Jurisdiction

Defendant appealed a decision of the North Smithfield Municipal Court sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen Laws 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway violation). Defendant argued that the North Smithfield Municipal Court acted in excess of its authority by imposing a severe penalty under the Colin Foote Act because a municipal court had no jurisdiction under that statute. The Appeals Panel noted that “a review of § 45-2-59 reveals that [a] municipal court [has] concurrent jurisdiction with the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal to hear and adjudicate those violations conferred upon the municipal court and enumerated in § 8-18-3.” The Appeals Panel held that, although the Colin Foote Act is not “enumerated in § 8-18-3,” it is a “sentencing-enhancement mechanism.” The Appeals Panel found an analogy to the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s ruling that Rhode Island’s habitual offender law (§ 12-19-21(a)) was a “sentencing-enhancement mechanism. State v. Sitko, A.2d 260, 261 (R.I. 1983)(citing State v. DeMasi, A.2d 1369, 1372 (R.I. 1980)). Under this reasoning, municipal courts maintain concurrent jurisdiction and can apply the provisions of the Colin Foote Act. Therefore, the Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge acted within the municipal court’s jurisdiction when imposing the penalties listed in § 31-27-24. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Dana Stephen, No. M17-0015 (April 11, 2018).pdf

Jurisdiction

Defendant appealed a decision of the West Warwick Municipal Court, sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 1956 31-17-2 (vehicle turning left or right). The allegation was that the Defendant turned left into ongoing traffic when he was required to yield. Defendant argued that the West Warwick Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the violation because the alleged accident that Defendant was involved in happened in Warwick, not West Warwick. The evidence suggested that the side of the street on which the Defendant had been driving was in West Warwick, but the side of the street onto which he turned and where the accident took place was in Warwick. The Appeals Panel noted that the Trial Judge relied on the evidence presented by two witnesses at trial to decide the case, including the testimony of the citing officer, that established that the failure to yield before turning, which constituted the violation, occurred in West Warwick. Therefore, the Appeals Panel found that the Town of West Warwick maintained the authority to issue the citation, as well as adjudicate the matter in West Warwick Municipal Court. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and sustained the charged violation.

Town of West Warwick v. John D. Vieira, No. M17-0004 (April 12, 2018).pdf

Jurisdiction

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial magistrate upholding violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(g) (no seatbelt – operator) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-10-27 (license to be carried and exhibited on demand). Defendant argued that, as a citizen of the Usquepaug Nehantick-Nahaganset Tribe, defendant is a foreign national and the Traffic Tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him for any traffic violations he committed. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that in accordance with authority granted to it by state statute, and based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, the Appeals Panel had subject matter jurisdiction over any traffic violation committed off tribal land and within the state’s borders. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied defendant’s appeal and upheld the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Wayne Everett, No. T17-0005 (June 5, 2018).pdf

Jurisdiction

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal (“RITT”) did not have jurisdiction over the Defendant because the Defendant was never arraigned at RITT and the transfer from East Providence Municipal Court to RITT was improper. The Appeals Panel held that the Defendant did not have to be re-arraigned at the RITT because the Traffic Rules of Procedure do not require re-arraignment of the Defendant upon transfer to the RITT. The Appeals Panel further held that the transfer was not improper. Rule 14 of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure allow a municipal court to order the transfer of a case to RITT. In this case, the municipal court ordered the transfer to avoid the apparent appearance of impropriety after the Defendant made a motion to remove the municipal court judge assigned to the matter for allegedly engaging in an improper ex-parte communication with the Officer. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the Defendant. 

City of East Providence v. Cheryl Fogarty, No. T15-0024 Amended (February, 2016).pdf

Jurisdiction

The Defendant appealed a municipal court trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-28-9 (owners liability for parking tickets).  The Defendant argued that the Pawtucket Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction over the Defendant and that the parking ticket violation, which was administered on a Pawtucket street, could not be applied to the Defendant because he was a Providence resident.  The Panel found the above referenced Rhode Island General Law allows for a municipality to impose parking violation penalties regardless of the violator’s residency.  Furthermore, the Panel noted that municipal courts have jurisdiction over parking violations.  Therefore, the Panel found that jurisdiction was not an issue and that the case was heard in the proper court.

City of Pawtucket v. Matthew Lambert, C.A. No. M14-0029 (February 4, 2016).pdf