Operation of Motor Vehicle

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that a customer had departed who may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Based on the vehicle’s description, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he had just come from D’Angelo’s. Defendant was ultimately arrested for suspicion of DUIand refused to submit to a chemical test. On appeal, Defendant argued that the charge could not be sustained because the officer did not actually observe Defendant operating the vehicle.

Under § 31-27-2.1, a police officer may direct a motorist to submit to a breathalyzer test if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Bruno, 709 A.2d 1048, 1050 (R.I. 1998). The Appeals Panel suggested that Defendant could properly be found to be operating the motor vehicle based upon the fact that he was “in actual physical control of the vehicle.” Alternatively, the Appeals Panel found that the totality of the facts in the case, including Defendant’s acknowledgement that he had just come from D’Angelo’s and the absence of any mention of or evidence of another driver, was sufficient to support reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant had operated the motor vehicle. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

NOTE: On appeal, the District Court explicitly refused to address the Appeal’s Panel’s suggestion that physical control of a motor vehicle can constitute operation for the purposes of this statute, a suggestion that appears to run counter to the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Capuano, 591 A.2d 35 (1991), that a motor vehicle must be in motion to constitute operation for this purpose.

State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019).pdf

Operation of Motor Vehicle

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-26-5 (“duty in accident resulting in highway fixtures”). Defendant argued that there was not enough evidence to establish that defendant had been operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. A witness called 911 forty minutes after a driver had struck a telephone pole. After the officer responded, the witness told the officer that the driver was operating a Chevrolet. The officer searched the surrounding area and found a Chevrolet in a parking lot that matched this description. After the officer ran the license plate, she identified the defendant as the owner. The officer then went to the defendant’s nearby house, where the defendant admitted that he had consumed three beers and had struck a telephone poll. The officer also testified that the defendant slurred his words and walked with an unsteady gait. Following State v. Perry, 731 A.2d 720 (R.I. 2000) and State v. Menge, T15-0036 (2016), the Appeals Panel held that the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the officer was authorized to request that the defendant to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Nevitt, No. T15-0043 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Operation of Motor Vehicle

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31- 27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (presence of alcoholic beverages while operating or riding in a motor vehicle). Defendant challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to ask the defendant to submit to a chemical test where the defendant was approached by the officer while he was outside the vehicle in a parking lot. The court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to infer that the defendant had been operating a vehicle while under the influence because the defendant stated that he had been driving, he was observed “rummaging through the trunk” of the vehicle, marks on the defendant’s tires that suggested the vehicle had been operated recently, and there were “no establishments within a half mile of the parking lot where [the defendant] could have consumed alcohol after the vehicle was parked.” Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate.Town of Richmond v. Bruce Bartels C.A.T13-0021.pdf

Operation of Motor Vehicle

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Court held that the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating the motor vehicle based on the facts as they were known to him because when the officer arrived at the scene the defendant was walking from the scene of the accident and another officer testified that when he arrived at the scene the defendant was inside the vehicle. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. 

City of Newport v. Regent Nicholas, C.A. No. T09-0120 (April 21, 2010).pdf

Operation of Motor Vehicle

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that there was a lack of evidence to find that she operated the vehicle because there was no witness who testified as to her operation and there was no credible admission that she operated the vehicle. Additionally, the Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s finding of operation violated the corpus delecti rule by allowing into evidence the motorist’s uncorroborated admission of operation. The Panel held that it did not need to address the corpus delecti argument because it is only applied in criminal cases. The Panel also held that there was evidence that made it apparent to the Officer that the Defendant operated of the vehicle because she was the registered owner of the vehicle with front-end damage and she made no mention of another operator. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Lawrence, C.A. T08-0049 (April 23, 2008).pdf