Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of the Trial Judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices). At trial, the officer testified he was at his post when he observed that the Defendant, who was traveling toward the officer, in the middle of a one-lane construction bridge controlled by a traffic light. The officer determined that the Defendant must have run a red light to end up in the middle of the bridge when the light on the officer’s side turned green. The officer presented evidence with respect to how long the traffic light stays green, yellow and red. Upon cross-examination by the Defendant, the officer testified that he did not recall how many vehicles were in front of the Defendant, that there were no signs posted telling vehicles the length of time they had to cross the bridge, and that he could not see the light on the Defendant’s side of the bridge because he was parked across the bridge. The Trial Judge found the officer’s testimony credible and sustained the charge against the Defendant.

On appeal, the Defendant argued that the officer’s testimony failed to establish that he proceeded through a red light “to a standard of clear and convincing evidence” as required by Rule 17 of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure. Traffic Trib. R.P. 17(a). The Appeals Panel stated that because the officer was unable to personally observe the color of the traffic light on the Defendant’s side of the bridge, he made an assumption based upon circumstantial evidence, including the light intervals and the fact that Defendant’s car was in the middle of bridge. Additionally, the officer agreed on the record that the length of time to cross the bridge could vary based on the number of vehicles crossing. For all of these reasons, the Appeals Panel found that the officer’s testimony was not enough to meet the “clear and convincing evidence” standard required to prove the charge, granted the appeal, and dismissed the charge.State of Rhode Island v. Chase No. M21-0007 (March 2, 2022).pdf

Obedience to Devices

The Defendant appealed the Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4, Obedience to traffic devices. A police officer testified that he observed a vehicle stopped at the exit of a shopping plaza sit through three green light cycles without proceeding through the light. After the vehicle eventually exited the parking lot, the officer conducted a traffic stop. Although the officer conceded that there were no vehicles behind the Defendant, he charged him with violating “obedience to traffic devices” on the theory that he was “obstructing the normal flow of traffic.” The Defendant argued that “there is nothing in the general law which mandates that you must go” when the light turns green. Ultimately the Trial Judge found the defendant guilty, holding that “it can be inferred that it is mandated to proceed, if you don’t, your presence there is going to disrupt the normal flow of traffic as it did here.”  The Defendant appealed, arguing that the Trial Magistrate “incorrectly interpreted § 31-13-6(1)(i).” 

RIGL § 31-13-6(1)(i) provides that “[v]ehicular traffic facing a circular green signal is permitted to proceed straight through or turn right or left or make a U-turn movement.” The Defendant here argued that the language of the statute is permissive and that nothing in the statute requires a motorist to proceed through a green light. The Appeals Panel noted that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has held that when a statute is ambiguous, the statute must be interpreted “literally and [a court] must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Additionally, the Appeals Panel noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that “under no circumstance will this Court ‘construe a statute to reach an absurd result.’” The Appeals Panel held that to interpret the statute as permissive and not mandatory, as suggested by the Defendant, would lead to an absurd result and, therefore, sustained the charged violation. 

 State of Rhode Island v. Jonathan Jamiel T20-0009 (January 15, 2021).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed a decision by a Providence Municipal Court Judge sustaining a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (Obedience to devices). An automated traffic camera captured a photograph of Defendant’s vehicle traveling through an intersection after the traffic light signaled red. Defendant argued that he was not the person driving the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation, and so it was clearly erroneous to uphold the citation as it relates to Defendant. Because Defendant had not had a full hearing on the issue, the Panel could not properly address Defendant’s argument that the statute was ambiguous as it related to the presumption of operation based on ownership. The citation was dismissed on other grounds and this issue was not decided. In a footnote, however, the Panel noted what it called a “latent ambiguity” contained within the automatic traffic camera statute. The statute enables the issuance of a traffic summons based on a photograph captured by a red light camera, but the substantive traffic violation that may be charged is § 31-13-4, Obedience to Devices. “The ambiguity arises from the fact that the [automated traffic camera] statute enables a police department to charge the owner of a vehicle with violating § 31-13-4, but to sustain a violation under § 31-13-4 the prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the driver of the vehicle failed to obey a traffic control device” (emphasis added).

City of Providence v. Stephen Gill, No. M16-0003 (April 17, 2018).pdf

Obedience to Devices

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation was an error of law because the statute requires proof that a traffic signal was red when the vehicle entered the intersection. Here, the Defendant and the Officer both testified that the traffic signal was yellow when the Defendant entered the intersection. The Panel held that since the traffic signal was yellow when the Defendant entered the intersection, the Defendant did not violate the statute. Accordingly, the Panel granted the Defendant’s appeal and dismissed the charged violation.

Town of Smithfield v. Gregory J. Degnan, C.A. No. T14-0063 (April 27, 2015).pdf

Obedience to Devices

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-13-4 (obedience to devices).  The trial testimony established that the Defendant’s car was parked outside of the marked lines in a Department of Transportation parking lot.  The Defendant argued that he was charged under the wrong statute.  The Panel found that the charged violation was improper because the charged violation is for a moving vehicle infraction, whereas the Defendant’s vehicle was neither in operation nor on a public road or highway.  Therefore, it was an error of law to sustain the charged violation because the necessary elements for the violation were not met.  The Panel granted the appeal and dismissed the violation.

Magistrate Noonan wrote in dissent, arguing that the language in the statute encompasses all public property and does not require a finding of a moving violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Atonine El Hosri, C.A. No. T14-0029 (November 25, 2015).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed from a decision of the trial court sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (Obedience to Devices).  Specifically, Defendant argued that because the Officer testified that he was in a position on the other side of a traffic light he could not see whether her traffic light was red or yellow at the time the Defendant passed through it.  The Panel explained that police officers are allowed to presume the regularity and calibration of traffic lights.  The Panel held that the trial judge properly credited the officer’s testimony that he made a presumption about the color of the light facing defendant based on the color of the light facing the opposite direction.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Warren vs. Heidi Jamiel, C.A. No. T12-0052 (April 9, 2013).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decsion of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices).  The Appeals Panel held that the state need not prove that the defendant actually saw the signs to sustain the violation.  Rather, the fact that the defendant drove by the signs was enough to sustain he violation.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. 

State of Rhode Island v. Christopher Bosley, C.A. No. T11-0026 (June 27, 2011).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). Defendant claimed that the state failed to prove that the defendant violated § 31-13-4 by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the traffic device indicated that “commercial vehicles weighing over 18 tons and having two or more axles” were required to exit before crossing the Pawtucket River Bridge. The Court held that the trooper failed to testify as to the specifications of the defendant’s vehicle and whether or not it met the requirements of the traffic device. Accordingly, the Court held that the state failed to prove the violation by clear and convincing evidence and dismissed the violation.State of Rhode Island v. Rusland Olkhovetskyy, C.A. T10-0071 (January 26, 2011)*.pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). The Appeals Panel held that the standard of clear and convincing evidence means that the truth of the facts asserted must be “highly probable.” The Court held that where there was no direct evidence that the defendant drove past the street signs prohibiting his truck from crossing the Pawtucket River Bridge, the states burden was satisfied where the defendant failed to offer any evidence to rebut the inference that he did so. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate.

State of Rhode Island v. Bert Salva, C.A. No. T09-0073 (January 28, 2010).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). The Court held that the state did not meet its burden of proof in proving the elements of the offense. Pursuant to Rule 17 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, the state is required to prove that the defendant disobeyed an instruction on a specific device by clear and convincing evidence. The trooper’s statements did not relate with “particularity the particular sign or any directional language Appellant allegedly disobeyed.” Consequently, the Court held that the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had disobeyed the signs and dismissed the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Darrel King, C. A. T10- 0053 (December 8, 2010).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of the North Providence Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices) (specifically, the axle restriction on the Pawtucket River Bridge and the Sakonnet River Bridge imposed by R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-25-30). The Appeals Panel held that a tractor and attached trailer constitute a single vehicle and are not to be considered two separate vehicles. Therefore, the exception in § 31-25-30 for “truck tractors” applies only to tractors without an attached trailer. Here, the defendant’s tractor was carrying an attached trailer. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate.

City of Pawtucket v. Zsolt Laszki, C.A. No. T08-137 (March 30, 2009).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendants appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining Defendant Pesce’s violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices) and Defendant PGT Trucking’s violation of § 31-25-30 (axle restriction on the Pawtucket River Bridge and Sakonnet River Bridge).  Defendant Pesce argued that the official traffic control device posted near the Pawtucket River Bridge (prohibiting vehicles with more than two axles from crossing) was not applicable to him because the vehicle he operated fell outside the ambit of § 31-25-30 and, therefore, that the trial judge’s decision was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant Pesce argued that the term “vehicle” as described in the statute did not refer to a tractor-trailer combination but rather should be read to mean that the motorized tractor portion of the vehicle is a separate and distinct vehicle from the non-motorized trailer portion.  The Panel explained that § 31-1-5 of the Motor Vehicle Code specifically defines a “tractor-trailer combination” as “every combination of a tractor and a trailer, properly attached to the tractor to form an articulated vehicle.”  Therefore, the Panel held that when the motorized tractor Defendant Pesce operated was attached to the trailer he was towing, the two units merged to form one vehicle, putting his vehicle within the ambit of § 31-25-30.  Additionally, the Panel explained that such a statutory construction would serve the legislative intent of the statute, which sought to prevent vehicles of such large size and weight from passing over the already structurally deficient bridges covered by the statute.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Pawtucket v. John Pesce, C.A. No. T08-0138; City of Pawtucket v. PGT Trucking, Inc., C.A. No. T08-0139 (March 5, 2009).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of the Cranston Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). Pursuant to § 31-41.1-6, the Court held that because the trial court did not include findings of fact in the record, the case must be remanded in order for the Municipal court to do so.City of Cranston v. Thomas Mercurio, C.A. No. M09-0009 (May 20, 2009).pdf

Obedience to Devices

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). The Court held that, according to Parker v. Parker, 238 A.2d 57, 60-61 (R.I. 1968), clear and convincing evidence “is a degree of proof different from a satisfaction by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ which is the recognized burden in civil actions and from proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ which is the required burden in criminal suits.” “‘[C]lear and convincing evidence’ means that the jury must believe that the truth of the facts asserted by the proponent is highly probable.” Id. The Court held that there was no evidence on record that the defendant drove by a sign or signs designed to limit access to the structurally-deficient span applicable to him. Further, the Court held that the state failed to prove the violation by clear and convincing evidence as required by Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure for the Traffic Tribunal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Roy Wood, C.A. No. T09-0023 (April 8, 2009).pdf

Obedience to Devices

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). Here, the Trooper stopped the Defendant for traveling over a bridge with a load in excess of the posted 22-ton weight limit. The Trooper did not have weighing scales to independently measure the vehicle’s actual weight and instead relied on the bill of lading to cite the Defendant for the violation. The Defendant testified that she had delivered part of her load and, without an independent weight measurement of her vehicle at the time of the stop, there was insufficient evidence to prove the charged violation by clear and convincing evidence. The Panel held that the standard of clear and convincing evidence was not met due to the absence of the Trooper’s independent weight measurement. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Ann Gordon, C.A. T08-0067 (August 6, 2008).pdf