Penalties

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-22-31 (mobile telephone usage by motor vehicle operators). The trial judge found Defendant guilty of the violation and after considering Defendant’s driving record, which included five speeding violations between 2018 and 2019, the trial judge imposed: (1) a fine of $100, (2) driver retraining, and (3) a loss of license for three months. Defendant argued that the imposition of a loss of license for three months and driver retraining exceeded the sanctions that were permissible under the charged violation.  Pursuant to G.L. § 31-41.1-6(c), a Traffic Tribunal judge may impose any penalty authorized by any provision of Title 31. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge had the authority to impose the aforementioned penalties. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Andrew Houlihan, No. T19-0019 (March 11, 2020).pdf

Penalties

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to impose a six-month license suspension after sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by imposing a suspension in excess of his statutory authority and by considering her previous driving record, for which she had been previously punished pursuant to the Colin Foote Law. Here, the trial magistrate imposed the license suspension after finding that the Defendant had an apparent disregard for traffic laws. The Panel noted that R.I.G.L. § 31-41.1-6 “vests a trial judge or magistrate with broad authority to include license suspension as part of a sentence for a violation of the motor vehicle code” and that the discretion to exercise that authority “is only abridged in extraordinary circumstances when the trial magistrate has imposed a sentence that is without justification and is grossly dissimilar from other sentences commonly imposed for similar offenses.” The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion in this case. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Noor Al-Nubani, C.A. No. T14-0030 (April 3, 2015).pdf

Penalties

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(g) (safety belt use). Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision to suspend the defendant’s license for two months was in excess of her statutory authority, and, further, that the sentence was an abuse of discretion because the penalty for a violation of § 31-22-22(g) enumerated in § 31-41.1-4 is forty dollars. The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge has the authority to include a license suspension as part of a sentence even where a fine is specified in § 31-41.1-4. Section 31-41.1-6 grants a trial judge or magistrate the authority to impose any penalty authorized by any provision of Title 31 “Motor and Other Vehicles.” Further, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine the length of time of a suspension. Accordingly, the Court held that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was within her statutory authority and was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, the violation against the defendant was sustained. State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas Light, C.A. No. T13-0057 (January 24, 2014).pdf

Penalties

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-15-11 (laned roadways) and 31-15-5 (turn signal required).  The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in finding him guilty of the violations.  The Panel explained it will not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge on issues of credibility.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.  The Panel, sua sponte, then reconsidered the court costs imposed.  The Panel pointed out that the trial judge erred in assessing court costs of $35.00 for each violation.  The Panel explained that, pursuant to the statute, a $35.00 fee shall be assessed for “each person” and not for each violation.  See R.I.G.L. 1956 § 8-18-4(g).  The Panel held that the trial judge erred in assessing a fee for each violation and that the Defendant was entitled to a refund for any costs beyond the $35.00 statutory hearing fee set out in § 8-18-4(g).  Accordingly, the Panel remanded for the re-allocation of court costs.

City of East Providence v. James Roberson, C.A. No. M12-0009 (December 13, 2012).pdf

Penalties

Concurrence, Almeida J. The issue of license suspension was not raised at trial, but Justice Almeida noted that because the defendant was cited going less than ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit and since her driving record indicated that she had three prior speeding offenses in the past year, then R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-41.1-6 and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-41.1-4 dictates that the defendant’s license should only have been suspended for thirty days, not the six months that the trial magistrate assigned.

Town of North Kingstown v. Michelle Mancini, C.A. No. T11-0008 (April 20, 2011).pdf

Penalties

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The Court held that the trial judge’s decision was neither in excess of the statutory authority nor characterized by abuse of discretion. Although the enumerated violations for 31-15-1 according to 31-41.1-4 is eighty-five dollars, under 31-41.1-6“[a] judge or magistrate may include in the order the imposition of any penalty authorized by any provisions of this title for the violation, including but not limited to, license suspension and/or, in the case of a motorist under the age of twenty (20), community service, except that no penalty for it shall include imprisonment.” Since any penalty authorized by Title 31, “Motor and Other Vehicles,” may be imposed upon the motorists by the trial judge, the trial judge has the authority to suspend the the defendant’s license as a penalty for this violation. The Appeals Panel can only review the record to ascertain the reasoning behind the trial judge’s decision in order to determine if there is any abuse of discretion. Since the defendant waived his right to have a transcript made available, the Court cannot consider the issue of whether the trial judge’s decision to impose a 30 day license suspension sentence was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

Town of South Kingstown v. Jon Lachapelle, C.A. No. T10-0045 (July 14, 2010).pdf