Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the Trial Magistrate sustaining a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding). Upon appeal, the Defendant argued the Trial Magistrate did not allow all his evidence to be introduced at trial, including copies of radar certifications and copies of the Rhode Island State Police policies for certification of calibration and frequency of calibration of radar devices. The Appeals Panel may only decide if the Trial Magistrate abused his discretion in his decision to not allow evidence at trial. See State v. Houde, 596 A.2d 330, 335 (R.I. 1991).

The Appeals Panel reviewed the record and determined the Trial Magistrate “did not err in excluding the documents from evidence because Appellant did not provide an adequate foundation demonstrating the authenticity of the documents.” See R.I. R. Evid. 901; O’Connor v. Newport Hospital, 111 A.3d 317, 323 (R.I. 2015) (“[A]uthentication and identification are regarded as a special aspect of relevancy; evidence is relevant only if it is in fact what the party seeking its admission claims it to be.”). The evidence the Defendant presented included documents received via a public records request, not through formal discovery, so the Trial Magistrate could not determine the authenticity of the documents, thus making the evidence not relevant. Id. The Appeals Panel distinguished this case from Town of Smithfield v. Connole, C.A. No. T13-0066, Sept. 3, 2014, R.I. Traffic Trib., in which the evidence presented was “obtained through discovery, authenticated by the officer and entered as full exhibits.” Because the Appeals Panel found the evidence presented by the Defendant was not authenticated or obtained through discovery, the Trial Magistrate did not abuse his discretion to exclude the documents. The Appeals Panel found the Trial Magistrate’s decision was not erroneous and denied the appeal.State of Rhode Island v. Aboh, Jr. No. T21-0029 (February 23, 2022).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-41.3-10 (driver/registered owner liability). After reviewing video footage of Defendant traveling forty-six miles per hour in a twenty miles per hour zone, a police officer issued the appropriate citation. At trial, the trial judge concluded that the violation had been proven by clear and convincing evidence based on the officer’s testimony and an engineering manager’s testimony that the camera was properly functioning and that the radar was recently and properly calibrated.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by refusing to admit certain evidence. Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 402 provides that evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Here, the trial judge determined that evidence related to the reliability of other cameras, not the camera at issue in the case, was not relevant. The Appeals Panel refused to disturb the trial judge’s relevancy determination, which it found to be within the judge’s discretion. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode island v. Andrew Nolan Proctor, No. M20-0005 (December 30, 2020).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic devices). At trial, the trial judge found that Defendant ran through a red light and hit another vehicle while proceeding through the intersection. The trial judge’s findings were inferred from uncontroverted testimony that established that the traffic light was in working order and that the vehicle which was hit was proceeding through a green light. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant proceeded through a red light.

Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 17(a) requires that the prosecution prove a violation by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence is clear and convincing when it “produce[s] in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction that the allegations in question are true.” Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 88 n.7 (R.I. 2011) (quoting 29 Am. Jur. 2d evidence § 173 at 188-89 (2008)). The Appeals Panel found that the trial judge made a reasonable inference that Defendant proceeded through a red light based on testimony that the light was in working order and that the light in the other direction was green. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Ralyauou Diallo, No. M18-0016 (March 11, 2019).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices). At trial, a state trooper presented uncontroverted testimony establishing that he had observed Defendant take a left turn through a red arrow. The trial magistrate asked Defendant if he had any testimony to present, but Defendant decided not to present any testimony. On appeal, Defendant argued that the state failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that Defendant drove through a red light.

Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 17(a) requires the state to prove a charged violation by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence is clear and convincing when the factfinder is able to “form a clear conviction without hesitancy of the truth of the precise facts.” See In re Veronica T., 700 A.2d 1366, 1368 (R.I. 1997). Importantly, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard. See In re Emilee K., 153 A.3D 487, 497 (R.I. 2017).

Here, the state trooper presented uncontroverted testimony that the trial magistrate found to be credible. As credibility determinations are reserved for the trial magistrate, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Xing Guang Cui, No. T19-0004 (June 6, 2019).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the East Providence Municipal Court sustaining Defendant’s charged violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 §31-17-4 (failure to yield). Defendant, driving a motorcycle, had gotten into a motor vehicle accident with a tractor-trailer. Two witnesses testified that Defendant had not obeyed a yield sign immediately prior to the accident. Defendant argued that the Trial Judge did not properly assert his findings of fact on the record, as required when a trial judge sits as the fact finder. The Appeals Panel noted, however, that the Supreme Court ruling in Notarantonio did not require a judge to “categorically accept or reject each piece of evidence in his decision[.]” Notarantonio v. Notarantonio, 941 A.2d 138, 147 (R.I. 2008). The Trial Judge stated that, after having the opportunity to listen and observe all the witnesses testify, he found the independent witnesses to be very credible and, based on that credibility determination, he found the Defendant guilty. As a result, the Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge asserted his factual findings and conclusions of law sufficiently for the record. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and upheld the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Andrew Thomson, No. M16-0011 (February 8, 2018).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the East Providence Municipal Court sustaining Defendant’s charged violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 §31-17-4 (failure to yield). Defendant, driving a motorcycle, had gotten into a motor vehicle accident with a tractor-trailer. At trial, two witnesses testified that Defendant had not obeyed the yield sign immediately prior to the accident. Defendant testified on his own behalf. On appeal, Defendant argued that the Trial Judge did not state the underlying reasons for his rejection of Defendant’s uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony, and that such testimony must be taken as fact under Supreme Court precedent in Jackowitz v. Deslauriers, 162 A.2d 528, 530-31 (1960). The Appeals Panel, however, noted that the two eyewitness accounts directly contradicted Defendant’s testimony, which rendered Jackowitz inapplicable. As a result, the Trial Judge was not required to give his reasons for rejecting Defendant’s testimony. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and upheld the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Andrew Thomson, No. M16-0011 (February 8, 2018).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed a decision of the North Smithfield Municipal Court sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen Laws 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway violation). Defendant argued that the Trial Judge erred by considering his prior moving violations because evidence of the violations was not properly admitted at trial. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence apply to all adjudications of civil violations before the traffic tribunal and municipal courts. Under Rule 20 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, “judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.” Therefore, the Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge had properly taken note under Rule 20 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence of Defendant’s past moving violations. The Appeals Panel did not address any argument of whether the prior moving violations may have been admitted improperly as evidence of propensity or whether the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and sustained the charged violation and the enhanced penalties.

State of Rhode Island v. Dana Stephen, No. M17-0015 (April 11, 2018).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of a Trial Judge at the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-13-4 (Obedience to Devices). Defendant was stopped on Route 95 after a Rhode Island State Trooper observed Defendant driving in the left two lanes of the highway, in violation of posted signs that prohibit trucks, campers, and buses from traveling in the left two travel lanes. Defendant argued that he had only passed one of the signs when he was being pulled over by the State Trooper and that the Trial Judge made his decision “upon unlawful procedure” by allowing testimony from the State Trooper regarding Defendant’s truthfulness. The Appeals Panel found no indication that the Trial Judge’s decision relied upon improper character testimony concerning Defendant, thus requiring the denial of Defendant’s appeal and sustainment of the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Donald Sholes, No. T17-0002 (April 12, 2018).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by refusing to admit Defendant’s proffered photographs into evidence. The Appeals Panel found that the trial judge abused his discretion because he failed to provide any reasoning as to why the photographs were excluded from evidence. Furthermore, the Panel noted that the record failed to provide “any factual findings, credibility determinations, or evidentiary considerations.” A trial judge’s findings “must contain . . . a factual finding and a conclusion of law on each cause of action adjudicated.” Cathay Cathay, Inc. v. Vindalu, LLC, 136 A.3d 1113, 1119 (R.I. 2016) (citing Cathay Cathay, Inc. v. Vindalu, LLC, 962 A.2d 740, 747-48 (R.I. 2009)). The Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous because the record did not provide any of the facts or testimony upon which his decision relied. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel reversed the decision of the trial judge.

Town of Tiverton v. Jacob Carvalho, No. M17-0029 (Amended) (July 31, 2018).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial judge upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30 (texting while driving). The trial centered around two witnesses: the citing officer, who testified to observing defendant’s phone screen “clearly playing” a “video” on his screen for “several seconds”; and the defendant, who testified that he had been making a phone call, did not recall playing a video, and offered to provide cell phone records to substantiate his defense. The trial judge, crediting the officer’s testimony, refused to allow the defendant to introduce his phone records, stating that “[defendant’s] phone record doesn’t mean anything . . . [y]ou could be . . . watching Donald Duck,” and found defendant guilty of texting while driving. The Appeals Panel, however, found that the trial judge abused his discretion and overlooked potentially material evidence by not allowing defendant to introduce his cell phone records, which may have substantiated his claimed defense. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel granted defendant’s appeal and remanded the case for further findings.

State of Rhode Island v. Edmund E. Hathawy, No. T17-0022 (May 11, 2018).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (“laned roadways”). Defendant argued that the trial court failed to make any factual findings on the record and that the testimony presented was insufficient to establish the charge. The Appeals Panel agreed that the trial court did not make any factual findings beyond observing that the motorist “never denied the charge.” In addition, the officer presented no evidence that the defendant violated § 31-15-11. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was reversed.

Town of Coventry v. Jason Silveira, No. M15-0041 (June 14, 2016).pdf

Evidence

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (“right half of road”). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to sustain the violation. In Waldman v. Shipyard Marina Inc., 230 A.2d 841 (R.I. 1967), the RI Supreme Court held that in “situations involving the pyramids of inferences… such inference drawn from another inference is rejected as being without probative force.” Applying the facts here, the Appeals Panel found that the trial court engaged in conjecture and building inferences upon inferences without basing them on the officer’s testimony or credibility. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was reversed.

Town of Bristol v. Daniele Nogueira, No. M15-0040 (September 7, 2016).pdf

Evidence

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-2 (manner of turning at intersection). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by choosing to credit the Trooper’s testimony and by refusing to consider photographs of the intersection where the violation occurred and an additional document titled “My Story” attached to her appeals packet. The Panel held that it may not assess the Trooper’s testimony on appeal because the Panel members did not have an opportunity to view the Trooper’s live testimony. The Panel also held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion by failing to admit the photographs because the record reflected that the Defendant failed to testify that the photographs were a fair and accurate representation of facts personally observed. Finally, the Panel held that it would be impermissible to consider the Defendant’s document titled “My Story” because the evidence was not put before the trial magistrate and was not part of the record for his decision. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Monica Davis, C.A. T08-0054 (May 28, 2008).pdf