Dismissal

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court denying his motion seeking dismissal of a prior adjudication that he had violated R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-5 (“overtaking on the right”) and § 31-15-16 (“use of emergency break-down lane for travel”). The Defendant proceeded to trial on the two charges, which were sustained by the trial court.  Subsequently, the Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Attorney General’s Office in District Court with respect to a related DUI charge that included a promise that the two adjudicated violations in the Traffic Tribunal would be dismissed. When Defendant moved for dismissal at the Traffic Tribunal pursuant to Rules 20 and 26(b), the Attorney General’s Office did not object to the dismissal. Defendant argued that if these violations were not dismissed, an injustice would occur because the defendant would be denied the benefits of his bargain. The trial court concluded, based on its reading of Rule 26(c), that it did not have the authority to dismiss the charges. The Appeals Panel agreed with the Defendant that the Rule 26(b) only limits prosecutors from dismissing previously adjudicated charges and does not similarly limit the court. However, even though the court had the discretion to dismiss adjudicated judgments in the interests of justice, the Appeals Panel found the trial court’s error harmless. For policy reasons, the Appeals Panel refused to reverse the trial court’s denial of the dismissal. The Appeals Panel reasoned that if it allowed defendants, after they receive an unfavorable result in the Traffic Tribunal, to then go to the District Court for a more favorable result, it would make the Traffic Tribunal essentially a “moot court.” Therefore, in the interests of preserving the finality of Traffic Tribunal decisions, the Appeals Panel refused to grant a dismissal. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. John C. Spengos, No. T16-0001 (June 14, 2016).pdf

Dismissal

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of the road). The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was made upon unlawful procedure where he improperly “un-dismissed” the case. Here, the Town moved to dismiss the charge because the Officer was unable to attend the trial date. After the trial judge dismissed the charge, the Defendant tried to speak and the trial judge told him not to say anything else. The trial judge asked the Defendant to apologize to the court and, when the Defendant refused, the trial judge continued the matter for a new trial date. After a trial on that date, the trial judge sustained the charge. The Panel noted that in order to vacate a dismissal, the moving party must have made a motion. The Panel held that the trial judge’s order dismissing the case should not have been vacated because neither party motioned to vacate the dismissal. Accordingly, the Panel noted that the trial judge’s decision was in violation of statutory provisions and affected by error of law and dismissed the charged violation.

Town of Coventry v. Emil Carsetti, C.A. No. M15-0001 (September 21, 2015).pdf

Dismissal

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges.  The re-filing went to trial and resulted in conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss the charges was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that the special prosecutor’s dismissal was with prejudice and that the City was required to move to vacate or appeal the initial dismissal before re-filing the charges.  The Appeals Panel noted that the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal of a civil case in Superior Court is governed by Super R. Civ. P. 41(a), and under that rule a prosecutor’s voluntary dismissal is without prejudice absent an affirmative statement of prejudice or stipulations between the parties.  The Appeals Panel applied the reasoning of Super R. Civ. P. 41(a) to Traffic Trib. R. P. 26(a), which allows the prosecuting officer to terminate the charges and held that there is a presumption that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice.  The Panel held that the filing of an appeal, which under the rule can only be filed by an “aggrieved party” was inapposite because the City, which dismissed the charges, was not an aggrieved party.  The Panel held that the filing of a Motion to Vacate would be inappropriate because no order had been entered; the role of the Tribunal in a decision by a party to dismiss is administrative only and functions simply to memorialize the dismissal for purposes of record keeping.  Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf