03/18/2015
Defendant appealed the judgment of the Appeals Panel affirming the trial magistrate’s verdict sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the trial judge to dismiss the refusal case because a District Court judge had previously dismissed the related drunk-driving case, apparently on the grounds that the Officer’s testimony was not sufficiently credible. The Court noted that of the three required elements of estoppel, the first element of privity and second element of a final judgment on the merits were not at issue because the City of Pawtucket prosecuted the drunk-driving case on behalf of the State and because the dismissal of the drunk–driving charge ended the case. The Court held that the third element – the identity of the issues –was not established because the charges of drunken driving and refusal have different elements and different standards of proof. As such, the Court held that the State was entitled to proceed on the refusal citation despite the dismissal of the drunk–driving charge. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the Defendant.
Marek Krzaczek v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 14-0099 (March 18, 2015).pdf