In-court identification of the defendant

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  Defendant claimed that because the Trooper identified the defendant by the wrong first name during testimony, the Trooper misidentified defendant as the operator of the vehicle.  Following Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey, C.A. No. T13-0008, September 10, 2013, R.I. Traffic Trib. (holding that in-court identification can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances presented to the finder of fact), the tribunal found that the trial magistrate was satisfied that the defendant had been identified as the operator of the vehicle because when defendant testified, defendant himself admitted to being the operator of the vehicle, and thus cured any defect in the Trooper’s testimony.  Thus, the tribunal held that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Jeffrey Babb, C.A. No. T13-0069 (April 16, 2014).pdf

In-court identification of the defendant

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-6 (clearance for overtaking), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-1 (care in starting from a stop), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-12 (interval between vehicles).  Defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the charged violations to a standard of clear and convincing evidence as there was no in-court identification of the Defendant by the Officer.  Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, before trial the Defendant had filed a written waiver of his right to be present at the trial.  During the trial, the trial magistrate stated that, by filing such a waiver, the Defendant had acknowledged that he was the operator of the motor vehicle.  When defense counsel objected, the trial magistrate ruled that the waiver was invalid and threatened to find the Defendant in default.  The Defendant then appeared and acknowledged his name and date of birth on the record, which corresponded to the information listed on the citation. The Panel held that this acknowledgement, in conjunction with the language in the Defendant’s “waiver of appearance” form that he was the “defendant in the above-entitled action,” made it highly probable that the Defendant and the operator of the vehicle were one and the same.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

City of Providence v. Raymond Beausejour, C.A. No. T08-0149 (January 28, 2009).pdf

In-court identification of the defendant

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-24-1 (times when lights required). The Defendant argued that the charge could not be sustained because there was no in-court identification of the Defendant as the operator of the vehicle. The Panel noted that the Defendant did not cite any sources to show that in-court identification is required, and held that the Defendant’s argument would fail even if he had cited a source because Defendant’s counsel indicated on the record that he was appearing “on behalf of” the Defendant and because the Officer testified that he “identified the driver [of the suspect vehicle]” as the Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not affected by error of law and sustained the charged violation.

Town of Lincoln v. Richard McKee, C.A. No. T08-0128 (December 10, 2008).pdf