Leaving the Scene

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-26-5 (duty in accident resulting in damage to highway fixtures). On a snowy night, a police officer responded to a report of a vehicle striking a wall. There, the officer noticed a stop sign knocked down, and he observed tire tracks in the snow which led to Defendant’s driveway. The officer also noticed recent damage to the front of Defendant’s vehicle that was consistent with striking a stop sign. Defendant testified that she did not strike anything and that there was no damage to her car. The trial magistrate found the testimony of the officer to be credible and adopted that testimony as her findings of fact.

On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Defendant’s vehicle struck the stop sign. But the Appeals Panel cannot “substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge” regarding questions of fact. See Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous because the record contained legally competent evidence from which the trial magistrate could conclude that Defendant’s vehicle struck the stop sign. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Carole Kus, No. T19-0007 (June 6, 2019).pdf

Leaving the Scene

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-26-5 (duty in accident resulting in damage to highway fixtures). Police officers responded to a report that a truck struck a telephone pole. Subsequently, officers located a vehicle that matched a reported description of the truck involved in the accident. At trial, the trial judge inferred that Defendant’s vehicle struck the telephone pole based on a police officer’s testimony that (1) Defendant’s vehicle had damage consistent with striking a pole and (2) Defendant admitted to recently being in the area of the accident.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the charged violation. The Appeals Panel noted that it “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility” and that a “trial [judge] may ‘draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses.’” See State v. Link, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 633 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Here, the trial judge’s inference and decision were based on finding an officer’s testimony to be credible. As such, the Appeals Panel held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s decision. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Terry Rigney T19-0014  (September 10, 2019).pdf

Leaving the Scene

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty on collision with unattended vehicle). A police officer responded to the scene of a reported accident whereby a parked vehicle was struck. The officer observed Defendant’s vehicle approximately 400 feet away from the parked vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he hit a parked car. Based upon the physical location of the vehicles and Defendant’s admission, the police officer cited Defendant for leaving the scene of the accident. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because there was no testimony in the record establishing that Defendant fled the scene of the accident.

Pursuant to § 31-26-4, a violation is sustained when evidence proves that: (1) a defendant operated a vehicle which collided with and caused damaged to an unattended vehicle; and (2) the defendant failed to notify the driver of the unattended vehicle and local law enforcement about the accident. Here, the trial magistrate’s decision was based upon the police officer’s testimony, which mentioned the location of the vehicles, the damage to the vehicles, and the officer’s conversations with Defendant and an eyewitness. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not affected by error since the trial magistrate could reasonably infer that Defendant violated the statute. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Jhonder Alarcon T19-0006 (September 10, 2019).pdf

Leaving the Scene

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial magistrate upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty upon collision with unattended vehicle). Defendant argued that he lacked knowledge of the collision, and therefore an essential element of the alleged citation could not be proven. The Appeals Panel noted, however, that the record contained an admission by defendant that he exited his vehicle to check for damage prior to leaving the vicinity of the unattended vehicle, and further testimony by the citing officer finding clear damage to the driver’s side of defendant’s vehicle along with “paint transfer” from the unattended vehicle. The Appeals Panel held that this evidence was sufficient for the trial magistrate to conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant had knowledge of the damage to the unattended vehicle and, therefore, had a duty to report the collision. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied defendant’s appeal and affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Douglas Lecuivre, No. T17-0014 (April 24, 2018).pdf

Leaving the Scene

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-3 (immediate notice of accident). Defendant claimed that the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous because the state failed to provide evidence sufficient to sustain either charge. The Court held that the defendant’s admission that he was driving and struck a light pole was not sufficient by itself to sustain the charge of § 31-14-1 because the officer did not provide any evidence that the defendant operated his vehicle in excess of the posted speed limit or that he faced any hazard which required him to reduce his speed. Further, the Court held that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain the violation of § 31-26-3 because the officer failed to provide a timeline of events and did not prove that the defendant failed to use the quickest means available to notify the police of the accident or that the defendant’s vehicle was so disabled as to prevent its normal and safe operation where the defendant drove the vehicle home after the accident and then called the police. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the violations.Town of North Kingstown v. James Almeida, C.A. No. T11-0028 (May 11, 2011).pdf

Leaving the Scene

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-4 (duty on collision with unattended vehicle) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to chemical test). The Defendant asserted that in order to sustain the charge, the trial judge must find that (1) the driver collided with an unoccupied vehicle; (2) the damage has resulted to either vehicle as a result of the collision; and (3) the operator of the vehicle doing the striking failed to notify the driver of the unoccupied vehicle. The Panel held that the trial judge erred in sustaining the violation because there was no evidence that either of the vehicles involved sustained any damage. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the duty on collision with unattended vehicle violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Kimberly Medeiros, C.A. T08-0033 (October 1, 2008).pdf