RI District Court and Traffic Tribunal Case Law

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Double Jeopardy

District Court

District Court
06/12/2007
Kristof Toth v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-98 Double Jeopardy

Double Jeopardy

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speeds). The Court held that the two charges could both be sustained even though the same conduct was the basis for both violations. Sustaining both of the charges did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy because the statutes were sufficiently distinct. Section 31-14-1 entails the failure to maintain control resulting in a collision, whereas § 31-14-3 requires only reduced speed under certain conditions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violations against the defendant. Kristof Toth v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-98 (June 12, 2007).pdf

Appeals Panel

Appeals Panel
03/10/2019
State of Rhode Island v. Pascual Tejada, Jr., T18-0023 (March 10, 2019)

Double Jeopardy

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining violations of G.L. 1956 §§ 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speed) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). Defendant was involved in a four-car accident. Based on testimony from the investigating police officer, a driver involved in the accident, and an eyewitness, the trial judge found that Defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit and the weather conditions (heavy rain) required reduced speed. On appeal, Defendant argued that sustaining violations of both §§ 31-14-1 and 31-14-3 violated his right against double jeopardy because the same conduct satisfied each charge.

Under Article 1, section 7, of the Rhode Island Constitution, “[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.” See State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 501 (R.I. 2004). The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Id. (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 905 n. 13 (R.I. 2003)). To determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is in danger of being violated, the “rule is that where the same . . . transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test . . . is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. See Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 905 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).

The Appeals Panel, citing the District Court’s opinion in Toth v. Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal, A.A. 06-98 (2007), confirmed that §§ 31-14-1 and 31-14-3 are sufficiently distinct because “§ 31-14-3 requires at least one of the stated conditions, such as weather hazards or engaged emergency vehicles, be present while § 31-14-1 does not require those specific conditions.” See Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 501. As such, charging Defendant with violations of both §§ 31-14-1 and 31-14-3 did not violate Defendant’s right against double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Pascual Tejada, Jr., T18-0023 (March 10, 2019).pdf