Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  Moments before trial, the Defendant plead guilty.  Following his guilty plea, the trial judge imposed an enhanced sentence under the Act.  The Defendant appealed, arguing that he should have been given a written notice that he would be sentenced under the Act.  The Panel held the neither the Constitution nor the Act required the trial judge to issue written notice to the Defendant before enhancing the sentence.  The Panel explained that a verbal warning at his arraignment that he could face a loss of license for up to two years, while not required, was sufficient to put the Defendant on notice and that, in any event, ignorance of the law is not a defense.  Accordingly, the panel sustained the violation in part; however the Panel remanded to the trial judge to make specific findings of fact that the Defendant’s continued operation of a vehicle would pose a substantial traffic safety hazard.

State of Rhode Island v. Jacob Botella, C.A. No. T11-0075 (February 7, 2012).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Defendant argued that because the first conviction in the eighteen month period fell prior to the date the Act took effect, the trial judge improperly applied the sentence enhancement to him retroactively.  The Panel noted this issue was a matter of first impression.  The Panel looked to secondary authority used to support other sentencing enhancement statutes and compared the Act to so-called “three strikes laws.”  The Panel reasoned that the Act does not provide sanctions for acts occurring prior to the effective date of the act.  Rather, the prior convictions serve as a condition precedent for imposing an increased penalty for the later offense.  The Panel held that violations prior to the date the Act took effect can be used as predicate offenses so long as the fourth offense is committed after the passage of the act.  Thus, the Panel held the trial judge did not retroactively apply the Act to the Defendant’s conviction.  However, the Panel remanded in part for the trial judge to make specific findings of fact that the Defendant posed a substantial traffic safety hazard.

State of Rhode Island v. Jacob Botella, C.A. No. T11-0075 (February 7, 2012).pdf