Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that a District Court order associated with the DUI prosecution of the Defendant required the Pawtucket Police to destroy all police records that tied the defendant to the events underlying the two charges sustained by the Tribunal and that, as a result, the Pawtucket Police could not re-file the charges.  The Panel reviewed the plain language of  R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12(a)(1), “Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated,” and explained that the statute requires only records of identification be destroyed.  The Panel then reviewed the trial record and found no evidence that the Police used any record of identification as a basis to identify Defendant as the operator of the vehicle.  Instead, identification was made by in-court testimony of the arresting officer.  The Panel explained that defendant’s assertion that the Police could not rely on records of identification ordered destroyed by the District Court order was immaterial to the matter before the Tribunal.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the Police to re-file the charges was not an error of law.