Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Defendant argued that because the first conviction in the eighteen month period fell prior to the date the Act took effect, the trial judge improperly applied the sentence enhancement to him retroactively.  The Panel noted this issue was a matter of first impression.  The Panel looked to secondary authority used to support other sentencing enhancement statutes and compared the Act to so-called “three strikes laws.”  The Panel reasoned that the Act does not provide sanctions for acts occurring prior to the effective date of the act.  Rather, the prior convictions serve as a condition precedent for imposing an increased penalty for the later offense.  The Panel held that violations prior to the date the Act took effect can be used as predicate offenses so long as the fourth offense is committed after the passage of the act.  Thus, the Panel held the trial judge did not retroactively apply the Act to the Defendant’s conviction.  However, the Panel remanded in part for the trial judge to make specific findings of fact that the Defendant posed a substantial traffic safety hazard.