Procedure

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant was taken into custody under a suspicion of driving under the influence. At the police station, Defendant agreed to take a chemical test, but initially failed to supply enough air into the breathalyzer. The officer gave Defendant a second opportunity to give a sufficient breath sample, but Defendant refused to take the test unless the officer informed him of when the breathalyzer was last calibrated. The test was then terminated, and Defendant was charged with the aforementioned violation. Defendant argued that the trial judge exceeded his role as a neutral fact finder by soliciting responses which assisted the State in meeting its burden of proof. A trial judge “has the discretion to elicit testimony that will clarify any confusion caused by prior examination.” See State v. Figueras, 644 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Giordano, 440 A.2d 742, 745 (R.I. 1982)). Even if a trial judge exceeds that discretion, “the error is harmless if the [judge’s] overall demeanor is neutral and impartial.” See id. at 294. Here, the trial judge raised questions about details that were not mentioned on direct or cross examination, including what sounds the breathalyzer machine made and what those sounds suggested. But the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge did not exceed his role as a neutral fact finder because the trial judge’s overall demeanor remained natural and impartial throughout the trial. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Kaba, No. T15-0032 (April 8, 2016).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the hearing magistrate’s decision to issue a preliminary license suspension at the arraignment on the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Panel found that this interlocutory order was not appealable because the order did not fall within one of the enumerated statutory exceptions found in R.I.G.L. § 9-24-7 nor would it cause irreparable harm before a final determination was issued.  Additionally, the Panel noted that even if the order were subject to a proper interlocutory appeal the Defendant did not follow the proper procedure to appeal, which would require a petition for certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.  See Pier House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corp., 689 A.2d 1069, 1070 (R.I. 1997).  Therefore, the Panel denied and dismissed the appeal.

State of Rhode Island v. Thomas Martucci, C.A. No. T15-0046 (February 4, 2016).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges.  The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment.  Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result.  Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits.  Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges.  The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment.  Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result.  Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits.  Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the City to re-file the charges was made upon unlawful procedure.  Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate was bound by the special prosecutor’s dismissal under Rule 26(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and therefore should have applied the “law of the case” doctrine to prevent the City from re-filing the charges.  The Panel explained that the “law of the case” doctrine stands for the proposition that once a judge has made an interlocutory decision, a second judge confronted with the same issue should not disturb the first ruling.  See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 683 (R.I. 1999).  The Panel explained further that Rule 26(a) allows for termination of the prosecution by the prosecutor, and at no time in the Defendant’s case did any magistrate make any interlocutory decision.  The Panel held that the “law of the case” doctrine did not apply to the facts and procedure of the case.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate did not make an error of law in allowing the City to re-file the charges.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that a District Court order associated with the DUI prosecution of the Defendant required the Pawtucket Police to destroy all police records that tied the defendant to the events underlying the two charges sustained by the Tribunal and that, as a result, the Pawtucket Police could not re-file the charges.  The Panel reviewed the plain language of  R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12(a)(1), “Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated,” and explained that the statute requires only records of identification be destroyed.  The Panel then reviewed the trial record and found no evidence that the Police used any record of identification as a basis to identify Defendant as the operator of the vehicle.  Instead, identification was made by in-court testimony of the arresting officer.  The Panel explained that defendant’s assertion that the Police could not rely on records of identification ordered destroyed by the District Court order was immaterial to the matter before the Tribunal.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the Police to re-file the charges was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion and denied the defendant the right to a fair and impartial hearing. The Court held that the trial magistrate abused his discretion because he made conclusory statements regarding his determination of the defendant’s guilt and the credibility of the state’s witness before the defendant had an opportunity to present his case in chief. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the defendant had been prejudiced by the trial magistrate’s abuse of discretion and remanded the case for further proceedings.Town of Bristol v. James R. Marchand, No. T11-0016 (November 15, 2011).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge imposing sanctions for the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27.2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) subsequent to the decision of the Appeals Panel to remand for further proceedings. Following the decision of the Appeals Panel remanding the case, but before the trial judge imposed sanctions, the defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel to the District Court. While awaiting review by the District Court, the trial judge imposed sanctions pursuant to the Appeals Panel’s order. The defendant argued that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because the case had already been appealed to the District Court. The Court held that the defendant’s appeal to the District Court was premature because its decision to remand the case for further proceedings was not a final order. Therefore, the order of the trial judge imposing sanctions was not in excess of his jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T10-0089 (December 8, 2010).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-12-12 (power of local authorities) and the violation of Rhode Island Airport Corporation Regulation 2.2.2 (permitted use at the airport). The Court held that the defendant’s contention that the Traffic Tribunal has no authority to hear the case was without merit. Under § 8-8-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws the Traffic Tribunal has the power “to hear, in addition to those cases specifically listed in the statute, “all violations in relation to motor vehicles, littering and traffic offenses, except those traffic offenses committed in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” The Airport is not in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Unites States, and therefore, the Traffic Tribunal judge who sustained the charged against the Appellant, had the authority to do so. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. 

State of Rhode Island v. Francisco Espinal, C.A. T10-0049 (October 13, 2010)..pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the trial judge took improper judicial notice on the issue of whether the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call because the judge relied on his own personal experiences instead of making credibility determinations based on the evidence presented at trial. The Court held that the trial judge relied on the officer’s testimony that he could not hear any of the defendant’s conversation to determine whether the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call and did not take improper judicial notice when he stated that he was familiar with the NCO room at the police barracks because he did not supply evidence of an essential element. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was an error of law because the magistrate violated Rule 614 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence when he asked questions that filled in missing elements of the prosecution’s case.  The Panel explained that Rule 614(b) allows the court to interrogate witnesses but that such questions should be limited to clarifying matters already asked on direct, redirect, or cross-examination.  The Panel held that the magistrate’s questions to the Trooper were simply designed to clarify answers to questions the Prosecutor asked on direct and redirect and did not raise anything not already asked by the Prosecutor.  The Panel held that the magistrate’s questions were within the scope of Rule 614 and, therefore, did not prejudice Defendant and were not an error of law or abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Following the “raise or waive” rule, the Court held that because the defendant did not raise the issue of delay concerning the rendering of the judge’s decision at trial, the issue was waived and could not be heard on appeal. Furthermore, the defendant’s attorney agreed to receive the decision on the date it was rendered and the delay falls under the ambit of harmless error. Therefore, this case presents no exception to the “raise or waive” rule. Additionally, Rules 18 and 25 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure allow the trial judge to enlarge the period within which a decision is rendered. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charge against the defendant. Town of West Warwick v. Dennis DeCorpo, C.A. No. T09-0074 (September 16, 2009).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Following the trial, but prior to the oral argument on appeal, the Defendant and the solicitor entered into an agreement whereby the Defendant would enter a plea in the District Court to the pending criminal violation and accept one-month license suspension in return for a dismissal of the chemical refusal charge pursuant to Rule 27(a) of the Rules of Procedure for the Traffic Tribunal. On appeal to the Panel, the Defendant attempted to enforce that agreement. The Panel, however, held that while it will accept a dismissal prior to or during a trial, it will not accept a dismissal following a trial and entry of judgment. Accordingly, the court would not allow the dismissal and sustained the charge.

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf

Procedure

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The State argued that the trial magistrate misinterpreted the Appeals Panel’s prior order by treating it as an implied reversal of his earlier decision sustaining the refusal charge and, therefore, improperly dismissed the violation. The prior Appeals Panel remanded the case for the trial magistrate to make specific findings on the issue of probable cause and to issue a ruling on the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. This Panel held that the trial magistrate’s original disposition was unaffected by error and that the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation on remand warranted reversal. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial magistrate’s decision on remand to dismiss the violation and upheld the trial magistrate’s original decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Edward Perez, C.A. T08-0099 (August 27, 2008).pdf