Sworn Report

The Defendant appealed the hearing magistrate’s decision to issue a preliminary license suspension at the arraignment on the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test).  The Defendant argued that language in the sworn report was misleading and contradicted statutory language found in §31-27-2.1.  Specifically, the Defendant argued that the sworn report indicated an immediate license suspension would follow from the refusal to submit a chemical test when the actual procedure is to first have the sworn report received and reviewed by a magistrate prior to any license suspension.  The Panel found, however, that a thorough review of the sworn report is not required by the statutory language and that the language in the sworn report was not misleading in this regard.

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.2 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-22-21.1 (“presence of open alcoholic beverage”). Defendant argued that the violations should have been dismissed because of a “perjured affidavit.” In his sworn affidavit the officer wrote that the defendant displayed “clues in all three (field sobriety) tests.” His trial testimony revealed that the defendant only displayed clues in two tests. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the court held that allegations of negligent or innocent mistake are insufficient to attack the validity of an affidavit. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. The Appeals Panel held that defendant had offered no offer of proof that the discrepancy was intentional or in a reckless disregard for the truth. The trial court had found credible the officer’s explanation that the discrepancy was a mistake because the officer may having been “typing too fast.” Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Town of Hopkinton v. Daniel A. Buck, No. T15-0037 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Defendant claimed that the decision of the trial judge was affected by error of law because the state failed to produce a sworn report where the officer did not swear to his initial report before a notary and a second report, sworn to three months after the arrest, was not admitted into evidence.  The first element of § 31-27-2.1 requires “a sworn report stating that a law enforcement officer possessed reasonable grounds to suspect the arrestee of driving under the influence.”  The Court held that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, must be interpreted literally.  The Court held that the state failed to establish the first element of § 31-27-2.1 because the officer did not swear to the first report before a notary and that the second report was not properly submitted into evidence.  Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous because, absent proof of a sworn report, the state was not able to prove one of the required elements. Thus, the Court granted the defendant’s appeal.

Town of Narragansett v. Laura Imswiler, C.A. No. T13-0012 (February 3, 2014).pdf

Sworn Report

The State appealed the trial judge’s decision dismissing the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test).  At trial, the Trooper testified that he created two sworn reports in connection with Defendant’s arrest for failure to submit.  The notary discovered an error in the first report and directed the Trooper to discard the report and complete a second. The Trooper testified he swore to the contents of both reports in front of the notary.  However, on cross-examination the notary testified that he could not recall whether the Trooper swore to the second report, despite the notary having signed it.  Defendant’s counsel moved to dismiss the case at the close of the trial on the grounds that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Trooper created a sworn report.  The State appealed, arguing the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous and was an error of law.  The Appeals Panel deferred to the wide latitude the trial judge enjoys in weighing evidence and the credibility of witnesses.  Here, the trial judge had not been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the Trooper swore to the report, a finding of fact that the Panel will not second guess.  Therefore, the decision was not clearly erroneous.  Also, because a sworn report is necessary to sustain a charge of refusal to submit, there was no error of law.  Accordingly, the Panel affirmed the dismissal and denied the State’s appeal.

State of Rhode Island vs. John O’Hara, C.A. No. T13-0079 (June 23, 2014).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Specifically, the Defendant argued that the arresting Officer did not swear to the veracity of his report before a notary, in violation of the statute.  At trial, the Officer testified that although the report had been notarized before trial, he was not present at the time it was notarized and he did not swear to its veracity.  The Panel explained that the plain language of the statute requires the existence of a “sworn report.”  The Panel held that because the Officer did not swear to the veracity of the report in the presence of a notary, the State could not satisfy the requirements of the statute.  Accordingly, the Panel dismissed the charged violation.

Town of Smithfield v. Badoui Sleiman, C.A. No. T12-0022 (August 1, 2013).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that although the officer’s report was not properly sworn before a notary, the officer’s testimony regarding the report rendered any defect inconsequential. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 (March 10, 2009).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the charging officer’s testimony at trial concerning an “affidavit” was sufficient evidence for the statutorily required “sworn report,” despite the different terminology that the officer had used. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant.City of Warwick v. Leslie Haley, C.A. No. 09-0040 (June 3, 2009).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Following Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993), the Court held that the role of the officer’s sworn report ended with the preliminary suspension of the defendant’s license. Therefore, the misidentification of the defendant’s vehicle on the sworn report was inconsequential at trail for the refusal to submit charge. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

City of Warwick v. Robert Iannotti, C.A. No. T09-0086 (September 17, 2009).pdf

Sworn Report

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by sustaining the refusal charge because the Officer’s report was not properly sworn before a notary as required by § 31-27-2.1. Here, the Officer appeared before the magistrate and testified that his report was not properly sworn, but further testified as to the information contained in the report. The Panel, citing Link v. State, 622 A.2d 1345 (R.I. 1993), held that a chemical refusal charge can be sustained even in the absence of a sworn report where there is sworn testimony for the court to consider. As such, the Panel held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the charge despite a defect in the report because the live testimony at trial rendered the defect inconsequential. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf