Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges.  The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment.  Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result.  Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits.  Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.