Parties to an Offense

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-9 (parties to offense). Here, a hit-and-run collision occurred and a motorist testified at trial that the Defendant’s vehicle matched the description of the hit-and-run vehicle. The motorist did not see who was operating the vehicle at the time. When the Officer spoke to the Defendant, the Defendant denied operating the car on the date in question and told the Officer that the damage to the Defendant’s car was caused by another accident the night before. The trial magistrate found the Defendant guilty under § 31-27-9 (parties to offense), but he found the Defendant not guilty under § 31-26-3 (duty to give information and render aid) because there was no evidence as to who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The Appeals Panel held that § 31-27-9 provides for liability when a defendant is a party to another substantive offense, but does not in and of itself serve as grounds for the imposition of civil liability. The Court held that because the trial magistrate found the defendant guilty under § 31-27-9 (parties to an offense), but not under another substantive offense of the motor vehicle code to which she was charged with being a party, the trial magistrate’s decision constituted an error of law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial magistrate and remanded with instructions to dismiss the violation.

City of Cranston v. Helen Pirri, No. T15-0017 (March 11, 2016).pdf

Parties to an Offense

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-9 (parties to offenses). The Appeals Panel held that § 31-27-9 provides for liability when a defendant is a party to another substantive offense, but does not in and of itself serve as grounds for the imposition of civil liability. The Court held that because the trial magistrate found the defendant guilty under § 31-27-9 (parties to an offense), but not under another substantive offense of the motor vehicle code to which he was charged with being a party, the trial magistrate’s decision constituted an error of law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial magistrate and remanded with instructions to dismiss the violation.

Ciullo, J., concurring: The judge believed that § 31-27-9 did provide for the imposition of liability in and of itself as a separate substantive offense. However, because the state had not met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was a party to an offense he concurred in the judgment that the magistrate’s decision should be reversed and the charge against the defendant should be dismissed.

City of Providence v. Patrick McCracken C.A. No. T09-0029 (August 18, 2009).pdf

Parties to an Offense

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-9 (parties to offenses). Here, a hit-and-run collision occurred and the Officer testified at trial that the Defendant’s vehicle matched the description of the hit-and-run vehicle provided by the other motorist, who did not testify at the trial. The Defendant, however, did not match the description of the driver involved and she testified that she did not know anyone matching the description. The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was based on insufficient evidence because no evidence was presented at trial to support the charged violation. The Panel held that the trial judge’s decision improperly rested on inferences drawn from hearsay accounts of the accident. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Sarah Rochon, C.A. T08-0061 (August 27, 2008).pdf