RI District Court and Traffic Tribunal Case Law

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State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019)

State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019).pdf
Appeals Panel
09/10/2019
State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019)

Rights for Use at Station

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 33-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). A police officer responded to the scene of a reported accident whereby a parked vehicle was struck. Following a series of standardized field sobriety tests, Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station where he refused to submit to a chemical test. At trial, Defendant testified that while he was signing the Rights for Use at the Station form, he was under the impression that any penalties stemming from his refusal could be negotiated due to the use of the word “can” within the form. But the trial magistrate was unmoved and sustained the charged violation.

On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not properly informed of the penalties resulting from his refusal due to the language used in the Rights for Use at the Station form. More specifically, Defendant asserted that the use of the word “can” rather than “shall” led Defendant to believe that the penalties could be negotiated. But, pursuant to § 33-27-2.1, a driver need only be informed of his rights and the associated penalties for refusal and, therefore, a driver’s subjective belief is irrelevant. Also, the Panel stated that whether a driver was adequately informed of his rights and the associated penalties is a “factual determination within the exclusive discretion of the trial judge or magistrate.” As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in determining that Defendant was adequately informed because Defendant testified that he was aware that he would face potential penalties, including losing his license. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019).pdf

Appeals Panel
09/10/2019
State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019)

Leaving the Scene

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty on collision with unattended vehicle). A police officer responded to the scene of a reported accident whereby a parked vehicle was struck. The officer observed Defendant’s vehicle approximately 400 feet away from the parked vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he hit a parked car. Based upon the physical location of the vehicles and Defendant’s admission, the police officer cited Defendant for leaving the scene of the accident. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because there was no testimony in the record establishing that Defendant fled the scene of the accident.

Pursuant to § 31-26-4, a violation is sustained when evidence proves that: (1) a defendant operated a vehicle which collided with and caused damaged to an unattended vehicle; and (2) the defendant failed to notify the driver of the unattended vehicle and local law enforcement about the accident. Here, the trial magistrate’s decision was based upon the police officer’s testimony, which mentioned the location of the vehicles, the damage to the vehicles, and the officer’s conversations with Defendant and an eyewitness. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not affected by error since the trial magistrate could reasonably infer that Defendant violated the statute. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019).pdf