Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed a decision from the Trial Magistrate accepting Defendant’s plea to R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating without insurance). Defendant argued that the Trial Magistrate erred in finding that the violation of § 31-47-9 in the instant case was Defendant’s second offense. Defendant claimed that her first offense had been dismissed and noted that the summons in this case charged her with a first offense. The Trial Magistrate agreed that the summons charged her with a first offense, but held that it was the facts, not the charge on the summons, that mattered. In the absence of any evidence that the first offense had been dismissed, he imposed a suspension and fine as a second offense. The Appeals Panel agreed, noting that the record did not contain any evidence that Defendant’s previous violation of § 31-47-9 had been dismissed. In a footnote, the Appeals Panel also suggested that even if the first offense had been dismissed the case might appropriately be treated as a second offense because the statute speaks to the number of offenses and does not require a conviction. Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal was denied and the Appeals Panel sustained the charges.

State of Rhode Island v. Sara Smolenski, No. T16-0009 (January 24, 2018).pdf