Appeals Panel
07/06/2022
State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas A. San Martino, No. T22-0006 Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
The Defendant appealed a Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violations of “Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test” and G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3, “Refusal to Submit to Preliminary Breath Test.” The Defendant argued that, because the speeding charge that was the predicate for the traffic stop was dismissed, the charge could not be sustained. At the trial, an officer testified that he saw a vehicle pass his position traveling in excess of the posted speed limit, which was 25 miles per hour. The officer then testified that a police radar indicated that the vehicle was traveling at 43 miles per hour. The Officer testified to having conducted a traffic stop and identified the Defendant as the driver. The officer testified that based on his training and experience, he believed the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol because the Defendant had “moderately bloodshot eyes,” “slightly slurred speech,” and “an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath.” During the stop, the Defendant consented to perform field sobriety tests after telling the officer that he had not been drinking. The Officer testified that the Defendant was having a hard time maintaining his balance and requested that he perform a walk and turn test. During the walk and turn test the Officer “observed six out of the eight possible clues of impairment that officers are trained to look for while a motorist is performing the test.” The Officer “observed three out of the four possible clues of impairment” when the Defendant was performing the One Leg Stand Test. Due to these reasons the Officer asked the Defendant to submit to a “preliminary breath test,” which the Defendant declined. The defendant was arrested for suspicion of a DUI and ultimately refused to submit to a chemical test. At trial the Defendant argued that the state failed to show reasonable suspicion to make the stop as they had not shown proof that the radar had been. Additionally, the Defendant argued that because the stop was not justified, any violation that occurred afterwards would not be justified either. The Trial Magistrate dismissed the speeding charge but sustained the refusal charges, and the Defendant appealed.
The Appeals Panel noted that an officer is “required to have specific and articulable facts providing reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred.” The Appeals Panel held that reasonable suspicion had been met because, although the officer had not testified to the calibration of the radar, he testified to his observation regarding the defendant’s speed, which would be an articulable fact sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Further, the Panel noted that reasonable suspicion to request a chemical test is satisfied “when that individual exhibits tangible indicia of alcohol consumption through his or her speech, physical appearance, and performance on field sobriety tests.” The Appeals Panel held that the officer’s testimony regarding his observations of the scene and the Defendant’s physical appearance, along with the officer’s training, was sufficient to justify the request for the chemical test. The Appeals Panel sustained the charged violations. State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas A. San Martino, No. T22-0006 (July 6, 2022).pdf
Appeals Panel
03/29/2019
State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019)
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that a customer had departed who may not have paid for his food and who may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Based on the vehicle’s description, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he had just come from D’Angelo’s. Defendant was ultimately arrested for suspicion of DUI and refused to submit to a chemical test. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a motor vehicle stop.
The Appeals Panel concluded that the D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee’s call, combined with the detailed description of Defendant and his vehicle, provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision as not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.
State of Rhode Island v. David DiOrio, No. T18-0024 (March 29, 2019).pdf
Appeals Panel
08/08/2013
Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013)
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). At trial, the Officer testified that he initially watched two vehicles leave the South Beach parking lot, one traveling at sixty-eight miles-per-hour and the second (Defendant’s vehicle) traveling at sixty-two miles-per-hour, in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone. Before stopping Defendant’s vehicle, however, the Officer pursued but lost the first vehicle, then went back to locate Defendant’s vehicle, a silver Mitsubishi with “wavy graphic lines.” The Defendant argued that the Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because the Officer improperly identified his vehicle as the vehicle the Officer saw speeding. The Panel noted that the trial judge concluded that the Officer had reasonable and articulable grounds to stop the Defendant’s vehicle because the Officer specifically described Defendant’s vehicle as the silver Mitsubishi with “wavy graphic lines” that he scanned traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. The Panel held that the trial judge sustained the charge based upon legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.
Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013).pdf
Appeals Panel
02/06/2012
City of Providence v. Dennis P. Lonardo, C.A. No. T11-0063 Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.3 (revocation of license upon refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test). Defendant argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because the officer did not observe the defendant commit a traffic violation. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because the officer observed the defendant stumble and sway from side to side while walking down a side walk, enter and exit a liquor store, then get into a vehicle and drive away. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.City of Providence v. Dennis P. Lonardo, C.A. No. T11-0063 (February 6, 2012).pdf
Appeals Panel
03/26/2012
Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because he observed the defendant travel at a high rate of speed and swerve into the break down lane. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-17-2.1. Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf
Appeals Panel
09/20/2009
State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009) Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle because the Trooper relied on an informant’s tip and did not personally observe any erratic driving, traffic violations, or other evidence of a crime. The Trooper testified he stopped the Defendant because an informant reported a vehicle matching the Defendant’s vehicle had been involved in a hit-and-run accident, and that the driver might have been operating under the influence. The Panel explained that in determining whether reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop exists based on an informant’s tip, the “totality of the circumstances” is taken into account, and that such a stop is permitted if supported by sufficient detail and corroboration. Here, the Panel noted that the Trooper relied on an informant who made an official statement, that the tip provided details including the make, model, and registration of the vehicle, that the informant had personally observed the Defendant leave the scene of an accident, that the informant had been following the Defendant while on the phone with the State Police dispatcher, and that the Trooper corroborated those details upon locating the vehicle. Based on the reliability of the informant and the Trooper’s corroboration of the details of the informant’s tip, the Panel held that the trial judge properly determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.
State of Rhode Island v. Richard DiPrete, C.A. No. T09-0072 (September 20, 2009).pdf
Appeals Panel
09/24/2008
State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Carnasciale, C.A. T08-0082 (September 24, 2008)
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was clearly erroneous because the Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. Here, the Officer testified that he stopped the Defendant’s vehicle after he witnessed it swerve abruptly into a parking lot and then hit a curb. Once in contact with the Defendant, the Officer observed that the Defendant’s breath smelled strongly of alcohol, his movements were slow and clumsy, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, and he acknowledged that he was coming from a bar and had “a couple beers.” In light of the evidence, the Panel held that the trial magistrate had legally competent evidence to conclude that the stop was lawful. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.
State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Carnasciale, C.A. T08-0082 (September 24, 2008).pdf
Appeals Panel
07/16/2008
Town of Portsmouth v. Stephen Abbruzzi, C.A. T08-0071 (July 16, 2008)
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the Patrolman did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop of his vehicle, rendering the underlying stop unlawful. Here, the police department had received an anonymous tip with a detailed description of a vehicle that was operating in an erratic fashion. The Patrolman testified that when he made contact with the Defendant’s vehicle, which matched the description, he observed the vehicle drift into the passing lane on multiple occasions and noted that the Defendant’s continued operation on the road would, in his opinion, compromise public safety due to the “congested” traffic. The Panel held that the officer’s independent observations corroborating the anonymous tip of erratic operation provided the trial magistrate with sufficient evidence to find that the Patrolman’s stop of the vehicle was lawful based on reasonable suspicion. The Panel also rejected the Defendant’s argument that the evidence of the chemical test refusal must be suppressed because the trial magistrate dismissed the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway violation). The Panel continued that the trial magistrate’s dismissal of the laned roadway violation had no bearing on the refusal violation because the two statutes have distinct elements. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.
Town of Portsmouth v. Stephen Abbruzzi, C.A. T08-0071 (July 16, 2008).pdf