Dismissal

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges.  The re-filing went to trial and resulted in conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss the charges was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that the special prosecutor’s dismissal was with prejudice and that the City was required to move to vacate or appeal the initial dismissal before re-filing the charges.  The Appeals Panel noted that the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal of a civil case in Superior Court is governed by Super R. Civ. P. 41(a), and under that rule a prosecutor’s voluntary dismissal is without prejudice absent an affirmative statement of prejudice or stipulations between the parties.  The Appeals Panel applied the reasoning of Super R. Civ. P. 41(a) to Traffic Trib. R. P. 26(a), which allows the prosecuting officer to terminate the charges and held that there is a presumption that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice.  The Panel held that the filing of an appeal, which under the rule can only be filed by an “aggrieved party” was inapposite because the City, which dismissed the charges, was not an aggrieved party.  The Panel held that the filing of a Motion to Vacate would be inappropriate because no order had been entered; the role of the Tribunal in a decision by a party to dismiss is administrative only and functions simply to memorialize the dismissal for purposes of record keeping.  Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Dismissal

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s dismissal the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). Here, the Town made a Rule 27 dismissal recommendation and, after hearing the State’s argument in opposition to the recommendation, the trial magistrate dismissed the charged violation pursuant to Rule 27(a). The State argued that the authority of cities and towns to prosecute violations does not extend to the dismissal of refusal cases. Specifically, the State argued that because R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4 vests only the Attorney General with the authority to prosecute refusal cases, he or she is the only official with the authority to dismiss refusal cases. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not improperly dismiss the charged violation because Rule 27(a) expressly provides that the attorney for a municipality may dismiss a summons and because the rules of the Traffic Tribunal supersede any conflicting statutory regulation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Mark Shallcross, C.A. T08-0093 (September 17, 2008).pdf

Dismissal

The State appealed the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test) based upon a dismissal recommendation filed by the police prosecutor for the City of Pawtucket pursuant to Rule 27(a). The State argued that because R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4 vests the Attorney General with the sole authority to prosecute violations of the refusal statute, the Attorney General has the sole authority to dismiss refusal charges. The Panel held that because rules adopted by the Traffic Tribunal and approved by the Supreme Court supersede any statutory regulations in conflict, Rule 27(a), which provides that “the prosecution officer or attorney for the state or municipality may dismiss a summons,” prevails against R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Patrick Emery, C.A. T08-0076 (July 9, 2008).pdf

Dismissal

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s dismissal of the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test) based upon a dismissal recommendation filed by the Coventry solicitor pursuant to Rule 27(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Traffic Tribunal. The State argued that because R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4 vests only the Attorney General with the authority to prosecute refusal cases, he or she is the only official with the authority to dismiss refusal cases. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not improperly dismiss the charged violation because Rule 27(a) expressly provides that the attorney for a municipality may dismiss a summons and because the rules of the Traffic Tribunal supersede any conflicting statutory regulation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Kyle Losek, C.A. T08-0043 (May 28, 2008).pdf

Dismissal

The State appealed the trial magistrate’s dismissal of the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test) based upon a dismissal recommendation filed by the Middletown solicitor pursuant to Rule 27(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Traffic Tribunal. The State argued that because R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-9-4 vests only the Attorney General with the authority to prosecute refusal cases, he or she is the only official with the authority to dismiss refusal cases. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not improperly dismiss the charged violation because Rule 27(a) expressly provides that the attorney for a municipality may dismiss a summons and because the rules of the Traffic Tribunal supersede any conflicting statutory regulation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Susan Jordon, C.A. T08-0055 (May 28, 2008).pdf