Text Messaging While Driving

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial judge upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30 (texting while driving). The trial centered around two witnesses: the citing officer, who testified to observing defendant’s phone screen “clearly playing” a “video” on his screen for “several seconds”; and the defendant, who testified that he had been making a phone call, did not recall playing a video, and offered to provide cell phone records to substantiate his defense. The trial judge, crediting the officer’s testimony, refused to allow the defendant to introduce his phone records, stating that “[defendant’s] phone record doesn’t mean anything . . . [y]ou could be . . . watching Donald Duck,” and found defendant guilty of texting while driving. The Appeals Panel, however, found that the trial judge abused his discretion and overlooked potentially material evidence by not allowing defendant to introduce his cell phone records, which may have substantiated his claimed defense. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel granted defendant’s appeal and remanded the case for further findings.

State of Rhode Island v. Edmund E. Hathawy, No. T17-0022 (May 11, 2018).pdf

Text Messaging While Driving

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30 (“text messaging while driving”). Defendant argued that she was not texting while driving, but was instead using her phone as a GPS. She provided documentation from T-Mobile proving she had not texted at the time the stop occurred. The Appeals Panel, however, adopted the interpretation of § 31-22-30 used in State v. Joseph Furtado, No. T16-0004, where the Panel found that using a phone as a GPS fell under § 31-22-30 because it still involved the concept of looking away from the road and reading words or symbols. The Appeals Panel noted that the legislature has since amended the statute to clarify that manipulating a GPS is not prohibited, but found that the amendment did not have retroactive application to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Dana Freeman, No. T16-0017 (January 24, 2018).pdf

Text Messaging While Driving

Defendant appeals the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30 (“text messaging while operating a motor vehicle”). Defendant argued that he was using his cell phone for GPS and therefore was not text messaging. Following R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30(a)(9), which defines use as “hold[ing] . . . in one’s hands,” the Appeals Panel found that the trooper did not present any evidence that the defendant was holding his cellphone in his hands. Therefore, there was not enough evidence to convict defendant of text messaging while operating a motor vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court was reversed and the violation was dismissed. 

State of Rhode Island v. Nabil Kiriaki, No. T14-0057 (March 11, 2016).pdf

Text Messaging While Driving

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30 (“text messaging while driving”). Defendant argued that the Trial Magistrate misinterpreted the statute by including GPS use. § 31-22-30 states that “no person shall use a wireless handset or personal wireless communication device to compose, read or send text messaging while driving…”. By the language of the statute, a navigation device that only receives transmission is different from a cellphone that is capable of receiving and transmitting data. A navigation device does not come under the statute because this device can only receive, while a cellphone that can both receive and transmit does come under the statute. Since the defendant was using his cellphone, even if only for GPS purposes, the device fell under the provisions of the statute. The court noted that the definition of “text message” in the statute included the concept of reading. To read a device does not solely mean to read the letters and words of an email, text or message. Reading includes looking at words, symbols, characters displayed on the phone interface. Because the defendant was looking at his phone and the symbols of the GPS software, the Appeals Panel found that the defendant’s conduct violated the statute. Therefore, the Appeals Panel held that a driver using his or her cellphone for GPS still violates § 31-22-30. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed. 

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Furtado, No. T16-0004 (August 31, 2016).pdf

Text Messaging While Driving

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30, “Text Messaging While Operating a Motor Vehicle.”  Defendant claimed that the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charge was in violation of the statutory provisions.  Specifically, defendant produced records of his text messages which showed no texts sent or received within the timeframe of the alleged violation.  The Panel reviewed the plain language of the statute, which states that “[n]o person shall use a wireless handset to compose, read or send text messages while operating a motor vehicle on any public street or public highway within the State of Rhode Island.”  The Panel noted that the statute clearly prohibits the reading of text messages, and that such activity would not be captured in the defendant’s text message records from his service provider.  The Panel explained that the trial judge was satisfied with the Trooper’s testimony that the defendant was observed holding and manipulating his cell phone at eye-level while appearing distracted, and reasonably inferred that the defendant did in fact read a text message, in violation of the plain language of the statute.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Jason Kilsey, C.A. No. T13-0056 (March 3, 2014).pdf

Text Messaging While Driving

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30, “Text Messaging While Operating a Motor Vehicle.”  Defendant claimed that the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charge was an abuse of discretion and that the Trooper’s testimony was insufficient to sustain the violation.  The Trooper testified that while following the Defendant, he observed a persistent glow coming from the rear window, that he pulled alongside the Defendant and shined his light into the cabin, and observed the Defendant holding his cell phone in the center of the steering wheel with the Defendant’s fingers “going at the cell phone.”  The Defendant attempted to produce phone records which he claimed would show no text messages were sent or received within the timeframe of the alleged violation.  The Panel reviewed the plain language of the statute, which states that “[n]o person shall use a wireless handset to compose, read or send text messages while operating a motor vehicle on any public street or public highway within the State of Rhode Island.”  The Panel noted that the statute clearly prohibits reading text messages as well as composing but not sending text messages, neither of which would be captured in the Defendant’s phone records from his service provider.  The Panel also noted that the statutory definition of “text message” includes not only text messages but also instant messages, electronic messages and emails. The Panel held that the Trooper’s testimony was sufficient to prove the elements of the statute.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Brian Gilbert, C.A. No. T12-0004 (April 2, 2012).pdf