Default Judgment

Defendant was charged with a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding). The Defendant failed to appear for trial and a default judgment was entered. The Defendant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, a new trial date was set, and the Defendant failed again to appear. A second default judgment was entered. The Defendant had mailed the Traffic Tribunal a letter, postmarked the day before the trial date, stating he could not appear for the second trial date because he and his family had tested positive for Covid-19 and were ordered to quarantine. The Trial Judge passed on the Defendant’s motion and entered judgment by mail. The Defendant appealed the decision.

On appeal, the Defendant argued that he missed his second trial date because of his Covid-19 quarantine. The Appeals Panel noted that a motion to vacate default judgment “is within the discretion of the trial justice before whom the motion is brought” and “such findings will not be disturbed upon appeal unless there is an error or law or an abuse of that discretion.” Phoenix Construction Co., Inc. v. Hanson, 491 A.2d 330, 332 (R.I. 1985) (citing Friendly Homes, Inc. v. Shareholders and Creditors of Royal Homestead Land Co., 477 A.2d 934, 937 (R.I. 1984)). The Defendant was required to show the Hearing Judge that he failed to appear at his trial date due to “excusable neglect” and “that the circumstances that caused the party to miss a deadline were out of that party or counsel’s control.” Rivera v. Rose, 14 A.3d 939, 945 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 840 (R.I. 2009)). The Appeals Panel found that the Defendant had a valid reason for not attending his second trial date but because he failed to provide notice to the court that he was unable to attend the hearing until after the trial date the missed appearance was due to his own “carelessness [or] inattention.” The Appeals Panel found the Trial Judge’s decision was not erroneous because the Defendant could have reached out to the court prior to the trial date and did not. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied the appeal.State of Rhode Island v. Pena No. T22-0002 (February 23, 2022).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the decision of the Cumberland Municipal Court denying his Motion to Vacate a default judgment entered against him for failure to appear. Defendant was charged with a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(g)(1) (safety belt use) and appeared for his original municipal court trial date, only to find that the court was closed due to the COVID pandemic. The trial date was eventually rescheduled, with notice mailed to the Defendant’s address, but the Defendant missed the rescheduled court date and the court entered a default judgment.  The Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate, alleging that he never received the notice due to a change in address after a fire at his former residence. He was unable to provide the DMV with a new address because he did not have permanent housing and the DMV did not allow him to enter a P.O. Box as a new address. At his hearing on the Motion to Vacate, the Trial Judge asked the Defendant if he intended to oppose the summons.  When the Defendant answered in the affirmative, the Trial Judge instantly and without explanation denied the Motion to Vacate.  The Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge’s apparently predicating his denial of the Motion to Vacate on the Defendant’s intent to challenge the summons was improper, noting the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s dictate that “a defendant’s right to “present his defense at a trial . . . should be carefully protected.” Berick v. Curran, 179 A. 708, 711 (1935).  At minimum, the Appeals Panel stated the trial judge should have offered an explanation for the decision to deny the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate. The Appeals Panel, without deciding the merits of the Motion to Vacate, remanded the case to the Cumberland Municipal Court for further proceedings.State of Rhode Island v. Lomba No. M21-0005 (October 27, 2021).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant  appealed decision of the trial judge denying a motion to vacate a default judgment sustaining three traffic violations. Defendant’s hearing was scheduled to begin at 8:00 a.m., but Defendant arrived at 9:00 a.m. because he mistakenly believed that court hearings began at that time since that is when court begins in his home state. Defendant argued that the trial judge abused his discretion because Defendant was prejudiced by not being allowed to argue his motion to vacate. The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because Defendant was placed on notice as to the scheduled time of the hearing. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Julian Hancox, No. M19-0016 (January 20, 2020).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision denying a motion to vacate a default judgment. Defendant failed to appear for the matter’s scheduled hearing, which resulted in a default judgment. Then, ten months later, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment. In support of the motion, Defendant asserted that he failed to appear because he had to go to work, but the trial magistrate denied the motion to vacate.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in denying the motion to vacate because the actual reason that Defendant failed to appear was because he never received the summons due to an address change and, therefore, he was unaware that he was supposed to appear in court.

Pursuant to Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 20(a), a court may relieve a party from a judgment for excusable neglect. To establish excusable neglect, a party must show that the cause of the missed deadline was out of the party’s control. See Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc., 139 A.3d 394, 399 (R.I. 2016). Here, the trial magistrate denied the motion to vacate because Defendant’s asserted reason in support of the motion failed to meet the standard of excusable neglect. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in denying the motion to vacate. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Albert Lawrence Thomas, No. T20-0005 (December 30, 2020).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed an entry of default judgment. Defendant did not appear at his trial. His attorney attempted to orally waive Defendant’s appearance, but the trial judge denied the waiver attempt and entered a default judgment against Defendant. Defendant argued that his due process rights had been violated because the trial judge “did not allow counsel to waive [Defendant’s] appearance at trial.”

Rule 23(b) of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure permits an attorney to request an order waiving his “client’s presence at trial.” Such a request must generally be made in writing no later than five days before the court appearance, but can be made orally with permission from the court. Any such request is subject to the trial judge’s discretion. The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not violative of the Defendant’s due process rights because the trial judge acted within his discretion. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s entry of default judgment.

State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas Rampone, No. M18-0008 (January 30, 2019).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed a decision of the hearing judge denying a motion to vacate a default judgment entered on a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-28-7 (motor vehicle plates for persons with disabilities). Defendant’s motion to vacate was denied because Defendant failed to appear at the hearing on the motion. Defendant argued that the hearing judge’s decision was affected by an error of law. The Appeals Panel held that the hearing judge’s decision was not affected by an error of law because Defendant failed to appear at his hearing. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the hearing judge.

City of Providence v. Arman Tovmasian, No. M17-0019 (August 14, 2018).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed a decision by a Trial Judge of the Providence Municipal Court sustaining a charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (Obedience to stop signs). After being cited for the aforementioned violation, Defendant did not appear for his arraignment. As a result, the Trial Judge entered a default judgment. Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate said default judgment, but then failed to appear for the hearing on his Motion to Vacate. Defendant argued that he failed to appear to the hearing on his Motion to Vacate because he believed the hearing was at 9:00AM, not 8:00AM when it was heard. After reviewing the record, the Appeals Panel found no basis for finding that the Trial Judge erred either in entering a default judgment or in denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the Trial Judge’s decision and denied Defendant’s appeal.

City of Providence v. Tariq Mahmoud, M17-0022 (May 8, 2018).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed a hearing magistrate’s decision denying a motion to vacate a default judgment. Defendant had a default judgment rendered against him after he failed to appear at his trial due to mistakenly writing down the wrong trial date. Defendant argued that the hearing judge erred by applying the excusable neglect standard instead of the inadvertence standard. The Appeals Panel rejected that argument, noting that the two standards are essentially the same, and proceeded to discuss the excusable neglect standard.  To establish excusable neglect, a party must show that the mistake was caused by circumstances that were out of the party’s control. See Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc., 139 A.3d 394, 399 (R.I. 2016). Here, Defendant’s mistake was “squarely within [his] control.” As such, the Appeals Panel held that the denial of the motion to vacate did not constitute an error because Defendant’s mistake did not meet the necessary standard for a finding of excusable neglect since the mistake was within Defendant’s control. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the hearing judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Rahim Caldwell, No. T18-0015 (December 11, 2018).pdf

Default Judgment

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his Motion to Vacate a default judgment entered on a charged violation of R.I.G.L. (use of multiple beam lamps) because the Defendant failed to appear. The Defendant argued that his absence should have been excused because he had to work. The Panel found that the Defendant was required to follow the course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would take in similar circumstances. The Panel held that because the Defendant was fully informed of the relevant date and because “choosing to go to work,” even if the motorist is concerned that he might lose his job, is not a legally sufficient reason to excuse his absence, the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he denied the Motion to Vacate. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the Motion to Vacate.

State of Rhode Island v. Robert Belota, C.A. No. 14-0021 (March 30, 2015).pdf

Default Judgment

The Defendant appealed a default judgment entered by the trial magistrate, sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-10-1 (no license on person), § 31-22-22(g) (no seat belt-operator), § 31-21-4 (places where parking or stopping prohibited), § 31-15-12.1 (entering intersection), and § 31-47-9 (operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate violated Rule 7 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules because he should not have entered a default judgment when the Defendant refused to offer a plea. The Panel held that because the Defendant appeared in his capacity as beneficiary to the trust and not as the licensed operator, Rule 7 did not apply. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to enter a default judgment.

City of Cranston v. In Re- Richard W. Audette, C.A. No. T14-0036 (March 30, 2015).pdf

Default Judgment

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-2.1 (presence of alcoholic beverages while operating or riding in a vehicle), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use), and R.I.G.L 1956 § 31-21-1 (stopping on traveled portion of open highway prohibited). Here, the Defendant filed a motion to vacate a default judgment entered by the trial magistrate after he failed to appeal for his hearing date. The Defendant argued that he did appear but was in the wrong courtroom. The trial magistrate denied the Defendant’s motion, finding that he had not provided the court with a legally sufficient reason for missing his court date. The Panel noted that a magistrate may enter a default judgment after a person charged with a violation fails to appear, but must then determine if the charged violations had been established based on the evidence presented. The Panel held that the record lacked information to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the charges against the Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel vacated the default judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

City of Providence v. Freddy R. Mago, C.A. No. T14-0054 (August 12, 2015).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices) entered in default. Defendant claimed that his failure to appear at the original trial was because he was not from the area and he did not have transportation. The Appeals Panel held that, although the proper procedure following the entry of a default judgment is to file a motion to vacate, the defendant should be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the merits despite his failure to do so. The Court noted that the procedural rules of the Traffic Tribunal are “intended to provide for the just determination of every civil traffic violation.” Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.Town of Warren v. Marcus Monroe, C.A. No. M13-0011 (January 7, 2014).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed a decision of the Municipal Court denying her motion to vacate the default judgment on the charged violations of R.I.G.L. § 31-10-32, “Notice of change of address or name,” and § 31-15-12, “Interval between vehicles.”  Defendant argued that the hearing judge’s decision to deny her motions to vacate the default judgments against her was an abuse of discretion.  Specifically, the Defendant argued that the hearing judge should have given credit to her explanation that she did in fact arrive at the courthouse for both hearings, but did not enter the courtroom for her hearings because on both occasions her attorney failed to appear due to an illness.  On both occasions, the Defendant claims her attorney instructed her to leave the courthouse.  The Panel pointed to the wide discretion a judge enjoys in determining whether to vacate a default judgment.  The Panel noted that the hearing judge did not find the Defendant’s excuse to be legally adequate because she made no attempt to go into the courtroom and inform the judge of her situation and did not otherwise present evidence to meet the standard that she missed the hearing for reasons beyond her control.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

City of Providence v. July Enel, C.A. No. M12-0023 (January 30, 2013).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision denying his motion to vacate a default judgment against him for the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9, “Operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance,” § 31-3-1, “Operation of unregistered motor vehicle,” and § 31-8-3, “Improper use of evidences of registration or certificate of title.”  Specifically, Defendant argued that his absence from his initial hearing should be excused because he was late for the hearing and that he was the victim of fraud because he was not the person who received the citation.  First, the Panel held that the Defendant did not present any evidence showing that he was late for the hearing due to some reason beyond his control.  Second, the Panel held that the Defendant did not present evidence showing he was the victim of fraud; the Defendant claimed he was mailed the citation, but the court noted that the citation was of the type that is typically handed to a violator in person.  The Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

City of Providence v. Ramon Minaya, C.A. No. T13-0004 (February 13, 2013).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-3-1 (operation of unregistered motor vehicle). The Appeals Panel held that the defendant’s failure to comply with procedural requirements, which resulted in the entry of a default judgment, must be accompanied by significant extenuating circumstances to justify vacating the default judgment. Here, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment after thoroughly reviewing the evidence and the defendant’s excuses for missing the prior proceeding before denying the defendant’s motion.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violations.

City of Woonsocket v. Jason Garfield-Demontigny, C.A. No. T12-0071 (March 28, 2013).pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the decision of the magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-5 (turn signal required), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (g) (no seat belt operator), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-24 (interior lights to be operated before dawn and after dusk during police stop) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-10-27 (license to be carried and exhibited on demand) entered in default. Defendant claimed the decision of the magistrate denying a motion to vacate was an abuse of discretion. The Appeals Panel concluded that the magistrate abused his discretion denying a motion to vacate where the seventy-three-year-old defendant’s failure to appear because he was stuck in his yard was the result of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel remanded the case for further proceedings. Town of Tiverton v. Edward Berube C.A. No. T13-0029.pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the decision of the Westerly Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign) entered in default. Defendant claimed the decision of the trial judge to grant the motion to enter a default judgment was an abuse of discretion because the defendant’s failure to appear was the result of his receiving medical care in his home. The Appeals Panel determined that based on the totality of the circumstances, the eighty-nine-year-old defendant should be afforded an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, despite the attorney’s failure to seek to have his client’s appearance excused pursuant to Rule 23, the Appeals Panel concluded that the decision of the trial judge was an abuse of discretion and remanded for further proceedings.Town of Westerly v. James Cardile C.A. No. M13-0003.pdf

Default Judgment

Defendant appealed the magistrate’s decision denying Defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment entered on the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating without insurance) and § 31-3-32 (expiration of registration).  At his arraignment, the Defendant did not appear and a default judgment was entered. The Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate the default judgment but then failed to appear at that hearing and the motion was denied.  Defendant argued that his absence from both hearings should be excused because he was confused by the process.  The Panel held that Defendant was fully aware of the dates of his hearings, and without evidence that his failure to appear was due to some reason beyond his control, the magistrate’s decision to deny the motion was not an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

City of East Providence v. Hudson Carvalho, C.A. No. T12-0087 (May 22, 2013).pdf

Default Judgment

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s entry of a default judgment sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (proof of financial security). Here, the prosecuting officer failed to appear at the initial trial date and the charges were dismissed. Following the dismissal, the prosecuting officer secured an order vacating the dismissal of the Defendant’s charged violations and the case was scheduled for a trial, but no notice of the order to vacate or notice of a new trial date was sent to the Defendant.  When the Defendant failed to appear at the new trial date a default judgment was entered against him. The Defendant argued on appeal that the prosecuting officer violated Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for the Traffic Tribunal because he failed to file a motion to vacate the order dismissing the Defendant’s charged violations and instead engaged in ex parte communications with the trial judge to reinstate the Defendant’s violations. The Panel held that the trial judge abused her discretion by reinstating the charged violations without the required motion to vacate from the prosecuting officer. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the charged violations.

State of Rhode Island v. Nefali Reyes, C.A. T08-0085 (July 23, 2008).pdf