Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed a decision from the Trial Magistrate accepting Defendant’s plea to R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating without insurance). Defendant argued that the Trial Magistrate erred in finding that the violation of § 31-47-9 in the instant case was Defendant’s second offense. Defendant claimed that her first offense had been dismissed and noted that the summons in this case charged her with a first offense. The Trial Magistrate agreed that the summons charged her with a first offense, but held that it was the facts, not the charge on the summons, that mattered. In the absence of any evidence that the first offense had been dismissed, he imposed a suspension and fine as a second offense. The Appeals Panel agreed, noting that the record did not contain any evidence that Defendant’s previous violation of § 31-47-9 had been dismissed. In a footnote, the Appeals Panel also suggested that even if the first offense had been dismissed the case might appropriately be treated as a second offense because the statute speaks to the number of offenses and does not require a conviction. Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal was denied and the Appeals Panel sustained the charges.

State of Rhode Island v. Sara Smolenski, No. T16-0009 (January 24, 2018).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (“operating without insurance”). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in not reciting the defendant’s prior insurance offenses on the record. § 31-47-9 does not require that the trial court recite the defendant’s prior insurance offenses on the record. This statute has never been interpreted to have this requirement. The Colin Foote Act § 31-27-24 does have this requirement, but the Appeals Panel declined to extend this requirement to § 31-47-9. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed. 

City of Providence v. Dominiqua Newkirk, No. T15-0028 (August 23, 2016).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed a default judgment entered by the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9, “Operating without insurance,” accompanied by a sentence of twelve months license suspension and a one thousand dollar fine.  On October 31, 2013, an officer of the Johnston Police Department charged defendant with operating without insurance.  Defendant failed to appear at her scheduled court date and the trial magistrate entered a default judgment against defendant.  When sentencing, the magistrate noted this was defendant’s third violation of the aforementioned statute and imposed the twelve month suspension and one thousand dollar fine as the statute permits.  Defendant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment on the grounds that she attempted to appear at her court date but arrived at the wrong courthouse.  A Traffic Tribunal judge denied the motion to vacate, apparently because “she was not satisfied with Appellant’s excuse that she had gone to the wrong courthouse.”  The Appeals Panel denied defendant’s appeal, noting that defendant did not raise an error of fact or law by the trial magistrate and that the sentence imposed did not exceed the trial magistrate’s statutory authority.  Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the default judgment and the sentence of the trial magistrate.

Town of Johnston v. Ashley DeSimone, C.A. No. T14-0002 (September 4, 2014).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L 1956 § 31-47-9 “proof of financial security.”  Defendant argued that it was not proved at trial that he knowingly operated the vehicle without insurance.  The Panel explained that the finding by the trial judge that “no proof of insurance [has] been submitted” did not satisfy the element of knowledge as required by the language of the statute.  The Panel held that the trial judge made a reversible error of law because the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant knew that the vehicle he was driving as not covered by insurance.  Accordingly, the Panel dismissed the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Shane Lee, C.A. No. T13-0002 (August 13, 2013).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed from a decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating a motor vehicle without insurance).  The Defendant asked for a continuance before trial because her attorney failed to appear.  The trial magistrate, stating that her attorney had not entered an appearance and that the officer was present, denied her request.  She argued that she was prejudiced because the trial magistrate denied her motion for a continuance and the Panel agreed.  The Panel noted that the trial magistrate was wrong when he said that the attorney had not yet entered an appearance and explained that, due to the nature of the charge and the severe implications of the sentence, the decision by trial judge to proceed without the Defendant’s attorney present was an abuse of discretion that substantially prejudiced the rights of Defendant.  Accordingly, the Panel remanded the case to the trial court.

City of Cranston v. Ciara Irace, C.A. No. T12-0077 (May 20, 2013).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (proof of financial security).  The Court held that the the trial judge’s decision was without error because the defendant admitted he had not registered or insured his vehicle when he was pulled over.  The Appeals Panel noted that they could not overrule the trial magistrate just because the defendant had stated he had learned his lesson and understood the severity of his actions.  Accordingly, the violation was sustained. 

State of Rhode Island v. Earth Walo, C.A. No. T11-0012 (April 20, 2011).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-14-2 (prima facie limits), R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-3-1 (operation of an unregistered vehicle), and R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-47-9 (proof of financial security). The Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate erred by not requiring the state to offer proof of the defendant’s knowledge that he was operating the vehicle without financial security. Since knowledge is an essential element for proving the violation of § 31-47-9, the Court reversed the trial magistrate’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Jim Desrosiers, C.A. No. T09-0052 (August 25, 2009).pdf

Operating without Insurance

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-3-1 (operation of an unregistered vehicle), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (verification of proof of financial security). The Appeals Panel held that a violation of § 31-47-9 requires that the vehicle be registered in Rhode Island. Since the the defendant’s vehicle was not registered in Rhode Island, the Court reversed the trial magistrate and remanded with instructions to dismiss the violation of § 31-47-9.

State of Rhode Island v. Jim Desrosiers, C.A. No. T09-0052 (August 25, 2009).pdf

Operating without Insurance

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-10-27 (license to be carried and exhibited on demand) and § 31-47-9 (proof of financial security). The Defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the Defendant knowingly operated without insurance given that the car was registered to someone else. The Panel held that the trial judge erred in sustaining the driving without insurance charge because there was no evidence that the Officer asked if the Defendant knew he was driving without insurance. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the charged violation.

City of Warwick v. Michael Palmisciano, C.A. T08-0127 (December 17, 2008).pdf

Operating without Insurance

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (proof of financial security). The Defendant was suspected in a hit-and-run accident because the Defendant’s vehicle had damage consistent with a collision and his license plate closely matched the plate of the vehicle involved. Further, the Defendant’s vehicle did not have insurance on the date of the hit-and-run, but he obtained insurance two days after the crash. The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in not crediting his testimony that the damage to his vehicle was caused after the collision. The Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not affected by error of law because the decision was supported by legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision and sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Derrick Corey, C.A. T08-0111 (November 5, 2008).pdf

Operating without Insurance

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (proof of financial security). Here, the Officer asked for the Defendant’s insurance information following an accident and the Defendant responded that he had insurance that he would present proof of at trial. The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in sustaining the charge when the Defendant failed to bring the proof to trial. At the trial, the judge declared that the Defendant’s failure to provide proof of insurance established a prima facie case sufficient to sustain the charge. The Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was improper because, despite the Rule 17 requirement that the burden be on the prosecution by clear and convincing evidence, the trial judge found shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant and sustained the charge when the Defendant failed to meet it. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Emiliano Giron, C.A. T08-0125 (October 22, 2008).pdf