Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges.  The re-filing went to trial and resulted in conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss the charges was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that the special prosecutor’s dismissal was with prejudice and that the City was required to move to vacate or appeal the initial dismissal before re-filing the charges.  The Appeals Panel noted that the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal of a civil case in Superior Court is governed by Super R. Civ. P. 41(a), and under that rule a prosecutor’s voluntary dismissal is without prejudice absent an affirmative statement of prejudice or stipulations between the parties.  The Appeals Panel applied the reasoning of Super R. Civ. P. 41(a) to Traffic Trib. R. P. 26(a), which allows the prosecuting officer to terminate the charges and held that there is a presumption that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice.  The Panel held that the filing of an appeal, which under the rule can only be filed by an “aggrieved party” was inapposite because the City, which dismissed the charges, was not an aggrieved party.  The Panel held that the filing of a Motion to Vacate would be inappropriate because no order had been entered; the role of the Tribunal in a decision by a party to dismiss is administrative only and functions simply to memorialize the dismissal for purposes of record keeping.  Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law.