Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The District Court held that the decision of the Appeals Panel finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence was not clearly erroneous because the state presented five indicia that the defendant had operated under the influence, including: the defendant admitted to alcohol consumption, had watery and bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, was unsteady exiting the vehicle, and nearly hit a parked vehicle while attempting to pull over. Defendant had presented testimony by an expert witness stating that what appeared to be indicia of alcohol consumption were in fact manifestations of the defendant’s mental state. The District Court concluded that the expert testimony was immaterial to the charge of refusal to submit because a defendant may be penalized for refusing under § 31-27-2.1 as long as the officer observes sufficient indicia of intoxication to constitute reasonable grounds, even if it is later revealed that the indicia of intoxication were the result of some source other than alcohol or drug intoxication. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the decision of the Appeals Panel was not clearly erroneous but was supported by substantial evidence. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed the magistrate erred in applying the wrong fact-finding standard because he applied a subjective standard when he considered “what was in [the officer’s] mind at the time of the stop.” The Court held that the magistrate did not err and applied the proper objective test because the Court must incorporate the personal knowledge and experience of the police officer when determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27 2.1 (refusal to submit) and 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed the decision of the Appeals Panel was clearly erroneous because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the motorist. After suggesting that the State might not be required to prove the existence of probable cause to arrest in a refusal case, the Court held that in this case probable cause existed to believe the defendant operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, swayed and used the vehicle for balance when exiting, was unable to keep the vehicle within the travel lane, and traveled with her hazard lights on. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.Joan DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-148 (April 15, 2014).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27- 2.1 (refusal to submit) and 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (open container). The defendant claimed the citing officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe he was driving while intoxicated because the officer approached the defendant while he was outside the vehicle in a parking lot with a flat tire and “rummaging through the trunk.” However, the District Court held that the Appeals Panel did not err in concluding the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had operated the vehicle while under the influence because the defendant had admitted he had driven the vehicle, admitted he was coming from Foxwoods, and there were markings on the tire which suggested to the officer that the tire had gone flat while being driven. Furthermore, the officer testified that the location of the defendant was not within one-half mile of a drinking establishment. Therefore, the Court concluded that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant operated a vehicle under the influence and sustained the violation.Bruce Bartels v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-164 (April 15, 2014).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The arresting officer came upon the defendant sitting in the driver’s seat of his parked car in a convenience store parking lot, his head slumped over the steering wheel, talking to himself.  A clerk at the store informed the officer the defendant had pulled into the parking lot approximately 30-60 minutes prior to the officer’s arrival.  The arresting officer testified that the defendant had apologized for driving drunk, had watery, bloodshot eyes, had slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, and had performed poorly on field sobriety tests. The defendant challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to conclude that he had been operating under the influence because of the time between his alleged operation and the officer’s observations.  After noting this issue had not been preserved for appeal, the Court held that, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the officer had more than reasonable suspicion to infer the defendant had been driving under the influence.  Therefore, the decision of the Appeals Panel was not an error of law, in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision and upheld the conviction.

Alec Cambio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-250 (August 12, 2014).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways).  The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant had bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, admitted to consuming two beers, and failed a field sobriety test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision sustaining the violation against the defendant. 

Joshua Kolator v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-016.pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The defendant challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to ask him to submit to a chemical test. The arresting officer testified that the defendant had admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had watery eyes, slurred speech, and failed two field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Appeals Panel’s decision and held that these facts provided reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence.
 

George Fayad v. State of Rhode Island A.A. No. 13-103.pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  The Court held that the offcer possessed reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating under the influence because the defendant admitting he consumed alcohol, had watery eyes, slurred speech, emitted a slight odor of alcohol, admitted the accident was the result of driving too fast, and failed to properly execute field sobriety tests.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. 

Nebeil Sarhan v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 12-094 (October 10, 2012).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  The Court held that the facts were sufficient—when measured against standards established in prior Supreme Court decisions—to affirm the appeals panel’s finding that the officer possessed reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had driven under the influence, as the defendant admitted he had consumed alcohol that night, had watery and bloodshot eyes, emitted the odor of alcohol, violated the traffic laws by speeding, and failed to properly execute field sobriety tests.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. 

Robert Samson v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2012-093 (September 21, 2012).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit).  Defendant claimed that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe he had operated a vehicle while under the influence.  The officer never observed the defendant driving, but rather arrived at the scene of an accident at which the defendant was the only person helped out of his car.   The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds because the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, lost his temper, had been involved in an accident, and had difficulty complying with requests from emergency personnel.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Regent Nicholas v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0208 (April 14, 2011).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering from a private road without yielding). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that she had operated a vehicle while under the influence. The District Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle while under the influence because the defendant admitted to the consumption of alcohol, had watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol, appeared confused, was evasive in answering the officer’s questions, had mumbled speech, failed the walk and turn field sobriety test, and operated her vehicle erratically by failing to yield when exiting a parking lot. Accordingly, the Court held that the state established by clear and convincing evidence that there were reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the defendant was operating under the influence and sustained the violation. Marsha Rooney v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 11-043 (December 23, 2011).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that he had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the officer never observed the defendant drive, did not administer field sobriety test, and only observed the defendant standing outside of the vehicle when he responded to the scene. The District Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle while under the influence because the officer observed the defendant standing “bloodied” next to a vehicle that had recently been in an accident, he admitted that he had been the driver of the vehicle, he admitted to consuming alcohol, he had water and bloodshot eyes, and he emitted an odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Craig Huntley v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 2010-0157 (March 17, 2011).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed).  Defendant argued that the Officer did not have reasonable grounds to warrant a second chemical test to determine the presence of drugs or a controlled substance.  The Panel noted that the Officer observed the Defendant operating his vehicle erratically at twice the posted speed limit during inclement weather.  After stopping the Defendant the Officer observed that he smelled of alcohol, had “glassy” eyes, was driving in the opposite direction of his intended location, failed two field sobriety tests, and was in possession of two bottles of pills.  The Panel held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant was impaired by alcohol or drugs, and after a breathalyzer test ruled out alcohol as the cause of the Defendant’s impairment, the Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the cause of the Defendant’s impairment was prescription or illicit drugs.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence and request that he submit to a chemical test because the defendant had committed motor vehicle violations, emitted an odor of alcohol, had slurred speech, glossy eyes, and admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. Accordingly, the Court found that the factual findings of the trial magistrate were not clearly erroneous and the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in finding a violation of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Thus, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

City of Warwick v. Eric Alhborg, A.A. No. 09-152 (February 9, 2010).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that where the defendant crossed completely over the double yellow line, had slurred speech, bloodshot and watery eyes, and failed field sobriety tests, probable cause to arrest existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and sustained the charges against the defendant.

Sean McKenna v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-82 (October 24, 2008).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the officer testified that the defendant failed field sobriety tests and, based on an objective analysis, believed that the defendant was under the influence, probable cause to arrest existed. Furthermore, the defendant’s subjective state of mind at the time of the officer’s observations is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John McLoughlin v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 02-68 (August 8, 2008).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test are admissible for probable cause purposes. Furthermore, where the defendant failed field sobriety tests of physical dexterity as well as the HGN, probable cause for arrest existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Neal Gaudreau, A.A. No. 06-04 (August 8, 2008).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-6 (yielding to emergency vehicles). The Court held that where the defendant was driving erratically, crossed over the double yellow line and then into the breakdown lane, had slurred speech and emitted a strong smell of alcohol on his breath, reasonable grounds to stop the defendant existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

John Ferri v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-83 (August 12, 2008).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions). The Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest because the defendant came to a screeching halt and then crossed over the double yellow lines, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, had slurred speech, had an open beer can in his vehicle, and failed the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the violations against the defendant.

Michael Jeff v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 08-65 (December 3, 2008).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that where the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath, fumbled when producing paperwork, swayed when exiting the vehicle, and failed field sobriety tests, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

Mark Lewis v. RITT, A.A. No. 08-64 (August 29, 2008).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). The Court held that where the defendant was stopped at a green light, partially over the white line, slumped over the steering wheel, emitted a moderate odor of alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests, the officer had reasonable grounds to request the defendant to submit to a chemical test. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant. John Waterman v. RITT, A.A. No. 06-40 (January 25, 2007).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that where the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, and failed the two field sobriety test that were administered, reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol existed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.John Duffy v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-34 (November 8, 2007).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charge against the defendant for the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The state argued that probable cause existed because the defendant was seated behind the steering wheel with the key in the ignition in the “on” position, appeared to be asleep in a car that had just been in an accident, emitted the odor of alcohol from her breath, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech. The Court held that “all that is needed at the arrest phase is for one of the reasonable interpretations of the facts and circumstances to establish probable cause,” citing Pound v. State, A.A. No. 02-40, 15-16 (R.I. 03 ) quoting State v. Bruno, 709 A.2d 1048 (R.I. 1998). The District Court held that “based on the mosaic of facts surrounding the circumstances available to the officer,” one reasonable interpretation of the facts pointed to the probability that the defendant had operated the vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and thus, held that probable cause existed. Accordingly, the District Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Panel and reinstated the decision of the trial judge finding the defendant guilty of the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Isabel Booth A.A. No. 03-124 (March 20, 2006).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s decision to dismiss the violations of a  R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering a private road or driveway). The Court held that probable cause to arrest is determined by the totality of the circumstances pursuant to State v. Castro, 891 A.2d 848, 853 (R.I. 2006). Here, the District Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest because the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, and failed two field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel and remanded the case back to the trial magistrate.

State of Rhode Island v. Michael Netro, A.A. No. 06-25 (August 24, 2006).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The Court held that although the trial judge referred to the standard being used as reasonable suspicion, he did in fact apply the proper reasonable grounds standard. The Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds because the defendant drove erratically, crossed over the double yellow line, emitted the odor of alcohol on his breath, had red watery eyes, had difficulty producing his registration, had three empty beer cans in his car, and failed the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violations against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Paul Young, A.A. No. 04-84 (January 12, 2006).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-2 (manner of turning at intersection) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). The District Court held that where the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath, admitted that he had consumed six beers, stumbled when exiting the car, failed one field sobriety test and said he could not perform two other field sobriety tests because of his bum knee, the officer had probable cause to arrest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. John Davis, A.A. No. 06-48 (August 15, 2006).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant because the defendant was speeding, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, emitted an odor of alcohol on his breath, and admitted to consuming alcohol. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of Appeals Panel sustaining the violation against the defendant.

Michael Rollings v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 00-75 (February 28, 2006).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the arresting officer possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest where the defendant crossed the double yellow line multiple times and drove into the curb. The fact that defendant was not charged with that exact arrestable offense is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the charge against defendant.

Pavel Kovner v. RITT, A.A. No. 05-13 (December 21, 2005).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant claimed that the citing officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and further contended that because he was not penalized for violating § 31-20-9 it could not constitute a basis for the stop. However, the District Court held that reasonable grounds existed to stop the defendant because the officer observed the defendant violate § 31-20-9 when he failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. Furthermore, after stopping the defendant, the officer observed indicia of intoxication, sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence, because the defendant slurred his speech, emitted an odor of alcohol from his breath, had bloodshot and watery eyes, was unsteady on his feet, and failed field sobriety tests. The failure of the magistrate to impose a penalty for violating § 31-20-9 does not affect whether reasonable grounds existed for refusal to submit. Accordingly the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Brian R. Cunha v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 03-80 (April 21, 2004).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel reversing the trial magistrate’s dismissal of the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The District Court held that the trial magistrate erred by choosing an incorrect legal standard, requiring the state to introduce evidence that the defendant was incapable of safely operating a vehicle. The Court held that the correct legal standard is whether the circumstances available to the arresting officer were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The Court held that there was reasonable suspicion for the officer to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant had watery and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and emitted an odor of alcohol on her breath. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations against the defendant. 

April Kuzdeba v. RITT, A.A. No. 02-82 (June 11, 2004).pdf

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

The state appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel dismissing the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 3-8-9 (transportation of an alcoholic beverage by a minor). The state claimed that the decision of the Appeals Panel upholding the dismissal on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence was in error. Additionally, the state claimed that the trial judge applied the wrong standard because she interchanged reasonable suspicion and reasonable grounds. The officers had testified that the defendant looked disheveled, had bloodshot and watery eyes, emitted an odor of alcohol, and had slurred speech. The District Court held that the trail judge’s decision that the officer lacked reasonable grounds was not in error because her decisions regarding credibility were supported by competent evidence on the record as she watched the video tape of the defendant’s stop multiple times, went to the scene of the stop, and considered to the officer’s testimony. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial judge’s application of a reasonable suspicion standard was immaterial and amounted to harmless error. Reasonable grounds is the proper standard for assessing a refusal case, and because reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than reasonable grounds, the state was not prejudiced when it failed to prove on a lesser standard that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence. Accordingly, the Court upheld the dismissal of the violations against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Zachary Flanders, A.A. No. 03-134.pdf