Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Defendant argued that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion necessary for a stop because the defendant was stopped based solely on a face-to-face tip from an unknown informant that the defendant was drunk and had been involved in an accident.  The Panel noted that the RI Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle based solely on an anonymous tip that the operator is driving under the influence is unconstitutional.   State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 1997).  The Panel held that, because the Officer’s first words to the Defendant upon stopping him were to ask whether the Defendant had hit another vehicle, the Officer’s intent in making the stop was to investigate the hit and run.  Noting the distinction between an unnamed citizen informant and an anonymous informant, the Panel then considered whether this unnamed citizen informant could have furnished reasonable suspicion in the mind of the Officer.  Citing federal case law, the Panel noted that a face-to-face informant is considered more reliable than a telephone informant because it exposes the citizen to criminal liability for making a false accusation.  The Panel emphasized that the informant had personally witnessed the alleged accident, that the informant provided a detailed description of the Defendant’s vehicle before it drove by and then pointed it out to the Officer, and that exigent circumstances in the interest of public safety justified the Officer’s decision to stop the Defendant before he disappeared into the night.  The Panel held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Officer was justified in relying on the informant’s tip despite the failure of the Officer to obtain the identity of the tipster.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.