Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court denying his motion seeking dismissal of a prior adjudication that he had violated R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-5 (“overtaking on the right”) and § 31-15-16 (“use of emergency break-down lane for travel”). The Defendant proceeded to trial on the two charges, which were sustained by the trial court.  Subsequently, the Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Attorney General’s Office in District Court with respect to a related DUI charge that included a promise that the two adjudicated violations in the Traffic Tribunal would be dismissed. When Defendant moved for dismissal at the Traffic Tribunal pursuant to Rules 20 and 26(b), the Attorney General’s Office did not object to the dismissal. Defendant argued that if these violations were not dismissed, an injustice would occur because the defendant would be denied the benefits of his bargain. The trial court concluded, based on its reading of Rule 26(c), that it did not have the authority to dismiss the charges. The Appeals Panel agreed with the Defendant that the Rule 26(b) only limits prosecutors from dismissing previously adjudicated charges and does not similarly limit the court. However, even though the court had the discretion to dismiss adjudicated judgments in the interests of justice, the Appeals Panel found the trial court’s error harmless. For policy reasons, the Appeals Panel refused to reverse the trial court’s denial of the dismissal. The Appeals Panel reasoned that if it allowed defendants, after they receive an unfavorable result in the Traffic Tribunal, to then go to the District Court for a more favorable result, it would make the Traffic Tribunal essentially a “moot court.” Therefore, in the interests of preserving the finality of Traffic Tribunal decisions, the Appeals Panel refused to grant a dismissal. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed.