Defendant appealed the decision of the Cumberland Municipal Court denying his Motion to Vacate a default judgment entered against him for failure to appear. Defendant was charged with a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(g)(1) (safety belt use) and appeared for his original municipal court trial date, only to find that the court was closed due to the COVID pandemic. The trial date was eventually rescheduled, with notice mailed to the Defendant’s address, but the Defendant missed the rescheduled court date and the court entered a default judgment.  The Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate, alleging that he never received the notice due to a change in address after a fire at his former residence. He was unable to provide the DMV with a new address because he did not have permanent housing and the DMV did not allow him to enter a P.O. Box as a new address. At his hearing on the Motion to Vacate, the Trial Judge asked the Defendant if he intended to oppose the summons.  When the Defendant answered in the affirmative, the Trial Judge instantly and without explanation denied the Motion to Vacate.  The Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge’s apparently predicating his denial of the Motion to Vacate on the Defendant’s intent to challenge the summons was improper, noting the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s dictate that “a defendant’s right to “present his defense at a trial . . . should be carefully protected.” Berick v. Curran, 179 A. 708, 711 (1935).  At minimum, the Appeals Panel stated the trial judge should have offered an explanation for the decision to deny the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate. The Appeals Panel, without deciding the merits of the Motion to Vacate, remanded the case to the Cumberland Municipal Court for further proceedings.