Hearsay

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-26-5 (duty in accident resulting in damage to highway fixtures). The police responded to a call stating that a vehicle had struck a road sign. Defendant’s vehicle matched the description, and her vehicle had damage consistent with striking a road sign, so the police pulled her over and, despite her denials, issued Defendant a summons. At trial, the prosecution presented the officer who issued the summons, a police officer who observed damage to the road sign, and a witness who saw “a vehicle” hit the road sign. Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial judge improperly admitted hearsay testimony when he allowed the police officer to testify about the call made to the police station, which described the accident and the vehicle involved. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that “an officer may testify about a message received through dispatch when ‘[t]he entire purpose of [the] testimony [is] to show why [an officer] apprehended [a] defendant[,] . . . because the radio message [is] not offered to prove the defendant’s guilt.’” The Appeals Panel held that the testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove Defendant’s guilt. Instead, “the testimony was offered to establish that [the officer] was on notice of the accident and the suspect vehicle’s description.” Having found that way, however, the Appeals Panel proceeded to find the evidence against Defendant sufficient to prove that she was the operator of the vehicle in the accident because the officer “testified that ‘the vehicle behind [Appellant] point[ed] toward [Appellant’s] vehicle,’ and that Appellant’s ‘vehicle matched a description called in by one of the witnesses.’” Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Carol Brown, No. T17-0031 (August 3, 2018).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial magistrate upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty upon collision with unattended vehicle). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate improperly admitted hearsay testimony into evidence and then relied on that testimony in his decision. Specifically, defendant contends that the citing officer’s testimony regarding defendant’s statements on the day of the accident were inadmissible as hearsay. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that defendant’s statements to the citing officer were statements by a “party opponent,” meaning they fall under an exception to the hearsay rule. As a result, the Appeals Panel held that defendant’s statements were admissible and not inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied defendant’s appeal and upheld the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Douglas Lecuivre, No. T17-0014 (April 24, 2018).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-4 (“overtaking on the left”). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. Defendant was accused of overtaking a Freightliner truck on the left, resulting in an accident. At trial, the trooper gave the Freightliner operator’s version of events and the magistrate admitted this evidence only for a limited purpose and not for its truth. Following Rule 801(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the Appeals Panel held that this limitation meant that the testimony was not hearsay and, therefore, that the testimony was properly admitted. Additionally, even though the operator of the Freightliner never testified, the Appeals Panel found no evidence that the trial court relied upon this testimony in making his decision. Accordingly the Trial Court’s decision was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Vernon S. Lawrence, No. T16-0002 (March 30, 2016).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31- 27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-21.1 (presence of alcoholic beverages while operating or riding in a motor vehicle). The Court held that the officer’s testimony regarding a statement the defendant made at the scene that “[he] was driving” was admissible. As the testimony was offered against the defendant at trial and was the defendant’s own statement, it did not amount to hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision and sustained the charge against the defendant. Town of Richmond v. Bruce Bartels C.A.T13-0021.pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 “vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.”  The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the judge allowed into evidence hearsay in violation of Rule 15 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure.  Specifically, the Officer testified that the Defendant failed to stop at the stop sign, but this testimony was based on a conversation with an independent eyewitness not present at trial.  The Panel explained that the statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and did not fit within one of the recognized exceptions the hearsay rule, and was thus inadmissible.  Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was affected by error of law and reversed and dismissed the charged violation.

Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices).  Specifically, the Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision to allow the officer to testify to out-of-court statements made by a witness constituted inadmissible hearsay requiring reversal of the charge.  The Panel explained that the statements were in fact inadmissible hearsay, and that the City offered no exception to the hearsay rule which might apply.  However, the Panel explained that although the judge allowed the officer to testify to the hearsay evidence, she did not rely on the evidence in reaching her decision.   The Panel noted that the judge stated in her conclusion that she credited other in-court testimony over Defendant’s.  Additionally, the Panel noted, in her decision she stated: “I’m not going to let it [the hearsay testimony] in….”  The Panel held that the trial judge relied on other competent evidence when reaching her decision, despite having heard the hearsay evidence.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Pawtucket v. Mark Daluk, C.A. No. M12-0022 (April 23, 2013).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices).  The Defendant argued the trial judge’s decision was affected by error of law because he did not admit into evidence an affidavit of an out-of-court witness offered by the Defendant.  At trial, the Defendant’s counsel had the affidavit marked for identification but the trial judge excluded it as inadmissible hearsay.  The Panel noted that the substance of the affidavit was being offered for the truth of the matter being asserted, that the declarant did not appear in court and was not subject to cross-examination, and that the Defendant did not articulate any exception to the hearsay rule.  The Panel held the trial judge properly excluded the affidavit as inadmissible hearsay.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Johnston v. Amalia Blinkhorn, C.A. No. M11-0029 (May 3, 2012).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate susatining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-11-20 (permitting unauthorized person to drive prohibited).  The Court held that the trial judge erred when it admitted a registry report through an officer’s testimony without a demonstration of proper authenticity.  Thus, the Appeals Panel reversed the decision of the trial magistrate and dismissed the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Joanna Carmino Lizardo, C.A. No. T11-0021 (November 17, 2011).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering from private road or driveway). The Court held that the testimony of the citing officer about statements made by a witness constituted inadmissible hearsay and that the trial court’s reliance upon this evidence constituted reversible error of law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the charge against the defendant.

Noonan, M., concurring in part, dissenting in part: The magistrate concurred that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. However, the magistrate believed that the testimony about the physical damage to the vehicles could be used to establish the inference that the defendant violated § 31-17-5.

City of Warwick v. Sandra Cerrito, C.A. No. T09-0002 (July 20, 2009).pdf

Hearsay

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-3-1 (operation of an unregistered vehicle), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (verification of proof of financial security). The Court held that the trooper’s testimony regarding his inquiry into the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) and his finding that the defendant’s vehicle was not validly registered did not constitute inadmissible hearsay as the defendant alleged. The Court ruled that the NCIC information was not “an out of court utterance as required under the well settled definition of hearsay,” pursuant to Worcester Textile Co. v. Morales, 468 A.2d 279, 281 (R.I. 1983). Therefore, the officer’s testimony was legally competent evidence contained in the record, and was sufficient to sustain the violation of §31-3-1. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Jim Desrosiers, C.A. No. T09-0052 (August 25, 2009).pdf