Defendant was charged with violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-13 (crossing center section of divided highway) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-13 (leaving lane of travel). At trial, the Defendant entered into a plea agreement. He plead guilty to the first two violations, and the third violation was dropped. The Defendant then filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, and his motion was dismissed through email. The following day, the Defendant filed a motion to vacate the decision and a hearing date was set.

The Defendant appeared for the hearing on the motion to vacate and argued that he had newly discovered evidence to show that he was not where the officer said he was at the time of the original violations – rather, he was at his workplace in Connecticut. The Defendant declared he had video from a “dash cam” in his car and evidence from his employer. The Trial Judge explained that without newly discovered evidence that the Defendant “could not have discovered prior to trial,” he could not grant the motion to vacate. The Defendant argued that he was not aware of the day and time of the violations and could not have known this before the trial, but the Trial Judge reminded him that he appeared at an arraignment prior to the trial date. The Defendant then argued that the court “misled him and told him that he could not present the evidence at trial” and that the officer “bullied” him into pleading. The Trial Judge did not believe the Defendant’s arguments and denied the motion to vacate. The Defendant appealed the decision.

On appeal, the Defendant again argued that newly discovered evidence proved his innocence. The Appeals Panel noted that its role is to decide “the correctness of the order granting or denying the motion, not the correctness of the original judgment.” Greenfield Hill Investments, LLC v. Miller, 934 A.2d 223, 224 (R.I. 2007) (citing McBurney v. Roszkowski, 875 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2005)). The Appeals Panel agreed with the Trial Judge’s reasoning that the Appellant “should have known…about his own whereabouts, or at a minimum, could have discovered the circumstances ‘by the exercise of ordinary due diligence.’” See Malinou v. Seattle Savings Bank, 970 A.2d 6, 10 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Forcier v. Forcier, 558 A.2d 212, 213 (R.I. 1989)). The Appeals Panel also found that Appellant’s own argument that the court misled him about his ability to present this evidence at trial meant that he was aware of this evidence at the time and it was not “newly discovered” evidence. The Appeals Panel found the Trial Judge’s decision was not erroneous and, accordingly, denied the Appellant’s appeal.