specifically, the Defendant argued the Officer did not personally observe the Defendant operating the vehicle and did not conduct any field sobriety tests at the scene and, therefore, arrested him without probable cause. The Panel noted that the Officer came upon the scene of a horrific accident and that the Defendant admitted to being the driver of the vehicle in question, admitted to having consumed alcohol, had bloodshot watery eyes, had an odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, was weaving back and forth on his feet, and appeared to be ready to fall asleep. The Panel also noted that field sobriety tests are not required but rather are simply one tool officers may use to obtain probable cause. Here, the Panel noted that the Officer decided not to conduct field sobriety tests so as to not interfere with medical treatment the Defendant was receiving at the scene. The Panel held that, based on the Defendant’s admissions and the Officer’s observations, the trial magistrate was justified in finding the Officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant of operating under the influence. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

Appeals Panel
12/16/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Craig Huntley, C.A. No. T09-0092 (December 16, 2009) RIghts for Use at the Scene

State of Rhode Island v. Craig Huntley, C.A. No. T09-0092 (December 16, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27 2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was an error of law because the Officer did not immediately arrest him and read him his Rights for Use at Scene once the Officer determined he had reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant had operated under the influence. The Officer testified he had reasonable grounds to arrest upon arriving on the scene and making observations, but decided to wait to arrest the Defendant until after the Defendant finished receiving medical treatment. The Panel explained that an Officer is only required to read a suspect the Rights for Use at the Scene once the suspect is under arrest. The Panel explained that the Defendant’s injuries and subsequent medical treatment prevented the Officer from immediately arresting Defendant, and held that because the Officer appropriately read the Defendant his Rights for Use at Station/Hospital upon arresting him, the Officer’s actions complied with § 31-27-3 and the magistrate’s decision was not in error. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

Appeals Panel
12/16/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Craig Huntley, C.A. No. T09-0092 (December 16, 2009) Arrest

Arrest

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27 2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). Defendant argued that the Officer failed to arrest him prior to requesting he submit to a chemical test. Specifically, Defendant rejected the trial magistrate’s finding that he was under arrest when the medical staff finished treatment and transferred custody of Defendant to the officers. The Panel explained that, under State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915 (R.I. 1980), a court determines when a person is under arrest by considering: (1) the extent to which a person’s freedom of movement has been curtailed and the degree of force used by the police; (2) the belief of a reasonably innocent person in these same circumstances; and (3) whether the person had the option of not going with the police. See id. at 915-18. The Panel held that when transfer of custody from medical personnel to the officers took place, the Officers made a joint decision to arrest the Defendant and that the Defendant did not have the option of leaving the officers custody, thereby effectuating a legally valid arrest. The Panel noted that the officers then read the Defendant his Rights for Use at Station/Hospital, at which point the Defendant refused to submit to a chemical test. The Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision was not in error, and, accordingly, sustained the charged violations.

State of Rhode Island v. Craig Huntley, C.A. No. T09-0092 (December 16, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/20/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009) Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was an error of law because the magistrate violated Rule 614 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence when he asked questions that filled in missing elements of the prosecution’s case. The Panel explained that Rule 614(b) allows the court to interrogate witnesses but that such questions should be limited to clarifying matters already asked on direct, redirect, or cross-examination. The Panel held that the magistrate’s questions to the Trooper were simply designed to clarify answers to questions the Prosecutor asked on direct and redirect and did not raise anything not already asked by the Prosecutor. The Panel held that the magistrate’s questions were within the scope of Rule 614 and, therefore, did not prejudice Defendant and were not an error of law or abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/20/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009) Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle because the Trooper relied on an informant’s tip and did not personally observe any erratic driving, traffic violations, or other evidence of a crime. The Trooper testified he stopped the Defendant because an informant reported a vehicle matching the Defendant’s vehicle had been involved in a hit-and-run accident, and that the driver might have been operating under the influence. The Panel explained that in determining whether reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop exists based on an informant’s tip, the “totality of the circumstances” is taken into account, and that such a stop is permitted if supported by sufficient detail and corroboration. Here, the Panel noted that the Trooper relied on an informant who made an official statement, that the tip provided details including the make, model, and registration of the vehicle, that the informant had personally observed the Defendant leave the scene of an accident, that the informant had been following the Defendant while on the phone with the State Police dispatcher, and that the Trooper corroborated those details upon locating the vehicle. Based on the reliability of the informant and the Trooper’s corroboration of the details of the informant’s tip, the Panel held that the trial judge properly determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
03/10/2009

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the defendant was speeding, had swerved, fumbled when producing the requested documents, had slurred speech, watery eyes, appeared unsteady on her feet, and the officer observed vomit on the vehicle’s floor, probable cause existed for arrest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 (March 10, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/10/2009

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that although the officer’s report was not properly sworn before a notary, the officer’s testimony regarding the report rendered any defect inconsequential. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 (March 10, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/10/2009

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 Confidential Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that although the arresting officer could hear the defendant’s voice during her confidential phone call, it was made in a room with no audio-visual surveillance and the officer could not recollect what was said. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 (March 10, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
03/10/2009

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the trial magistrate stated to the prosecution that the Rights for Use at Scene and Station cards had not yet been introduced into evidence, there was no due process violation. The magistrate did not attempt to establish proof to support the position of the prosecution, and, therefore, did not violate the defendant’s right to a trial before a neutral and detached fact-finder. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 (March 10, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/16/2009

City of Warwick v. Eric Alhborg, C.A. No. T09-0058 Reasonable Grounds

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable grounds for arrest where defendant left his lane without signaling multiple times, had bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech, emitted the odor of alcohol from his breath, and failed two field sobriety tests. Therefore, the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous, and, thus, the Court affirmed that decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.City of Warwick v. Eric Alhborg, C.A. No. T09-0058 (September 16, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/09/2009

City of Warwick v. Nicole Cianci, C.A. T 09-0015-1 Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). At trial, the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the state’s non-compliance with discovery order was denied. However, since a copy of a videotape had not been produced for the defense, the trial magistrate allowed for a continuance or the recall of witnesses after the tape was produced. Here, the Court held that the defendant was not entitled to a dismissal because her attorney had seen the tape, and the state had a limited opportunity to comply with the order and eventually did comply with it. Furthermore, the remedy for the delay was within the trial court’s discretion under Rule 11 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure. Additionally, the remedies the trial magistrate put forth did not constitute an abuse of that discretion. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the charged violation against the defendant.
Noonan M., dissenting: The magistrate believes the charge should have been dismissed because of the Warwick Police Department’s contemptuous behavior in ignoring an order of the court for 19 months. Furthermore, the trial magistrate misapplied Rule 12 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and the defendant did all that was required of her under Rule 11. Therefore, the trial magistrate’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion and the case should have been dismissed.
*Note: On appeal, the District Court reversed the majority and dismissed the charge against the defendant.
City of Warwick v. Nicole Cianci, C.A. T 09-0015-1 (December 9, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
06/03/2009

City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the charging officer’s testimony at trial concerning an “affidavit” was sufficient evidence for the statutorily required “sworn report,” despite the different terminology that the officer had used. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant.City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 (June 3, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
06/03/2009

City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 Collateral Estoppel

Collateral Estoppel

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in this case because the defendant impliedly waived her right to argue the issue of whether or not she was the operator of the vehicle by taking the stand and testifying that she was, in fact, the operator. Despite the defendant’s contention that the state failed to establish that she was the operator of the vehicle in prior proceedings, the defendant’s testimony served as an implied waiver of her right to argue that issue. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant.City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 (June 3, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
06/03/2009

City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the defendant was properly informed of the penalties associated with a refusal to submit to a chemical test by the Rights for Use at Station card even though the seventy-five dollar license reinstatement fee was not specifically enumerated therein. The reinstatement of a suspended license is optional and, therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of the specific amount of the fee. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the violation against the defendant.City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 (June 3, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
06/03/2009

City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 PBT

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that § 31-27-2.1 specifically concerns subsequent chemical tests and only becomes operative once a driver has been placed under arrest. Thus, the fact that the defendant agreed to submit to a preliminary breath test at the scene, does not preclude her from being charged with a violation of § 31-27-2.1 for refusing to submit to a subsequent chemical test at the station. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant.City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 (June 3, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/16/2009

Town of West Warwick v. Dennis DeCorpo, C.A. No. T09-0074 Confidential Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that § 12-7-20 (right to use telephone for call to attorney) also applies to civil cases, and the term “confidentiality” in that statute is clear and unambiguous and, thus, should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The Court held that the defendant’s phone calls were confidential because the officer was out of earshot range and could not hear what the defendant was saying. Furthermore, the defendant was given twenty minutes to attempt to contact an attorney. Though he was unsuccessful, he also spent much of that time contacting friends, and was not prejudiced by his inability to reach an attorney. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of West Warwick v. Dennis DeCorpo, C.A. No. T09-0074 (September 16, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/16/2009

Town of West Warwick v. Dennis DeCorpo, C.A. No. T09-0074 Procedure

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Following the “raise or waive” rule, the Court held that because the defendant did not raise the issue of delay concerning the rendering of the judge’s decision at trial, the issue was waived and could not be heard on appeal. Furthermore, the defendant’s attorney agreed to receive the decision on the date it was rendered and the delay falls under the ambit of harmless error. Therefore, this case presents no exception to the “raise or waive” rule. Additionally, Rules 18 and 25 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure allow the trial judge to enlarge the period within which a decision is rendered. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charge against the defendant. Town of West Warwick v. Dennis DeCorpo, C.A. No. T09-0074 (September 16, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/01/2009

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, C.A. No. T09-0031 Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that there was no evidence to support the defendant’s claim that there was confusion or prejudice because the arresting officer read the defendant and another defendant their rights at the same time. Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous and the Court affirmed that decision sustaining the violation against defendant.City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, C.A. No. T09-0031 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
04/29/2009

City of Warwick v. Marcus Thomas, C.A. No. T08-0152 Rights for Use at Station

Appeals Panel
09/17/2009

City of Warwick v. Robert Iannotti, C.A. No. T09-0086 Sworn Report

City of Warwick v. Robert Iannotti, C.A. No. T09-0086 (September 17, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Following Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993), the Court held that the role of the officer’s sworn report ended with the preliminary suspension of the defendant’s license. Therefore, the misidentification of the defendant’s vehicle on the sworn report was inconsequential at trail for the refusal to submit charge. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
09/17/2009

City of Warwick v. Robert Iannotti, C.A. No. T09-0086 Summons

Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the summons was sufficiently clear to inform the defendant of the charge against him despite the officer’s failure to correctly identify the defendant’s vehicle on the summons or have it notarized. Because this did not constitute prejudicial error, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

City of Warwick v. Robert Iannotti, C.A. No. T09-0086 (September 17, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/01/2009

T09-0031-Rights for use at Scene/Station

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, C.A. No. T09-0031 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/01/2009

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, C.A. No. T09-0031 Constitutional Issues

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, C.A. No. T09-0031 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protections against an unreasonable “search” of the defendant’s breath did not apply here because the defendant refused to submit to a breath test, and no such test was administered. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
07/04/2009

City of Warwick v. Robert Malo, C.A. No. T09-0021 Opportunity to Make a Phone Call

City of Warwick v. Robert Malo, C.A. No. T09-0021 (July 4, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that under R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20 defendants must be given the opportunity to make a phone call, however, it is not a requirement that a defendant actually speak with an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a chemical test. Here, the defendant was afforded the opportunity to make a phone call. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation.

Appeals Panel
09/23/2009

City of Warwick v. Jason Haley, C.A. No. T09-0024 Reasonable grounds/Probable cause

City of Warwick v. Jason Haley, C.A. No. T09-0024 (September 23, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the state was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was under the influence, and was not required to prove that defendant was actually under the influence. The requisite reasonable grounds existed here because the defendant went through a red light, narrowly avoided a collision with another vehicle, struck a curb, fumbled with his license, had slurred speech, had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol from his breath, and failed two of three field sobriety tests. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
05/14/2009

James Herard, C.A. No. T09-0006 Right to Appeal

City of Providence v. James Herard, C.A. No. T09-0006 (May 14, 2009).pdf

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that it may not review a case in which a final judgment of the trial court has not been rendered. The matter was not ripe for review because the defendant appealed the denial of the magistrate’s motion before a final judgment has been entered. Therefore, the Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. However, since the parties had stipulated to all the essential elements of § 31-27-2.1 the Court sustained the charge against defendant.

Appeals Panel
05/13/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No. T09-0025 Deficient Sample

Deficient Sample

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that where the defendant agreed to submit to a chemical test which produced a deficient sample, the state had the burden to prove that the breathalyzer was certified for accuracy and the person conducting the test was competent to do so, as described in § 31-27-2. Here, the testimony of the arresting trooper and an employee of the Department of Health provided sufficient evidence that the requirements of § 31-27-2 were met. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Appeals Panel
05/13/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No. T09-0025 Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that, although the state failed to account for the breath test cards indicating that the defendant produced a deficient sample, this was not grounds for dismissal. The Court held that the failure to produce the cards did not cause inordinate delay, expense or frustration, and was not part of a pattern of continuous noncompliance with discovery orders. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not dismissing the charge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Appeals Panel
05/13/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025 Right to an Independent Medical Examination

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the recitation of the Rights for use at Scene and Rights for Use at Station cards was sufficient to afford the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to be examined by a physician of his choosing, in accordance with § 31-27-3, pursuant to State v. Langella, 650 A.2d 478, 479 (R.I. 1994). The Court held that the lack of evidence of the defendant exercising his right to be examined independently satisfies the state’s burden of proving that the defendant made the decision to forgo the exam. The Court held that there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant’s claim that he exercised his right to an independent medical examination. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

Appeals Panel
05/13/2009

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No. T09-0025 Evidence

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow testimonial evidence about the breathalyzer cards without the state entering the cards themselves into evidence or offering any proof that the cards were unavailable due to loss, destruction, inaccessibility, or other justifiable cause violated the “best evidence rule” (Rule 1002 in the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence) and constituted an abuse of discretion. However, the Court held that the abuse of discretion constituted harmless error as the violation was supported by other legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Appeals Panel
07/01/2009

Town of Portsmouth v. Jesse Faria, C.A. No. T09-0068 Discovery

Discovery

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Defendant argued that the violation should be dismissed because the police did not send a supplemental discovery package, which included the incident report of a witness who observed the defendant, until three weeks after the trial. The Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced because he had not submitted a discovery request, there was no ongoing discovery, and he did not make a motion for discovery. Moreover, the police did not possess the incident report or have knowledge of the information contained within it because the witness did not submit the report to the police until after the trial. Accordingly, the Court held that neither the state nor the police failed to comply with a discovery order. Thus, the Court sustained the violation.Town of Portsmouth v. Jesse Faria, C.A. No. T09-0068 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/10/2008

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008)

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that she was deprived of her due process right to an impartial fact finder because the trial magistrate assisted the prosecution to prove an essential element of the violation. Specifically, the trial magistrate advised counsel for the State that the “Rights for Use at the Station” form had not been introduced into evidence, which prompted counsel to enter the form. The Panel explained that a dismissal based on impartial fact finder is warranted when the actions of the magistrate undermine the fundamental fairness required by due process and, even though a citizen is guaranteed an impartial fact finder, there is no evidence here that the trial magistrate attempted to establish proof to support the position of either party. Here, the Panel found that the trial magistrate did not exceed his permissible scope of authority because his participation in the proceeding was for the limited purpose of ensuring that it proceeded in an orderly and expeditious fashion. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
12/10/2008

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008)

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by sustaining the refusal charge because the Officer’s report was not properly sworn before a notary as required by § 31-27-2.1. Here, the Officer appeared before the magistrate and testified that his report was not properly sworn, but further testified as to the information contained in the report. The Panel, citing Link v. State, 622 A.2d 1345 (R.I. 1993), held that a chemical refusal charge can be sustained even in the absence of a sworn report where there is sworn testimony for the court to consider. As such, the Panel held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the charge despite a defect in the report because the live testimony at trial rendered the defect inconsequential. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
12/10/2008

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008)

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that she was not given a reasonable opportunity to make a confidential phone call within one hour of her arrest by the Officer, in compliance with R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20, because the Officer testified that he was able to hear the phone call through the door. Here, the Officer testified that the Defendant refused to make the phone call in the interview room and instead preferred to make the call from in the booking room. The Officer further testified that the booking room was not under audible surveillance and he was not physically present in the room at the time of the call. Since the Officer made clear he had no recollection of the Defendant’s conversation and did not include any details of the conversation in the report, the Panel found that the integrity of the confidential conversation was not compromised. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
12/10/2008

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008)

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the underlying arrest was not supported by probable cause to believe the Defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Here, the Officer observed the Defendant to be speeding, as well as swerving. Once in contact with the Defendant, the Officer observed that the Defendant was “fumbling” with documents and that her vehicle and/or her person was emanating a strong alcoholic odor. The Officer further observed that the Defendant was slurring her speech, her eyes were “glassy,” she was unsteady on her feet, and she used the vehicle’s door to maintain her balance. The Officer also testified that there was what appeared to be vomit between the driver’s seat and driver’s side door. Noting that reasonable grounds and probable cause are “functionally equivalent,” the Panel held that Officer had probable cause to believe that the Defendant had operated the motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
12/10/2008

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008)

Procedure

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Following the trial, but prior to the oral argument on appeal, the Defendant and the solicitor entered into an agreement whereby the Defendant would enter a plea in the District Court to the pending criminal violation and accept one-month license suspension in return for a dismissal of the chemical refusal charge pursuant to Rule 27(a) of the Rules of Procedure for the Traffic Tribunal. On appeal to the Panel, the Defendant attempted to enforce that agreement. The Panel, however, held that while it will accept a dismissal prior to or during a trial, it will not accept a dismissal following a trial and entry of judgment. Accordingly, the court would not allow the dismissal and sustained the charge.

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
12/10/2008

Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T08-0106 (December 10, 2008)

Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T08-0106 (December 10, 2008).pdf

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The State argued that the trial magistrate erred in his decision to dismiss the charge because the Defendant’s right to an independent examination pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-3 had been compromised. Here, once the Defendant indicated to the Officer that he would not submit to a chemical test, the Officer took the Defendant to Newport Hospital, where he requested that a doctor perform a blood alcohol test. Subsequently, the Officer requested that the sample be preserved for future investigative purposes. The State, relying on State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862 (1996) argued that the Defendant’s right to a physical examination was not compromised because, like in Collins where the blood test was performed by hospital personnel, the Officer here did not “commandeer” the Defendant’s blood. Here, the drawing and testing of the Defendant’s blood was done by hospital personnel, rather than at the direction of the Officer, and the blood would have been preserved pursuant to hospital policy regardless of the Officer’s request. As such, the Panel reversed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charge because the substantial rights of the Defendant were not compromised.

Appeals Panel
12/17/2008

Town of Jamestown v. Steven White, C.A. No. T08-0141 (December 17, 2008)

Town of Jamestown v. Steven White, C.A. No. T08-0141 (December 17, 2008).pdf

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test) and R.I.G.L § 31-27-2.1 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to preliminary breath test). The State argued the trial magistrate erred in his decision to dismiss the charged violations on jurisdictional grounds because there was a mutual aid agreement in effect between the two jurisdictions. A police department is limited to its own jurisdiction, absent one of the two exceptions recognized in the controlling authority, State v. Ceraso, 812 A.2d 829 (R.I. 2002). Ceraso explains that an Officer is not limited by territorial jurisdiction if the Officer is in “hot pursuit” of the suspect or if the Officer is responding to an emergency request for assistance. Here, the Panel concluded that the Officer was neither in hot pursuit of the suspect nor was the Officer was responding to an emergency situation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charges because the arrest occurred outside the Officer’s jurisdiction.

Appeals Panel
09/17/2008

Town of Warren v. Lewis Quatrucci, C.A. No. T08-0057 Confidential Phone Call

The state appealed the decision of the trial magistrate dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The majority held that the term “confidentiality” in § 12-7-20 is clear and unambiguous on its face and does not require legislative interpretation. Further, the Court held that § 12-7-20 is also applicable in civil cases. However, since this case is civil in nature, the appropriate remedy for not affording the defendant with a confidential phone call was dismissal of the charge. Here, the arresting officer was in earshot of a defendant’s phone conversation in a room with constant audio and video surveillance. Thus, the call was not confidential. The defendant’s verbal waiver of his right to confidentiality was inconsequential because it was the duty of the officer to provide confidentiality. Since a confidential call was not provided to the defendant, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the charge against the defendant.
Goulart M., dissenting: The magistrate believes that the Court should follow State v. Carcieri, 730 A.2d 11 (R.I. 1999), which states that the mere presence of an officer during a phone call does not violate §12-7-20. Unless there is substantial prejudice, dismissal of the charge is an excessive remedy. However, where a defendant can establish that the phone call was to an attorney, there should be a presumption of prejudice and the burden should shift to the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was not prejudiced.Town of Warren v. Lewis Quatrucci, C.A. No. T08-0057 (September 17, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/17/2008

Town of Warren v. Michael Dolan, C.A. No. T08-0075 Confidential Phone Call

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the term “confidentiality” in § 12-7-20 is clear and unambiguous on its face and does not require legislative interpretation. Further, the court held that § 12-7-20 is also applicable in civil cases. However, since this case is civil in nature, the appropriate remedy for not affording a defendant with a confidential phone call is dismissal of the charge. The court held that a defendant may waive his or her right to a confidential phone call, but, if it is not waived, once a phone call is made, the full protections of § 12-7-20 become effective. Here, the trial court determined that the defendant did in fact waive his right to a confidential phone call. Since that was a question of fact, it was not for the Appeals Panel to review. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.
Goulart M., concurring in part, dissenting in part: The magistrate believes that the court should follow State v. Carcieri, 730 A.2d 11 (R.I. 1999), which states that mere presence of an officer during a phone call does not violate §12-7-20. Unless there is substantial prejudice, dismissal of the charge is an excessive remedy. However, where a defendant can establish that the phone call was to an attorney, there should be a presumption of prejudice and the burden should shift to the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was not prejudiced.Town of Warren v. Michael Dolan, C.A. No. T08-0075 (September 17, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/24/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Carnasciale, C.A. T08-0082 (September 24, 2008)

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Carnasciale, C.A. T08-0082 (September 24, 2008).pdf

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was clearly erroneous because the Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. Here, the Officer testified that he stopped the Defendant’s vehicle after he witnessed it swerve abruptly into a parking lot and then hit a curb. Once in contact with the Defendant, the Officer observed that the Defendant’s breath smelled strongly of alcohol, his movements were slow and clumsy, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, and he acknowledged that he was coming from a bar and had “a couple beers.” In light of the evidence, the Panel held that the trial magistrate had legally competent evidence to conclude that the stop was lawful. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
10/01/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Sousa, C.A. T08-0008 (October 1, 2008)

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial judge abused her discretion by ignoring material medical evidence. The Defendant had provided the court with an affidavit from his physician that the Defendant had undergone hip replacement surgery and walked with a “pronounced limp.” Because the doctor noted in his affidavit that he “[didn’t] know [whether] the hip replacement might have contributed to” the Defendant’s failure of the field sobriety tests, the Panel held that the trial judge properly found that the affidavit was irrelevant and immaterial. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Sousa, C.A. T08-0008 (October 1, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
10/01/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Kimberly Medeiros, C.A. T08-0033 (October 1, 2008)

State of Rhode Island v. Kimberly Medeiros, C.A. T08-0033 (October 1, 2008).pdf

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty on collision with unattended vehicle) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in sustaining the violation of refusal to submit to a chemical test because the dispatch received by the Officer was insufficient to furnish him with probable cause to arrest the Defendant for leaving the scene of an accident. Here, the Officer received a detailed description of the Defendant and there was no one else in the vicinity matching the description. Once in contact with the Defendant, the Officer observed that her breath and person emanated an odor of alcohol, her speech was slurred, her eyes were bloodshot and watery, and she was unsteady on her feet. The Panel further held that the Officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant because a reasonably prudent person would have believed it was more probable than not that the Defendant’s vehicle collided with the unoccupied vehicle. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of refusal to submit to a chemical test.

Appeals Panel
10/08/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas Picchione, C.A. T08-0047 (October 8, 2008)

State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas Picchione, C.A. T08-0047 (October 8, 2008).pdf

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the Officer did not have probable cause to arrest the Defendant on suspicion of driving under the influence. Here, the Officer testified that he observed the Defendant’s vehicle drifting towards the median before veering into the travel lane. Once in contact with the Defendant, the Officer observed that the Defendant appeared confused, there was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, and he “stumbled” outside of the vehicle. The Panel held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the Officer had sufficient evidence to believe that the Defendant had operated his vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

Appeals Panel
09/17/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Brian Priest, C.A. T08-0048 (September 17, 2008)

Discovery

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The State argued that the trial magistrate misapplied the three-part analysis set out in State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180 (R.I. 1994), to determine whether the failure of law enforcement to preserve evidence amounted to an infringement of a defendant’s due process rights. Here, defense counsel sent a letter to the police department asking for a copy of a videotape depicting the Defendant in the police station at the time of his arrest. The police department responded with information about how to review and copy the videotape, and subsequently “recycled” it before the Defendant had an opportunity to view it. Garcia requires a defendant to establish: (1) that the evidence possessed an apparent exculpatory value; (2) that comparable evidence is unobtainable by reasonably available means; and (3) that the state destroyed the evidence in bad faith. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not have competent evidence to find that the videotape was exculpatory where defense counsel argued only that viewing the videotape the videotape was necessary in order to “know exactly what happened in regards to the purported refusal.” The Panel noted that the mere possibility that the videotape could have exculpated the Defendant was not enough. The Panel also held that the trial magistrate misapplied the prevailing legal authority of State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 1106 (R.I. 2004), for “bad faith” by finding that the police department’s negligent “recycling” of the videotape amounted to bad faith. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation was in error and remanded for a hearing on the merits.

State of Rhode Island v. Brian Priest, C.A. T08-0048 (September 17, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/17/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Mark Shallcross, C.A. T08-0093 (September 17, 2008)

Dismissal

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s dismissal the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Here, the Town made a Rule 27 dismissal recommendation and, after hearing the State’s argument in opposition to the recommendation, the trial magistrate dismissed the charged violation pursuant to Rule 27(a). The State argued that the authority of cities and towns to prosecute violations does not extend to the dismissal of refusal cases. Specifically, the State argued that because R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4 vests only the Attorney General with the authority to prosecute refusal cases, he or she is the only official with the authority to dismiss refusal cases. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not improperly dismiss the charged violation because Rule 27(a) expressly provides that the attorney for a municipality may dismiss a summons and because the rules of the Traffic Tribunal supersede any conflicting statutory regulation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Mark Shallcross, C.A. T08-0093 (September 17, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/17/2008

Town of Warren v. Lewis Quattrucci, C.A. T08-0057 (September 17, 2008)

Town of Warren v. Lewis Quattrucci, C.A. T08-0057 (September 17, 2008).pdf

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The State argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the presence of the Officer and Sergeant in the room had a “chilling” effect on the Defendant’s right to a confidential phone call. The Panel held that the right to a confidential phone call attaches in civil chemical test refusal cases and that the arrested person must be given the opportunity to make a call out of police earshot within one hour of arrest. Here, the Officer testified that he asked the Defendant whether he wanted to make a confidential phone call and the Defendant responded that he “didn’t care.” The Panel held that while the Defendant had the right to waive his or her right to make a phone call, once the Defendant decided to make a phone call, the Officer had an affirmative obligation to ensure that the call was confidential. Accordingly, because the Officer did not afford the Defendant with an opportunity to make a confidential phone call, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

Magistrate Goulart filed a dissenting opinion, noting his view that dismissal would be warranted only upon proof that a telephone call was placed to an attorney and that an attorney-client communication occurred.

Appeals Panel
09/17/2008

Town of Warren v. Michael Dolan, C.A. T08-0075 (September 17, 2008)

Town of Warren v. Michael Dolan, C.A. No. T08-0075 (September 17, 2008).pdf

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the civil refusal statute must be read in conjunction with R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-7-20, a statute that safeguards the right of those arrested for a criminal offense to make a confidential phone call. The Panel held that the right to a confidential phone call does attach in civil chemical test refusal cases and that the arrested person must be given the opportunity to make the call out of police earshot within one hour of arrest or the refusal charge must be dismissed. Here, the trial magistrate found that the Defendant expressly waived his right to a confidential phone call when he responded “no, I’m all set” to the Officer’s inquiry and also implicitly waived his right by making a non-confidential phone call in the Officer’s presence on his personal cell-phone. The Panel held that while an arrestee can waive his or her right to a confidential-phone call in the first instance, once the arrestee decides to make a phone call the police have an affirmative obligation to leave the room. The Panel noted that here the Officer was not informed of the Defendant’s intention to make a confidential phone call. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

Magistrate Goulart filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He concurred in the result but noted his view that dismissal would be warranted only upon proof that a telephone call was placed to an attorney and that an attorney-client communication occurred.

Appeals Panel
08/20/2008

City of Warwick v. Joann Maiorano, C.A. T08-0087 (August 20, 2008)

City of Warwick v. Joann Maiorano, C.A. T08-0087 (August 20, 2008).pdf

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-21-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Here, the arresting Warwick Police Officer testified that he initially observed the Defendant’s vehicle in West Warwick but that he did not observe any moving infractions. He subsequently observed moving violations when the vehicle was in Warwick and stopped the Defendant in Warwick. The Panel held that the Officer had the authority to initiate the traffic stop because his police cruiser’s computer indicated that the location where he observed the offenses was within his jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the case and remanded the matter for a hearing on the merits.

Appeals Panel
08/27/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Edward Perez, C.A. T08-0099 (August 27, 2008)

Procedure

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The State argued that the trial magistrate misinterpreted the Appeals Panel’s prior order by treating it as an implied reversal of his earlier decision sustaining the refusal charge and, therefore, improperly dismissed the violation. The prior Appeals Panel remanded the case for the trial magistrate to make specific findings on the issue of probable cause and to issue a ruling on the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. This Panel held that the trial magistrate’s original disposition was unaffected by error and that the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation on remand warranted reversal. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial magistrate’s decision on remand to dismiss the violation and upheld the trial magistrate’s original decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Edward Perez, C.A. T08-0099 (August 27, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/09/2008

State of Rhode Island v. Patrick Emery, C.A. T08-0076 (July 9, 2008)

Dismissal

The State appealed the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test) based upon a dismissal recommendation filed by the police prosecutor for the City of Pawtucket pursuant to Rule 27(a). The State argued that because R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4 vests the Attorney General with the sole authority to prosecute violations of the refusal statute, the Attorney General has the sole authority to dismiss refusal charges. The Panel held that because rules adopted by the Traffic Tribunal and approved by the Supreme Court supersede any statutory regulations in conflict, Rule 27(a), which provides that “the prosecution officer or attorney for the state or municipality may dismiss a summons,” prevails against R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Patrick Emery, C.A. T08-0076 (July 9, 2008).pdf

Appeals Panel
07/16/2008

Town of Portsmouth v. Stephen Abbruzzi, C.A. T08-0071 (July 16, 2008)