Appeals Panel
04/24/2018
State of Rhode Island v. Douglas Lecuivre, No. T17-0014 (April 24, 2018)
Identification
Defendant appealed a decision by a trial magistrate upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty upon collision with unattended vehicle). Defendant argued that the citing officer did not properly identify the motorist, citing the Appeals Panel’s past decision in City of Warwick v. Michael Murphy, T06-0002 (R.I. Traff. Trib. 2006) (requiring defendant identification for an officer to testify about a breathalyzer test he conducted). The Appeals Panel, however, noted that the issue differed in this case, because the issue was only whether the citing officer had provided sufficient evidence to prove that defendant was the operator of the vehicle that collided with the unattended vehicle. After analyzing the record, which included evidence that the citing officer found fresh paint and damage from a collision on defendant’s car, the Appeals Panel found that the trial magistrate’s decision to uphold the citation was not affected by error of law. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied defendant’s appeal and upheld the trial magistrate’s decision.
State of Rhode Island v. Douglas Lecuivre, No. T17-0014 (April 24, 2018).pdf
Appeals Panel
02/03/2016
Department of Environmental Management v. Marilyn Sheldon, C.A. No. T15-0027 (February 3, 2016)
Identification
The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of Department of Environment and Management Fish and Wildlife Regulation §20-1-12 (feeding wildlife prohibited). The Defendant was issued a ticket for feeding geese in an apartment complex common area and was identified through an eyewitness account and video evidence. The Defendant argued on appeal that the violation issuing officer could not properly identify the Defendant in the video because the video did not show the Defendant’s face and, therefore, the officer could only assume it was the Defendant. The Panel noted that when a “witness has personal knowledge of the defendant, the witness’s subsequent identification of the defendant is reliable.” See State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 547 (R.I. 2004). Here, the Panel found the officer had spoken with the Defendant in person over the same issue in the prior year and had personal knowledge of the defendant. Therefore, the officer was able to properly identify the Defendant. Furthermore, the trial magistrate determined it was the Defendant feeding the geese and the Panel cannot second guess that decision without viewing the evidence. Ultimately, the Panel found the decision was not affected by error of law and supported by legally competent evidence.
Department of Environmental Management v. Marilyn Sheldon, C.A. No. T15-0027 (February 3, 2016).pdf
Appeals Panel
03/07/2014
Town of East Greenwich v. Anthony Ianiero, C.A. No. M13-0014 (March 7, 2014)
Identification
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Following Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey, C.A. No. T13-0008, September 10, 2013, R.I. Traffic Trib. (holding that in-court identification can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances presented to the finder of fact), the tribunal found that the trial magistrate was satisfied that the defendant had been identified as the operator of the vehicle because during testimony, the officer referred to him as the operator of the vehicle. Thus, the tribunal held that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation against the defendant.
Town of East Greenwich v. Anthony Ianiero, C.A. No. M13-0014 (March 7, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/16/2014
State of Rhode Island v. Jeffrey Babb, C.A. No. T13-0069 (April 16, 2014)
In-court identification of the defendant
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed that because the Trooper identified the defendant by the wrong first name during testimony, the Trooper misidentified defendant as the operator of the vehicle. Following Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey, C.A. No. T13-0008, September 10, 2013, R.I. Traffic Trib. (holding that in-court identification can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances presented to the finder of fact), the tribunal found that the trial magistrate was satisfied that the defendant had been identified as the operator of the vehicle because when defendant testified, defendant himself admitted to being the operator of the vehicle, and thus cured any defect in the Trooper’s testimony. Thus, the tribunal held that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation against the defendant.
State of Rhode Island v. Jeffrey Babb, C.A. No. T13-0069 (April 16, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
09/10/2013
Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008 Identification
Identification
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed the decision of the trial judge was affected by error of law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the town failed to successfully identify him at trial as the perpetrator of the charged violation. The Court held that there were enough facts on the record to infer that the person in court was the operator of the vehicle. Here, the Court concluded that the testimony of the citing officer that at the time he stopped the individual he identified him as the defendant, constituted an in-court identification. Further, the Court held that the defendant acknowledged he was the operator of the vehicle because he testified that the officer failed to issue him a summons and, in his testimony, said “I don’t believe I was going that fast . . . .” Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.Town of North Kingstown v. Philip Dey C.A. No. T13-0008.pdf
Appeals Panel
01/28/2009
City of Providence v. Raymond Beausejour, C.A. No. T08-0149 (January 28, 2009) Identification
In-court identification of the defendant
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-6 (clearance for overtaking), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-1 (care in starting from a stop), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-12 (interval between vehicles). Defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the charged violations to a standard of clear and convincing evidence as there was no in-court identification of the Defendant by the Officer. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, before trial the Defendant had filed a written waiver of his right to be present at the trial. During the trial, the trial magistrate stated that, by filing such a waiver, the Defendant had acknowledged that he was the operator of the motor vehicle. When defense counsel objected, the trial magistrate ruled that the waiver was invalid and threatened to find the Defendant in default. The Defendant then appeared and acknowledged his name and date of birth on the record, which corresponded to the information listed on the citation. The Panel held that this acknowledgement, in conjunction with the language in the Defendant’s “waiver of appearance” form that he was the “defendant in the above-entitled action,” made it highly probable that the Defendant and the operator of the vehicle were one and the same. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.
City of Providence v. Raymond Beausejour, C.A. No. T08-0149 (January 28, 2009).pdf
Appeals Panel
08/18/2009
T09-0036 Identifying the Defendant
Identification
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Although there was no in-court identification of the defendant, the Court held that the evidence on record showed that it was highly probable that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle where he responded numerous times to his name at trial. Thus, the state met its burden and proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation against the defendant.
State of Rhode Island v. George Philips, C.A. No. T09-0036 (August 18, 2009).pdf
Appeals Panel
12/10/2008
Town of Lincoln v. Richard McKee, C.A. No. T08-0128 (December 10, 2008)
In-court identification of the defendant
Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-24-1 (times when lights required). The Defendant argued that the charge could not be sustained because there was no in-court identification of the Defendant as the operator of the vehicle. The Panel noted that the Defendant did not cite any sources to show that in-court identification is required, and held that the Defendant’s argument would fail even if he had cited a source because Defendant’s counsel indicated on the record that he was appearing “on behalf of” the Defendant and because the Officer testified that he “identified the driver [of the suspect vehicle]” as the Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not affected by error of law and sustained the charged violation.
Town of Lincoln v. Richard McKee, C.A. No. T08-0128 (December 10, 2008).pdf