Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Defendant asserted that he was stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.  The officer admitted at trial that he did not observe the defendant commit any traffic violations or observe any indicia of intoxication before he stopped the defendant and that the sole basis for the stop was in reliance on “departmental knowledge” allegedly provided by a witness who followed the defendant and informed the dispatcher that the defendant had been in an accident, was possibly intoxicated, and provided the make, model, and license plate.  The District Court held that although the officer acted properly in stopping the defendant, the correct analysis under Fourth Amendment precedent for warrantless stops was to inquire whether the “communicating” officer possessed reasonable suspicion to instigate the stop.  Here, the Court held that the state did not meet its burden in proving that the dispatcher had reasonable suspicion to instigate the stop because the state failed to prove that the alleged telephone call by the witness was ever made.   After suggesting that the state’s failure to meet its burden was enough by itself to recommend reversal, the Court went on to note that following the line of analysis laid out in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the anonymous tip failed to meet the standards of “veracity, basis of knowledge, and reliability” because the information did not have any predictive value and the police only corroborated the make, model, and license plate of the defendant.  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the violation against the defendant.