09/10/2019
Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 33-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). A police officer responded to the scene of a reported accident whereby a parked vehicle was struck. Following a series of standardized field sobriety tests, Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station where he refused to submit to a chemical test. At trial, Defendant testified that while he was signing the Rights for Use at the Station form, he was under the impression that any penalties stemming from his refusal could be negotiated due to the use of the word “can” within the form. But the trial magistrate was unmoved and sustained the charged violation.
On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not properly informed of the penalties resulting from his refusal due to the language used in the Rights for Use at the Station form. More specifically, Defendant asserted that the use of the word “can” rather than “shall” led Defendant to believe that the penalties could be negotiated. But, pursuant to § 33-27-2.1, a driver need only be informed of his rights and the associated penalties for refusal and, therefore, a driver’s subjective belief is irrelevant. Also, the Panel stated that whether a driver was adequately informed of his rights and the associated penalties is a “factual determination within the exclusive discretion of the trial judge or magistrate.” As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in determining that Defendant was adequately informed because Defendant testified that he was aware that he would face potential penalties, including losing his license. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019).pdf