Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel upholding the trial magistrate’s decision to suspend his driver’s license for three months and requiring him to complete a four hour driver re-training program based upon a speeding violation. The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in relying on the broad sentencing authority of R.I.G.L. § 31-41.1-6(c) to suspend his license for three months because R.I.G.L. § 31-41.1-4(b)(1), providing that a license “may be suspended up to thirty (30) days” for the speeding offense at issue, was the more specific sentencing provision. The Court determined that the use of the word “may” in § 31-41.1-4(b) provides the legal authority to impose a penalty that is not explicitly enumerated in § 31-41.1-4(b) so long as it is a penalty “provided by law.” The Court held that the trial magistrate’s sanctions were “provided by law” because §§ 31-11-5 and 31-41.1-6(c) provide a judge or magistrate with “unlimited discretion when suspending the licenses of those drivers adjudicated to have violated one or more sections within Title 31, unless the specific section that the driver violated” explicitly limits that discretion. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion and upheld the Appeal Panel’s decision to sustain the trial magistrate’s sanctions.