Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(B) (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that he could not have been speeding because the time between his citation and the time listed on a store purchase receipt proved that it was impossible for him to violate the speed limit. Here, the Trooper testified that he used a calibrated radar unit to measure the Defendant’s vehicle speed and that he was trained in radar speed measurements. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err because his decision was based on the Trooper’s testimony and the Trooper’s testimony satisfied the criteria outlined in State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1874), for admissibility of an accurate radar speed measurement. Accordingly, the Panel upheld that trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. David Barros, C.A. T08-0066 (June 11, 2008).pdf