Right to an Independent Medical Examination

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that the officer did not give the defendant an immediate opportunity to contact and be examined by a physician of his choosing. Defendant was read his rights at the scene and then arrived at the station 23 minutes later. In State v. Poole, 197 A.2d 163 (R.I. 1964), the court held that a forty-five minute time delay between the defendant being notified of his right to be examined by a physician and the defendant’s opportunity to contact a physician did not violate the immediacy requirement. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016).pdf

Right to an Independent Medical Examination

The Town of Barrington appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Here, the Defendant alleged that his right to be seen immediately by a physician was delayed because although he told the Officer twice that he wanted to be examined the Officer never allowed him to call a physician.  Instead, the Officer simply released the Defendant after his arraignment by a bail commissioner, which took place nearly three hours after his arrest. The Town argued that the “immediate” timeframe mentioned in the refusal statute does not create a strict timeline. The Panel held that even a broad interpretation of “immediately” would not render the trial magistrate’s holding erroneous because the Officer never afforded the Defendant the right to an examination. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the violation.

Town of Barrington v. William Mathews, C.A. No. T13-0081 (May 13, 2015).pdf

Right to an Independent Medical Examination

The state appealed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that he was denied his right to an independent medical exam because he was not released from the police station until after his arraignment the following morning. The Court held that it was the duty of the defendant to invoke his right to an examination. The Court held that the defendant was not denied his right to an exam because there was no evidence on record that the defendant ever made his desire to receive an independent medical examination known to the police while he was in custody. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial judge dismissing the violation and remanded the case for further proceedings.Town of Smithfield v. Stephen Beauregard, C.A. No. T11-0014 (April 27, 2011).pdf

Right to an Independent Medical Examination

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the recitation of the Rights for use at Scene and Rights for Use at Station cards was sufficient to afford the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to be examined by a physician of his choosing, in accordance with § 31-27-3, pursuant to State v. Langella, 650 A.2d 478, 479 (R.I. 1994). The Court held that the lack of evidence of the defendant exercising his right to be examined independently satisfies the state’s burden of proving that the defendant made the decision to forgo the exam. The Court held that there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant’s claim that he exercised his right to an independent medical examination. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Right to an Independent Medical Examination

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The State argued that the trial magistrate erred in his decision to dismiss the charge because the Defendant’s right to an independent examination pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-3 had been compromised. Here, once the Defendant indicated to the Officer that he would not submit to a chemical test, the Officer took the Defendant to Newport Hospital, where he requested that a doctor perform a blood alcohol test. Subsequently, the Officer requested that the sample be preserved for future investigative purposes. The State, relying on State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862 (1996) argued that the Defendant’s right to a physical examination was not compromised because, like in Collins where the blood test was performed by hospital personnel, the Officer here did not “commandeer” the Defendant’s blood. Here, the drawing and testing of the Defendant’s blood was done by hospital personnel, rather than at the direction of the Officer, and the blood would have been preserved pursuant to hospital policy regardless of the Officer’s request. As such, the Panel reversed the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charge because the substantial rights of the Defendant were not compromised.

Town of Bristol v. Richard Dion, C.A. No. T08-0106 (December 10, 2008).pdf