Evidence

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). A North Kingstown police officer conducted a traffic stop which resulted in a citation under § 31-27-2.1. Following multiple appeals, Defendant’s case was remanded to the trial magistrate for further factual findings on the issue of the location of the violation. Defendant attempted to introduce two maps to show that the stop took place outside of North Kingstown, but the trial magistrate excluded one of the maps (Map B). Moreover, the trial magistrate accorded little weight to the admitted map (Map A). On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred since Map A established that the violation occurred outside of North Kingstown and, therefore, the violation should have been dismissed.

Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 15 provides that the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence govern all proceedings before the Traffic Tribunal. Although relevant evidence is admissible, “the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial [magistrate].” See State v. Grayhurst, 652 A.2d 491, 504 (R.I. 2004). Moreover, the Appeals Panel “will not conclude that a trial [magistrate] abused his or her discretion as long as some grounds to support the decision appear in the record.” Id. at 505.

Here, the trial magistrate did not err in excluding Map B because Defendant did not supply any evidence demonstrating the authenticity of the map. Also, the trial magistrate did not err in according Map A little weight because Defendant failed to demonstrate that the map was a fair and accurate representation of the area. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. James Harrington, T15-0040 (April 30, 2019).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appeals the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”). Defendant argued that his arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment and that all evidence collected as a result of his arrest should have been suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant was pulled over in the early morning for crossing a painted line, failure to use his turn signal, and failure to stop at a stop sign. The Officer employed “high-risk protocol” during the traffic stop. The defendant was ordered out of the vehicle and onto his knees while the officer trained his gun on the defendant. The defendant was searched, cuffed and placed in the rear of the cruiser. The officer then searched the defendant’s vehicle. Afterwards, the officer uncuffed the defendant and began asking him questions as part of the officer’s investigation of driving under the influence of alcohol. The Appeals Panel held that the arrest was illegal; however, the panel held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to Refusal cases because these cases are civil in nature. Defendant appealed this decision, arguing that the exclusionary rule should apply to traffic tribunal trials. The District Court agreed that the arrest was illegal and that the constitutionally based exclusionary rule did not apply. However, the District Court held that R.I.G.L 1956 § 9-19-25 mandates the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence because, by its explicit language, it applies to all actions in state courts. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Michael Rhodes v. Town of Burrillville, A.A. No. 16-45 (August 10, 2017).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.2 (“refusal to submit to chemical test”) and § 31-22-21.1 (“presence of open alcoholic beverage”). Defendant argued that the trial record was incomplete.  At trial, the defendant attempted to play a video of the defendant at the police station. After several failed attempts to get the CD to play, the magistrate played the video on his personal computer off the record. The defendant contends that this video contained something that would change the outcome of this case and that it is important that the Appeals Panel view this video. Defendant contends that Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89 (1st Cir. 1990), allowed the defendant to supplement the record with the video tape. The Appeals Panel found that Rivera also provides that if the Defendant fails his duty to furnish an appellate court with the raw materials necessary in the due performance of the appellate task then the court may scrutinize the merits of the case insofar as the record permits. Since the Defendant failed to move the video into evidence after the trial court viewed the video, the defendant failed in his duty to preserve the issue for appeal. Therefore, the Appeals Panel proceeded based only on the facts provided by the record. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Town of Hopkinton v. Daniel A. Buck, No. T15-0037 (August 25, 2016).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow testimonial evidence about the breathalyzer cards without the state entering the cards themselves into evidence or offering any proof that the cards were unavailable due to loss, destruction, inaccessibility, or other justifiable cause violated the “best evidence rule” (Rule 1002 in the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence) and constituted an abuse of discretion. However, the Court held that the abuse of discretion constituted harmless error as the violation was supported by other legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Abel Pedroso C.A. No T09-0025.pdf

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial judge abused her discretion by ignoring material medical evidence. The Defendant had provided the court with an affidavit from his physician that the Defendant had undergone hip replacement surgery and walked with a “pronounced limp.” Because the doctor noted in his affidavit that he “[didn’t] know [whether] the hip replacement might have contributed to” the Defendant’s failure of the field sobriety tests, the Panel held that the trial judge properly found that the affidavit was irrelevant and immaterial. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Sousa, C.A. T08-0008 (October 1, 2008).pdf

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate should have considered the Officer’s sworn report as substantive evidence of his prior inconsistent statements and erred in finding that the Officer’s sworn reports had no viability after the preliminary suspension hearing. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err because the omissions in the Officer’s sworn report did not rise to the level of prior inconsistent statements and because the Officer’s sworn report was admitted for the limited evidentiary purpose of showing compliance with § 31-27-2.1 Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Lawrence, C.A. T08-0049 (April 23, 2008).pdf

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the Officer’s reports were inaccurate and unreliable because they listed different accident times. The Panel held that the defects in the Officer’s report did not rise to the level of a reversible error and the divergent accident times were likely the result of the lack of a third-party witness to the accident. The Panel continued that, though the exact time of the accident may be difficult to discern, the time had little bearing on whether the Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated and refused a chemical test. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Lawrence, C.A. T08-0049 (April 23, 2008).pdf

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by admitting into evidence the hearsay statements of a civilian witness who did not testify at the trial, violating her constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination. The witness owned the vehicle into which the Defendant collided, but neither witnessed the accident nor observed the Defendant’s operation of the vehicle prior to the accident. The trial magistrate admitted his statements to the police into evidence pursuant to the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule under Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 803(1). To qualify as a present sense impression, the statement must be made while the event is occurring or with only a slight lapse of time. The Panel held that because some time had elapsed between the accident and the Officer’s conversation with the witness, the application of Rule 803(1) was questionable. However, the Panel continued that the trial magistrate also stated on several occasions that the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter. Accordingly, the statements did not meet the definition of hearsay under Rule 801(c) and were admissible to prove facts used by the Officer to determine probable cause to arrest the motorist. The Panel concluded that the trial magistrate’s citation of Rule 803(1) instead of Rule 803(c) was a harmless error. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Lawrence, C.A. T08-0049 (April 23, 2008).pdf

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant argued that her statements to the police should have been suppressed because she was detained at the time of her questioning at the scene of her accident and should have been informed of her rights. The Panel held that no admonition of the Defendant’s rights were required until the Defendant was handcuffed and the Officer placed her in the police cruiser. The Panel observed that the record indicated that the Officer read the Defendant her rights once she was detained. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Erin Lawrence, C.A. T08-0049 (April 23, 2008).pdf