Jurisdiction of Police Officers

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued, in part, that his appeal should be granted because the officers who stopped him were from North Kingstown and the moving violation and traffic stop occurred in East Greenwich, outside of the North Kingstown officers’ jurisdiction. Under the provisions of R.I.G.L. § 12-7-19 then in effect (the statute has since been amended), extra-territorial stops were only permissible where the officers making the stop would otherwise have the right to arrest a defendant, which is not the case for civil traffic violations such as the laned roadway violation alleged in this case.  At trial, the Defendant sought to introduce a map of the area in which the stop occurred, but the trial magistrate chose not to review it, instead finding the arresting officer’s testimony regarding the stop being within his jurisdiction to be credible and sufficient to sustain the charge against Defendant. The Appeals Panel affirmed, but did not mention whether the trial magistrate erred by declining to review a map of the area in which the stop occurred. On appeal to the District Court, Defendant challenged the propriety of that evidentiary ruling.  Because the Appeals Panel failed to address this issue of possible merit, the District Court remanded to the Appeals Panel for a decision on that issue.

James Harrington v. State, A.A. No. 16-102 (January 17, 2018).pdf

Jurisdiction of Police Officers

The Town of Middletown appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel vacating the trial judge’s finding that the defendant was guilty of violating R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits) where a Middletown officer observed the defendant speeding in his jurisdiction, but cited the defendant in Newport after he crossed over the border while slowing to a stop. The District Court held that the authority of a municipal officer is limited to his own jurisdiction except for “emergency situations” or when engaged in “hot pursuit.” The District Court concluded that in this case, the emergency situation exception did not apply. Furthermore, the Court held that in order for the exception of “hot pursuit” to apply, the pursuing officer must have established probable cause to arrest while still in his own jurisdiction. Therefore, because the civil violation of speeding does not subject the perpetrator to arrest, nor did the officer establish probable cause to make an arrest for another crime while in Middletown, the hot pursuit law did not authorize the officer to follow the motorist into an adjoining municipality for the purpose of issuing only a traffic citation. Lastly, the Court concluded that the agreement between Middletown and Newport to act in non-emergency situations did not authorize the officer to stop the defendant outside of his jurisdiction, in this case, because the officer did not observe the defendant commit a serious traffic violation in Newport, but only followed the defendant there after having observed him speed in Middletown. Accordingly, the Court sustained the decision of the Appeals Panel vacating the charge against the defendant. Town of Middletown v. Thomas Oliver, A.A. No. 13-26 (March 13, 2014).pdf

Jurisdiction of Police Officers

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel claiming it erred when it affirmed the trial judge’s verdict finding him guilty of violating R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-12 (Stopping For School Bus Required).  Defendant claimed that the citation must be dismissed because he passed the bus while it was in Pawtucket and therefore the Lincoln Officer had no jurisdiction to issue a citation for an offense committed outside the town of Lincoln.  The District Court reviewed the trial record transmitted to it by the RITT and noted many significant portions of the testimony regarding the location of the school bus at the time defendant committed the offense were missing.  The District Court pointed out the ambiguity and conflicting testimony regarding the precise location of the school bus, ultimately holding that the City did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the offense was committed in the officer’s jurisdiction (Lincoln), but more likely was committed in Pawtucket.  Further, although the Lincoln officer testified he stopped defendant and issued the citation in Lincoln, his testimony describing his location tended to show that the officer must have been in Pawtucket, not Lincoln, when writing the citation.  Because failing to stop for a school bus is a civil violation not subject to arrest, the Court held the officer did not have authority to pursue the defendant into Pawtucket to issue the citation.  Accordingly, the District Court held that the Appeals Panel decision was contrary to law and clearly erroneous in view of the record, and reversed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

Christopher Cartwright v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13-200 (August 19, 2014).pdf