Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of refusal to submit was in error because she consented to a PBT after arrest and, therefore, had fulfilled her obligations under R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 to submit to a chemical test. Section 31-27-2.1(d) states “any test . . . for the presence of alcohol which relies in whole or in part upon the principle of infrared light absorption is considered a chemical test.” The District Court held that the defendant did not fulfill her obligation of implied consent under § 31-27-2.1 because the PBT used to test the defendant utilized fuel-cell technology to determine the presence of alcohol and did not rely on infrared light. Accordingly, the District Court sustained the violation against the defendant.