Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-4 (Colin Foote Statute). At trial, the trial judge sustained a violation of § 31-16-2 and thereafter imposed sanctions under the Colin Foote Statute.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was in violation of the law as the Colin Foote Statue enumerates specific offenses for which sanctions may be imposed and the charged violation was not one of those enumerated offenses. The Appeals Panel found that the Colin Foote Statute does not apply to the charged violation here. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was in violation of the law. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision to apply the Colin Foote Statute and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.

Note: Although the Appeals Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision to impose sanctions pursuant to the Colin Foote Statute, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision with respect to the § 31-16-2 violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Jeffrey D’Ambra, No. M18-0012 (November 4, 2019).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge subjecting Defendant to enhanced penalties under the Colin B. Foote Act. Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by “calculating the eighteen month statutory period using the date that [Defendant] received the citations” instead of the date of Defendant’s convictions. In State of Rhode Island v. Jacob Botella, the District Court held that “the opening date—for purposes of calculating the [] Colin Foote Law window—[is] in fact the date of [the] first conviction and not the date of the first citation.” The District Court also noted that the “operative date applied for the new offense (for which the defendant is being sentenced) is the date of offense, not the date of conviction.” Here, Defendant’s fourth violation occurred within eighteen months of her first conviction. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

NOTE: This holding directly contradicts the court’s holding in Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey, C.A. No. T13-0008, where the Appeals Panel held that the relevant date for the qualifying event is the date of conviction, not the date of offense.

City of Providence v. Anna Kyriakides, No. T18-0001 (August 3, 2018).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits) and § 31-27-27 (multiple moving offenses) and to impose sanctions pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-24 (Colin B. Foote Act). Here, the trial magistrate found that the Defendant posed a potential hazard to motorists based on his receiving four driving violations within an eighteen-month period and imposed the sanctions. The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s imposition of sanctions was improper because he did not consider the number of miles the Defendant drives on a yearly basis, which he said was fifty to sixty thousand. The Panel held that since the statute does not require the trial magistrate to consider the number of miles driven each year, the trial magistrate did not err in imposing sanctions.

Town of Portsmouth v. Kevin Dietz, C.A. No. T14-0043 (April 29, 2015).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate improperly imposed sanctions pursuant to the Colin Foote Act because failed to make specific findings of fact to establish that the Defendant posed a substantial threat to safety. Here, the trial magistrate imposed sanctions after finding that the Defendant had the requisite four moving violations within an eighteen-month period, suggesting that he had a “flagrant disregard for the traffic laws,” and that he would “pose a potential hazard if he continue[d] to operate a motor vehicle in the State of Rhode Island.” The Panel held that because the trial magistrate did make specific findings that the Defendant posed as a safety hazard, the trial magistrate did not err in imposing sanctions. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation and the trial magistrate’s sentence.

Town of Burrillville v. Nfamara Jadama, C.A. No. T14-0039 (March 30, 2015).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-42-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate imposed excessive sanctions pursuant to the Colin Foote Act of a $300 fine, 60 hours of community service, 60 hours of license retraining, loss of license for three months, and court costs. The Panel noted that the Colin Foote statute required the court to make findings as to whether the defendant would pose a substantial traffic safety hazard. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in finding that the Defendant did pose a substantial traffic safety hazard because he had received four speeding violations and a violation for stopping and starting within seven months. Accordingly, based on the trial magistrate’s findings and the Defendant’s driving record, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to impose the enhanced sanctions.

Town of Portsmouth v. Steven Harkness, C.A. No. T15-0011 (July 14, 2015).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s imposition of sanctions under the Colin B. Foote Act (R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-24) as an error of law, claiming that because two of the defendant’s prior moving offenses were on appeal they should not have counted toward sentence enhancement under the Act.  The Appeals Panel considered the precedent of nearby jurisdictions and determined that the finality of the appellate process should not preclude the imposition of an enhanced penalty, suggesting that the proper avenue for relief would be a motion to stay the penalties.  The Appeals Panel held that “prior convictions of this Tribunal on appeal with no final decision from the Appeals Panel do not prevent the imposition of sentence enhancement under § 31-27-24.”  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the 12 month license suspension and denied the defendant’s appeal.

Town of Smithfield v. Matthew Connole, C.A. No. T14-0014 (September 3, 2014).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G. L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits) and enhanced sentence imposed under R.I.G.L. § 31-27-24 (Colin B. Foote Act).  The defendant claimed that the trial judge’s decision to suspend defendant’s license was an error of law because the trial judge failed to make a finding of fact that the defendant’s continued driving would constitute a “substantial traffic safety hazard” as required by the Act.  Following the language of the language of the Act, the panel explained that the Act requires a trial judge to make such findings of fact before imposing enhanced penalties.  Although the trial judge found that defendant had “disregarded the rules of the road and is a persistent violator,” and noted that he was “appalled that [the appellant] continues to speed,” such findings do not indicate that defendant’s continued driving constitutes a substantial safety hazard to traffic.  The panel held that the trial judge’s decision to suspend defendant’s license was an error of law.  Accordingly, the panel granted defendant’s appeal and dismissed the charged violation.

Town of Burrillville v. Geraldine Davenport, C.A. No. M13-0010 (March 7, 2014).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed the decision of the trial judge to impose an enhanced sentence under R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-24 (Colin B. Foote Act), was affected by error of law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the date of the fourth conviction (Feb 1, 2013) was more than eighteen months after the date of the first conviction (Jun 22, 2011). Here, the Court concluded the decision of the trial judge was affected by error of law because he interpreted the statute to apply when the first conviction and the fourth incident fell within an eighteen month period. “The Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Clarke, 974 A.2d 558, 571-72 (R.I. 2009). Section 31-27-24 states that every person “convicted” within an eighteen month period is subject to enhanced sentencing. Accordingly, the Court held that the enhanced sentence imposed by the trial judge was affected by error of law and remanded the case for appropriate sentencing.Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008.pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (Safety belt use—child restraint).  The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge did not make specific findings of fact that the defendant had been convicted of four specific moving violations within an eighteen month period as required by the statute. Additionaly, the Court held that the trial judge erred by only sentencing the defendant to twenty-five hours of community service instead of the statutory minimum of sixty.  Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial judge to make specific findings of fact and to impose to proper sentence. 

State of Rhode Island v. Inam Islam, C.A. No. T12-0021 (June 26, 2012).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed from the hearing magistrate’s decision accepting the Defendant’s guilty plea to violation of R.I.G. L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits) and imposing an enhanced sentence under R.I.G.L. § 31-27-24 (Colin B. Foote Act).  The defendant argued that the hearing magistrate failed to make a finding of fact that the defendant’s continued driving would constitute a “substantial traffic safety hazard” as required by the Act.  The Panel noted that, in his decision, the magistrate warned Defendant that her license would be suspended under the Act if she plead guilty, advised her to seek counsel, and imposed the sentence because of Defendant’s “continuing violation of the law,” and not “because of anything other than your own driving.”  The Panel held that the magistrate’s statements to Defendant amounted to sufficient findings of fact to satisfy the Act and that the sentence did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Iole Ribizzi-Akhtar, C.A. No. T12-0012 (April 25, 2012).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Defendant argued that because the first conviction in the eighteen month period fell prior to the date the Act took effect, the trial judge improperly applied the sentence enhancement to him retroactively.  The Panel noted this issue was a matter of first impression.  The Panel looked to secondary authority used to support other sentencing enhancement statutes and compared the Act to so-called “three strikes laws.”  The Panel reasoned that the Act does not provide sanctions for acts occurring prior to the effective date of the act.  Rather, the prior convictions serve as a condition precedent for imposing an increased penalty for the later offense.  The Panel held that violations prior to the date the Act took effect can be used as predicate offenses so long as the fourth offense is committed after the passage of the act.  Thus, the Panel held the trial judge did not retroactively apply the Act to the Defendant’s conviction.  However, the Panel remanded in part for the trial judge to make specific findings of fact that the Defendant posed a substantial traffic safety hazard.

State of Rhode Island v. Jacob Botella, C.A. No. T11-0075 (February 7, 2012).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  Moments before trial, the Defendant plead guilty.  Following his guilty plea, the trial judge imposed an enhanced sentence under the Act.  The Defendant appealed, arguing that he should have been given a written notice that he would be sentenced under the Act.  The Panel held the neither the Constitution nor the Act required the trial judge to issue written notice to the Defendant before enhancing the sentence.  The Panel explained that a verbal warning at his arraignment that he could face a loss of license for up to two years, while not required, was sufficient to put the Defendant on notice and that, in any event, ignorance of the law is not a defense.  Accordingly, the panel sustained the violation in part; however the Panel remanded to the trial judge to make specific findings of fact that the Defendant’s continued operation of a vehicle would pose a substantial traffic safety hazard.

State of Rhode Island v. Jacob Botella, C.A. No. T11-0075 (February 7, 2012).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge made the requisite findings of fact pursuant to the Colin B. Foote Act, as the trial judge stated the following: (1) that the defendant had been a habitual offender of the motor vehicle code; (2) that the appellant’s driving record included three previous moving violations with a five month period; and (3) that based upon those violations and the most recent speeding charge, that the appellant “pose[d] a substantial safety hazard.”  However, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge erred in awarding the appellant forty hours of community service instead of the sixty hours required by the Colin B.  Foote Act.  Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial judge to impose the proper sentence.

Town of Hopkinton v. Keith W. Bowers No. M12-0008 (Dec. 20, 2012).pdf

Colin B. Foote Act

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G. L. 1956 § 31-27-24 (prima facie limits) and sentenced imposed under R.I.G.L. § 31-14-2 (Colin B. Foote Act).  The Appeals Panel held that the defendant’s failure to appear did not demonstrate excusable neglect, and that the trial judge was legally allowed to rely on the officer’s testimony.  Thus, because the defendant committed four separate and distinct moving violations within an eighteen month period, the Court sustained the violations.

Town of Bristol v. David Galuppo, No. M11-0012 (September 8, 2011).pdf