Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Defendant claimed that, as a result of an accident in which his head had gone “partially through the windshield,” he was unable to make a knowing and voluntary decision about whether to submit to a chemical test.  The trial magistrate ruled that the defendant bore the burden of proving his inability to make a knowing and voluntary decision and held that the defendant had failed to meet that burden.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s burden-shifting approach was improper.  The District Court agreed that the trial magistrate’s burden-shifting approach was improper, holding that the burden of proof always stays with the State, but nonetheless upheld the finding of violation.  The District Court noted that the trial magistrate had found the testimony of the officers to be more credible than that of a trauma surgeon expert witness as to the issue of the defendant’s cognitive ability at the time of refusal.  Holding that an appellate body “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”  Consequently, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.