Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that the officer did not have a right to be on the premises. Defendant was in the parking lot of a bar with his vehicle running and the keys in the ignition. The officer had responded to a call from the bar owner of a suspicious vehicle parked in the parking lot after the bar was closed. In State v. Cook, 440 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1982), the court noted that police are often called upon to perform “community caretaking functions” that have nothing to do with the apprehension and conviction of alleged criminals. These scenarios require the officer to investigate when the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect something amiss. Id.  Here, the officer responded to a call and at first inquired about the defendant’s condition. During this caretaking function the officer, the officer began to suspect the defendant had operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The Appeals Panel held that the officer had the right to investigate as part of the officer’s “community caretaking functions.” Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Bryan E. Menge, No. T15-0036 (July 27, 2016).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-26-5 (“duty in accident resulting in highway fixtures”). Defendant argued that the officer violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. A witness called 911 forty minutes after he witnessed a car hit a telephone poll, and the officer responded. The officer found a vehicle matching the witness’s description. The officer then ran the plate number and determined that the defendant owned the vehicle. The officer went to the nearby address and, after no one answered the officer’s knock at the front door, the officer went into defendant’s back yard where the officer saw the defendant inside the house. The officer then requested that the defendant come outside and talk. The Appeals Panel held that the officer had an objective, compelling reason to make that request. In State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302 (R.I. 2011), the court held that exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The officer had a reasonable belief that her assistance was required to avert a crisis, that crisis being the defendant’s potential need for medical assistance, because the officer had a reasonable belief that someone required medical attention. The Appeals Panel found that the officer had an obligation to find the potentially injured person. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Nevitt, No. T15-0043 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant argued that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial. However, the Court held that there is no such right to a jury trial for an infraction of the motor vehicle code. A defendant is only entitled to a jury trial if they would have had such a right at the time the Constitution was adopted or if the offense is of a nature that requires a jury trial. See Calore Freight Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Trans., 576 A.2d 1214 (R.I. 1990). Therefore, because the motor vehicle code did not exist at the time the Constitution was adopted in 1842, nor did any similar statute then exist, and the fines imposed under the motor vehicle code are definite and without discretion, the defendant had no right to a jury trial on the charge of violating R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-2-2.1. However, the Court went on to dismiss the charge against the defendant on other grounds. Town of Barrington v. Stephen Day, C.A. No. T13-0011 (January 17, 2014).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that various conflicts of interest by the Pawtucket Police Department amounted to a violation of his due process rights that should have resulted in a dismissal of the charges.  The Panel looked to various Rhode Island, Connecticut, and U.S. precedent to explain that to succeed on a claim of bias under the Due Process clause, as an initial matter, the defendant must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity by the decision maker.  Furthermore, in an administrative proceeding like the Traffic Tribunal, Due Process requires the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner in front of a neutral decision maker.  Finally, the defendant must show not only prosecutorial misconduct, but also that the misconduct resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendant.  The Panel then looked at the record and found that the defendant made only general accusations of impropriety and failed to identify any specific misconduct committed by the Pawtucket Police Department.  Moreover, the defendant did not impute any misconduct to the trial magistrate and did not show that the alleged misconduct resulted in any unfair prejudice.  The Panel held that the Defendant did not overcome the presumption that he received a full hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.  The Panel explained that it was satisfied that the requirements of due process were met and held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law or an abuse of discretion

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway). Defendant claimed that the officer’s stop and detention of her constituted a de facto arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and investigate for suspicion of DUI because the officer observed the defendant travel at a high rate of speed and swerve into the breakdown lane, the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, she emitted an odor of alcohol, she admitted to the consumption of alcohol, and she had difficulty retrieving the requested documents. Further, the Court noted that there was nothing on the record that suggested the officer’s detention of the defendant was unusual in either duration or scope. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation of § 31-27-2.1. Town of Middletown v. Svetlana Semenova, Ca.A. No. T11-0049 (March 26, 2012).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed).  After submitting to two breath tests, Defendant was asked to submit to a blood test, which he refused.  Defendant argued that he denied his due process rights when the police asked him to submit to a second chemical test because the “Rights for the Use at Station” form’s language – “I request you submit to a chemical test” – fails to inform a suspected impaired driver that he or she must submit to more than one chemical test.  The Defendant argued that, in order to satisfy due process, the language should be changed to track § 31-27-2.1, which allows for the administration of two chemical tests. The Panel explained that the use of the singular article “a” is used because the form is read before a single chemical test for either alcohol or drugs is administered.  The Panel noted that there is no statutory or constitutional requirement that suspected impaired drivers be told they may be subjected to multiple tests.  The Panel noted that the Officer read the Defendant the Rights for Use at the Station form before both tests and that the Defendant was fully apprised of the consequences of refusing to submit to the second test and willingly refused.  The Panel held that none of the Defendant’s due process rights were violated and accordingly sustained the charged violations.

State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that where the trial magistrate stated to the prosecution that the Rights for Use at Scene and Station cards had not yet been introduced into evidence, there was no due process violation. The magistrate did not attempt to establish proof to support the position of the prosecution, and, therefore, did not violate the defendant’s right to a trial before a neutral and detached fact-finder. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No T08-0130 (March 10, 2009).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protections against an unreasonable “search” of the defendant’s breath did not apply here because the defendant refused to submit to a breath test, and no such test was administered. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.

City of Warwick v. Richard Porter, C.A. No. T09-0031 (July 1, 2009).pdf

Constitutional Issues

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Defendant argued that she was deprived of her due process right to an impartial fact finder because the trial magistrate assisted the prosecution to prove an essential element of the violation. Specifically, the trial magistrate advised counsel for the State that the “Rights for Use at the Station” form had not been introduced into evidence, which prompted counsel to enter the form. The Panel explained that a dismissal based on impartial fact finder is warranted when the actions of the magistrate undermine the fundamental fairness required by due process and, even though a citizen is guaranteed an impartial fact finder, there is no evidence here that the trial magistrate attempted to establish proof to support the position of either party. Here, the Panel found that the trial magistrate did not exceed his permissible scope of authority because his participation in the proceeding was for the limited purpose of ensuring that it proceeded in an orderly and expeditious fashion. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Portsmouth v. Deborah Casey, C.A. No. T08-0130 (December 10, 2008).pdf