Appeals Panel
07/21/2022
State of Rhode Island v. Aitor Aldazabal T21-0026 Appellate Procedure
Appellate Procedure
Defendant appealed the Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-15-12,“Following too Close.” An officer for the Portsmouth Police Department testified at trial that he was assisting with an undercover operation to determine whether vehicles would stop for pedestrians on a crosswalk. The Officer testified to witnessing a car stop for the undercover officer at the crosswalk and that the Defendant “was following too close to the vehicle in front of it and did not leave enough space that was reasonable and prudent.” Further, the officer testified that the Defendant had to use the breakdown lane to avoid causing an accident. Defense counsel attempted to present a motion before having the Defendant testify, but the Magistrate stated that he “would want to hear from [the Defendant] first.” During his testimony, the Defendant stated that the vehicle in front of him “abruptly stopped” and he made the decision to use the breakdown lane to avoid the car behind him from rear ending him and causing a chain reaction. The Defendant testified that he could have stopped in time but was worried about getting rear ended . Ultimately, the Trial Magistrate found that the Defendant was justified in the use of the breakdown lane, but he found the Defendant guilty of “following too close.” The Defendant appealed, arguing that the Magistrate failed to permit him to present a motion to dismiss after the State rested its case and that the officer failed to identify the Defendant as the operator of the motor vehicle.
The Appeals Panel focused its decision using the “raise or waive” rule to determine whether the issues being appealed had been properly raised at the trial. While the Panel noted that Defendant did not specifically raise the issue of identification as the operator or specifically state that counsel was presenting a motion to dismiss, the Appeals Panel found that defense counsel “said just enough to raise the issue for consideration on appeal” when counsel stated that the Defendant would testify depending on the Magistrate’s ruling on his motion. The Appeals Panel held that this was sufficient information to alert the Magistrate that counsel intended to present a motion to dismiss before presenting any further evidence. For these reasons the Appeals Panel held that the Trial Magistrate erred in failing to hear the Defendant’s Motion and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its decision.
State of Rhode Island v. Aitor Aldazabal T21-0026 (July 21, 2022).pdf
Appeals Panel
01/26/2022
State of Rhode Island v. Richard Abyar M18-0015 Appellate Procedure
Appellate Procedure
Petitioners appealed from an Appeals Panel decision to dismiss all charges against the Defendant based upon the absence of a trial transcript. The District Court heard the appeal and remanded it to the Appeals Panel for further decision. The Defendant was originally charged with four separate traffic violations: § 31-16-5 (Turn Signal Required), § 31-24-12 (Stop Lamps Required), § 31-22-22(g) (No Seat Belt – Operator) and § 31-22-24 (Interior Lighting During Police Stop). The violations were noted on two different summonses because each summons can only fit up to three violations. A Magistrate found the defendant guilty of all charged violations after a trial in the Cranston Municipal Court and the Defendant appealed. In the Defendant’s appeal he cited only to one summons number and failed to list the other summons number. The Traffic Tribunal requested two copies of the summons and a recording of the trial. The city responded stating that the recording was “irretrievable.” At the initial appeal the Defendant was the only one in attendance. During the appeal the Defendant asked the Appeals Panel if he could include both summonses in his appeal and the Panel allowed it. Ultimately the Panel dismissed the case because the required trial recording was not available. The City appealed from the Panel’s decision, and arguing that the appeal for the second summons was not properly filed because they had not been given notice, that the Traffic Tribunal never requested the audio recording for the second summons, and that the Panel did not have the authority to allow for an oral amendment of an appeal. The District Court remanded the issue back to the Appeals Panel to address four issues: “[1] whether Notices of Appeal may be amended (at all), [2] whether the motion could be heard in the absence of notice, [3] whether it could be made orally, and [4] whether it is barred by expiration of the appeal period.”
The Appeals Panel explained and reconfirmed its initial determination that there was no recording available on the second summons. The Panel took issue with the question of whether the appeal had been amended, finding instead that, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, all that had happened was that a clerical error had been properly corrected. The Panel further cited Rule 20, which provides the court with “broad powers” to provide “relief [that] is warranted in the interests of justice,” and Rule 21, which grants the court “the discretion to decide in what form it will consider appeals,” to find that the addition of the second summons to the appeal was proper. Noting Rule 20 also provides the court with discretion to make amendments when there has been “excusable neglect,” the Panel found that the omission of the second summons number by a pro se litigant, unfamiliar with the legal process, was a reasonable mistake. On the issue of notice, the Panel held that notice for the second summons was implied by the notice for the first summons. Further, the Panel pointed out that had the city attended the appeal it would have been aware of the amendment and could have made an argument then and there; by failing to appear, it waived its right to object. Finally, the Panel held that Rule 25, which anticipates oral motions, and Rule 20, which provides for the correction of mistake, provide the court with discretion to hear both oral and written amendments and to extend the time to amend. For the reasons stated above, the Appeal Panel granted the Defendant’s appeal and remanded the case to the municipal court, pursuant to Rule 20(h), for the parties to agree upon a record for appeal or for a new trial.State of Rhode Island v. Richard Abyar M18-0015 (January 26, 2022 ) Remand from District Court.pdf
Appeals Panel
12/30/2020
State of Rhode Island v. Albert Lawrence Thomas, No. T20-0005 (December 30, 2020)
Appellate Procedure
Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision denying a motion to vacate a default judgment. Defendant failed to appear for the matter’s scheduled hearing, which resulted in a default judgment. Then, ten months later, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgement. In support of the motion, defendant asserted that he failed to appear because he had to go to work, but the trial magistrate denied the motion.
On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in denying the motion to vacate because the actual reason that Defendant failed to appear was because he never received the summons due to an address change and, therefore, he was unaware that he was supposed to appear in court. But the Panel is “confined to a reading of the record.” See Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993). Thus, the Panel did not and could not consider Defendant’s argument regarding failing to receive the summons due to an address change. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in denying the motion to vacate. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.
State of Rhode Island v. Albert Lawrence Thomas, No. T20-0005 (December 30, 2020).pdf
Appeals Panel
01/23/2019
State of Rhode Island v. William Fallon, No. T18-0012 (January 23, 2019)
Appellate Procedure
Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). At trial, the trial magistrate found as credible a police officer’s testimony establishing that the speed limit where the violation occurred was thirty miles per hour. Moreover, the trial magistrate concluded that “by [Defendant’s] own admission[,] he was driving in violation of the speed limit. He said he was doing 35 mph and no more than 35 mph . . . [and] by his own admission he’s in violation of the statute.”
On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was clearly erroneous because the posted speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour. To support his argument, Defendant “attempted to present new evidence regarding the speed limit.” But the Appeals Panel’s review is “confined to a reading of the record,” and, therefore, new evidence may not be presented “during an appeal if doing so would require that the Panel reconsider questions of fact.” See Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993). As the determination of the speed limit is a question of fact, the Appeals Panel could not consider the new evidence. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.
State of Rhode Island v. William Fallon, No. T18-0012 (January 23, 2019).pdf
Appeals Panel
01/25/2018
City of Providence v. Jose Rodriguez, No. T17-0003 (January 25, 2018)
Appellate Procedure
Defendant appealed a decision from the Trial Judge accepting Defendant’s plea to the charged violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-16-5 (turn signal required). Defendant argues that the Trial Judge should not have accepted his guilty plea because he was entitled to relief under the “Good Driving Record” exemption under § 31-41.1-7. The Appeals Panel held, however, that because Defendant had not mentioned his intent to seek a dismissal based on his good driving record at trial, he had waived that issue and the Panel was unable to review his argument on appeal. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal.
City of Providence v. Jose Rodriguez, No. T17-0003 (January 25, 2018).pdf
Appeals Panel
06/08/2018
State of Rhode Island v. Alyssa R. Alvarez, No. T17-0008 (June 8, 2018)
Appellate Procedure
Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30 (text messaging while operating a motor vehicle). Defendant argued that § 31-22-30 does not prohibit the use of a mobile device to make telephone calls using the speaker function, and, therefore, the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous. The trial judge did not make a specific finding of fact as to whether Defendant was texting or making a phone call when the police officer observed Defendant operating the vehicle. The Appeals Panel held that without a clear and unambiguous answer to that question, the decision on appeal could not properly be reviewed. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel remanded the case for the trial judge to make appropriate findings of fact.
State of Rhode Island v. Alyssa R. Alvarez, No. T17-0008 (June 8, 2018).pdf
Appeals Panel
06/30/2015
City of Providence v. Blake Barrie, C.A. No. M14-0010 (June 30, 2015)
Appellate Procedure
The Defendant appealed from his guilty plea to the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Panel held that the Defendant improperly appealed because a guilty plea signified a waiver of the right to appeal the violation. The Panel explained that the Defendant could have filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea before the sentence was levied, or, failing that, could have filed a motion for relief from judgment with the trial court. Accordingly, the Panel determined that the Defendant’s appeal of the guilty plea was improper.
City of Providence v. Blake Barrie, C.A. No. M14-0010 (June 30, 2015).pdf
Appeals Panel
09/04/2012
T12-0051 Right to Appeal
Appellate Procedure
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Appeals Panel held that Rule 18(b), provided that “after imposing a sentence the court shall advise the defendant of his or her right to appeal to an appellate panel of the traffic tribunal,” but the rule does not mandate that the Court comport with the rule after a guilty plea. Thus, the Appeals Panel held that Rule 18(b) did not require the trial court to instruct a motorist regarding her appellate rights after a plea of guilty. Accordingly, the vioation was sustained.
State of Rhode Island v. Milissa Garrity, C.A. No. T12-0051 (September 4, 2012).pdf