The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to impose a six-month license suspension after sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by imposing a suspension in excess of his statutory authority and by considering her previous driving record, for which she had been previously punished pursuant to the Colin Foote Law. Here, the trial magistrate imposed the license suspension after finding that the Defendant had an apparent disregard for traffic laws. The Panel noted that R.I.G.L. § 31-41.1-6 “vests a trial judge or magistrate with broad authority to include license suspension as part of a sentence for a violation of the motor vehicle code” and that the discretion to exercise that authority “is only abridged in extraordinary circumstances when the trial magistrate has imposed a sentence that is without justification and is grossly dissimilar from other sentences commonly imposed for similar offenses.” The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion in this case. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision.