Speeding

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds). A police officer responded to a reported motor vehicle accident between Defendant and another driver. At trial, an accident reconstruction expert testified that, in his “best estimation,” Defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit. Moreover, based on a witness’s testimony, the trial magistrate found that Defendant passed the witness’s vehicle “at a much higher rate of speed” than the posted speed limit. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because the evidence on the record did not establish that Defendant violated § 31-14-1.

Here, the record contained sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant traveled at an unreasonable speed, but a driver is guilty of § 31-14-1 based upon a collision only when the other driver entered the roadway using due care. Although the trial magistrate found that the other driver did not operate recklessly, a finding that a driver did not drive recklessly is not equivalent to a finding that a driver exercised due care. As such, the Appeals Panel held that further factual findings were necessary as to whether the other driver exercised due care. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel remanded the matter to the trial magistrate to determine whether the other driver exercised due care.

State of Rhode Island v. Tayla Delvecchio, No. T18-0025 (July 24, 2019).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds). A police officer responded to a reported motor vehicle accident between Defendant and another driver. At trial, an accident reconstruction expert testified that, in his “best estimation,” Defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit. Moreover, based on a witness’s testimony, the trial magistrate found that Defendant passed the witness’s vehicle “at a much higher rate of speed” than the posted speed limit. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because § 31-14-1 cannot be sustained on its own without also charging §§ 31-14-2 or 31-14-3.

In State v. Campbell, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that § 31-14-1, standing alone, does not meet the constitutional test of reasonable certainty. See State v. Campbell, 196 A.2d 131-32 (R.I. 1963) (concluding that a complaint charging a driver with violating § 31-14-1 must also reference §§ 31-14-2 or 31-14-3 to satisfy the reasonable certainty test). But, in State v. Lutye, the Court found that a “third alternative for satisfying the certainty test is to charge that the speed was unreasonable because the operator could not so control his vehicle as to avoid colliding with persons or vehicles as particularized in the second sentence of § 31-14-1.” State v. Lutye, 287 A.2d 634, 637 (R.I. 1972).

Here, Defendant was accused of traveling at an unreasonable speed because a collision resulted. As such, the Appeals Panel held that it was not an error of law for the trial magistrate to allow a charge of § 31-14-1 to stand on its own. Nevertheless, the Appeals Panel remanded the matter on other grounds.

State of Rhode Island v. Tayla Delvecchio, No. T18-0025 (July 24, 2019).pdf