Procedure

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The officer did not provide any testimony regarding her training on the use of a radar device, a necessary requirement for the charge to be sustained, until prompted by the trial judge’s question “Did you go to school?” Defendant argued that the trial judge’s question was improper. Although a court may interrogate witnesses, judicial interrogation is limited to clarification of confusing matters for the judge or jury. State v. Nelson, 982 A.2d 602, 617 (R.I. 2009). Here, the trial judge’s question did not seek to clarify confusing testimony, but instead improperly assisted the prosecution in satisfying an element of the charged violation. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel reversed the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Tayla Northup, No. T19-0016 (January 9, 2020).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed a decision from the Trial Magistrate accepting Defendant’s plea to R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating without insurance) and imposing a license suspension and fine. Defendant argued that the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered because the Trial Magistrate did not inform Defendant of the consequences that could result from her entering a guilty plea. The Appeals Panel, relying on the fact that Defendant’s license had previously been suspended for the same offense and that the arraignment judge had warned her of the sentence she was facing, found compliance with Rule 7(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, which requires that a plea be entered “voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charge and the judgment to be imposed.” Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal was denied and the Appeals Panel sustained the charges.

State of Rhode Island v. Sara Smolenski, No. T16-0009 (January 24, 2018).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-16-1 (care in starting from stop). After approaching a stop sign, Defendant noticed a vehicle approaching from the left, but attempted to cross the intersection anyway. Defendant’s vehicle was struck from the left by a driver who had the right of way. At trial, the patrolman who observed the scene of the accident testified that Defendant caused the accident by moving her vehicle in an “unsafe manner.” Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s decision. § 31-16-1 provides that “[n]o person shall start a vehicle which is stopped . . . unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety.” In part, Defendant argued that the trial judge admitted improper expert opinion testimony from a non-expert witness. The trial judge stated that the patrolman was testifying as a lay witness, and, pursuant to Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness may offer opinion testimony which is “limited to ‘opinions which are . . . rationally based on the perception of the witness.’”  Here, the patrolman’s opinion was based on his physical observations of the scene of the accident. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge did not improperly admit expert opinion testimony. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Rosa Diarbian, No. T17-0006 (December 20,2018).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial magistrate upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-5 (duty in accident in damage to highway fixtures) following his entry of a guilty plea. Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision to accept his guilty plea was clearly erroneous because he was not made aware of the nature of the violation. The Appeals Panel, after reviewing the record, agreed with defendant. The Appeals Panel found that the record established that defendant was aware that he hit a highway fixture, but not that he failed to “take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the property,” as required statute, in order to be guilty. See R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-5. As a result, the Appeals Panel found that there was no affirmative evidence indicating that defendant was fully aware of the nature of the violation when he plead guilty, as required to accept such a plea. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel granted defendant’s appeal and vacated his guilty plea, with the matter remanded for further proceedings.

State of Rhode Island v. Matthew Pichi, No. T17-0019 (May 15, 2018).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of Department of Environment and Management Fish and Wildlife Regulation §20-1-12 (feeding wildlife prohibited).  The Defendant was issued a ticket for feeding geese in an apartment complex common area and was identified through an eyewitness account and video evidence.  The Defendant argued on appeal that the trial transcript was inaccurate.  The Panel noted when a conflict of personal recollection arises against the written transcript, the transcript is viewed as accurate and the court must accept that what is found in the transcript was said in open court.  See Schafer v. Thurston Mfg. Co., 137 A.2d 5 (R.I. 1927).  Here, the Panel found such a conflict existed and, under Schafer, the transcript must be viewed as accurate.  Additionally, the Panel noted the alleged inaccuracy in the transcript did not affect the decision.  The Panel denied the appeal.

Department of Environmental Management v. Marilyn Sheldon, C.A. No. T15-0027 (February 3, 2016).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the Pawtucket Municipal Court’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-14-2(a) (prima facie limits).  The Defendant argued on appeal that the trial judge’s decision contained an error of law because the trial judge interrupted the Defendant’s cross-examination of the Officer.  The Appeals Panel, noting that the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence allow a court and or judge to maintain and exercise control over witness interrogation held that the trial judge was within her bounds to interrupt the cross-examination. The Panel granted the appeal on other grounds and dismissed the violation.

City of Pawtucket v. Mary E. Woll, C.A. No. M14-0022 (January 16, 2016).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the Pawtucket Municipal Court’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-14-2(a) (prima facie limits). At the close of the Officer’s trial testimony the trial judge independently asked the Officer about calibrating the radar unit and whether the Officer was properly trained to operate the radar unit.  Such questioning in hopes of meeting the requirements established under State v. Sprauge, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974), violates the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Nelson, 982 A.2d 602, 615 (R.I. 2009), that a trial judge may ask questions only for clarification, and not to elicit substantive evidence. Therefore, the Panel found that the trial judge exceeded her boundaries and her decision was made from unlawful procedure. The Panel granted the appeal and dismissed the violation.

City of Pawtucket v. Mary E. Woll, C.A. No. M14-0022 (January 16, 2016).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed a municipal court trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-28-9 (owners liability for parking tickets).  The Defendant argued that the trial judge failed to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, treated the case as a criminal case, and failed to give adequate time for the Defendant to prepare for trial.  Additionally, the Defendant argued that the Pawtucket Police did not disclose all relevant documents and violated the United States Constitutional double jeopardy clause by charging the Defendant twice with the same infraction.  The Panel noted that the Traffic Tribunal and Municipal Courts adhere to the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when addressing a traffic violation and found that the trial judge followed the correct rules for her decision.  Additionally, the Panel noted the Defendant was brought before Pawtucket Municipal Court in a civil violation, not criminal, and that the double jeopardy clause cannot be violated regarding civil matters.  The Panel also found that the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure address the timing of trial and discovery of documents and that the Defendant never moved for additional time or document discovery.  Thus, the Panel found the trial judge followed proper procedure by hearing the trial without additional time or discovery.

City of Pawtucket v. Matthew Lambert, C.A. No. M14-0029 (February 4, 2016).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court denying defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order filed pursuant to Traffic Tribunal Rule of Procedure 20(e). Defendant pled guilty to R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (“refusal to submit to a chemical test”) on September 5, 1985. Defendant, a resident of Connecticut, paid the fine, but failed to attend driver retraining and to complete the required ten hours of community service. For this failure, defendant’s driving privilege in Rhode Island was suspended. When Defendant attempted to renew his license in Connecticut some 30 years later, in 2015, the Connecticut DMV refused because of the Rhode Island driving suspension. Defendant made a motion in the Traffic Tribunal to request relief from the requirement to complete both the driver retraining and community service. The Appeals Panel held that the Traffic Tribunal does not have the authority to waive mandatory sanctions under Rule 20(e) since in doing so the court would intrude upon substantial legislative matters. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph E. Sands, No. T16-0005 (August 31, 2016).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed a default judgment entered by the trial magistrate, sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-10-1 (no license on person), § 31-22-22(g) (no seat belt-operator), § 31-21-4 (places where parking or stopping prohibited), § 31-15-12.1 (entering intersection), and § 31-47-9 (operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance). The Defendant argued that the Traffic Tribunal did not have subject matter jurisdiction because he identified himself at arraignment as the beneficiary of a trust rather than in his capacity as the operator of the vehicle. The Panel held that because the Defendant was served with the violations in his capacity as operator of the vehicle, the Traffic Tribunal did properly have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision.

City of Cranston v. In Re- Richard W. Audette, C.A. No. T14-0036 (March 30, 2015).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous because he failed to consider the Defendant’s cell-phone video evidence. The Panel noted that a video “is received into evidence only after a witness with personal knowledge testifies that it is a true and accurate representation.” State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101, 1117 (R.I. 2014). The Panel held that the trial judge was not able to consider the admissibility of the video because the Defendant, who was pro se at the trial, never moved to introduce the video to the court and it was not authenticated. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to not consider the video evidence and to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Manelik Vallejo, C.A. No. T14-0048 (July 8, 2015).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(g) (no seat belt. operator), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(f) (no seat belt, passenger over 13 years old). The Defendant argued that he was not given a fair trial because the trial magistrate did not consider the prosecution’s failure to produce a key witness or key evidence and, additionally, the trial magistrate did not “hear out” his witness. Here, the Defendant requested a police report from the police station, but the police department told him that it did not have a written report of the incident. The Panel noted that the Defendant did not subpoena additional witnesses or file a motion for discovery and, even if he did file a motion for discovery, the trial magistrate could not order the Officer to produce a report that did not exist. The Panel held that the Defendant was not prejudiced by not having additional witnesses or evidence. The Panel further held that the record indicated that the trial magistrate did consider the testimony of both the Officer and Defendant’s wife and, after he considered each witness’s testimony, determined that the Officer’s testimony was credible and sufficient to sustain the charged violations. Accordingly, the Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision to uphold the charged violations.

Brown University v. Roark Malloy, C.A. No. T15-0013 (September 15, 2015).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant argued that he was prejudiced because the trial judge questioned the officer. The Appeals Panel held that the defendant failed to object to the question asked or the answer given. However, even if the issue had been properly preserved for review, the Court concluded that trial judge’s question to the officer — “How far away was your fixed position when you targeted the vehicle?” — was not improper because it was for clarification purposes and did not rise to the level of being an advocate for the prosecution. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Cure, Jr., C.A. No. T13-0049 (January 21, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a) (Prima Facie Limits).  At trial, the Defendant appeared pro se.  The judge asked the officer whether his radar unit had been calibrated and whether he held certification in the use of radar equipment, thereby establishing the evidence required under State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974), to support the charge.  Defendant argued that the judge improperly guided the police officer’s testimony at trial. The Appeals Panel explained that a trial judge’s prerogative to question witnesses is limited to clarifying a matter that may be cause for confusion.  Here, the Panel concluded these questions were not asked to clarify confusing testimony or subject matter, but were pin-point questions designed to ensure that the officer gave testimony establishing the necessary elements to sustain the charge.  Accordingly, the Appeals Panel held that the judge’s decision was based on unlawful procedure and abuse of discretion, and dismissed the charged violation.

Town of North Smithfield v, Santo Mascena, C.A. No. M14-0002 (August 7, 2014) Trial Procedure.pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges.  The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment.  Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result.  Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits.  Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the City to re-file the charges was made upon unlawful procedure.  Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate was bound by the special prosecutor’s dismissal under Rule 26(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and therefore should have applied the “law of the case” doctrine to prevent the City from re-filing the charges.  The Panel explained that the “law of the case” doctrine stands for the proposition that once a judge has made an interlocutory decision, a second judge confronted with the same issue should not disturb the first ruling.  See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 683 (R.I. 1999).  The Panel explained further that Rule 26(a) allows for termination of the prosecution by the prosecutor, and at no time in the Defendant’s case did any magistrate make any interlocutory decision.  The Panel held that the “law of the case” doctrine did not apply to the facts and procedure of the case.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate did not make an error of law in allowing the City to re-file the charges.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that a District Court order associated with the DUI prosecution of the Defendant required the Pawtucket Police to destroy all police records that tied the defendant to the events underlying the two charges sustained by the Tribunal and that, as a result, the Pawtucket Police could not re-file the charges.  The Panel reviewed the plain language of  R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12(a)(1), “Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated,” and explained that the statute requires only records of identification be destroyed.  The Panel then reviewed the trial record and found no evidence that the Police used any record of identification as a basis to identify Defendant as the operator of the vehicle.  Instead, identification was made by in-court testimony of the arresting officer.  The Panel explained that defendant’s assertion that the Police could not rely on records of identification ordered destroyed by the District Court order was immaterial to the matter before the Tribunal.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the Police to re-file the charges was not an error of law.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed that the evidence of calibration was not properly submitted at trial because the calibration sheet was not marked for identification and was not introduced as a full exhibit. Further, the calibration sheet was handed to the judge after the defendant’s objection. It is mandatory that the calibration sheet be entered into evidence in order to prove a violation of speeding. See State v. Mancino, 115 R.I. at 54, 340 A.2d 128 (R.I. 1975). Here, the Appeals Panel concluded that the calibration sheet was not properly admitted into evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous as it was made upon unlawful procedure. Consequently, the Appeals Panel dismissed the violation.State of Rhode Island v. Michael Hersey C.A. No. T12-0081.pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed from the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(g) (Safety Belt Use – Operator).  A police officer testified that he observed the motorist driving while not wearing a seatbelt.  At the conclusion of the officer’s testimony the Defendant asked the trial judge for a continuance so that he might be able to obtain video surveillance footage showing he was wearing his seat belt.  The trial judge denied the request for a continuance and sustained the charge.  The Panel noted that a request for a continuance “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge” and may be reversed only upon a finding that the trial judge abused his or her discretion.  Here, the judge denied the Defendant’s request because the Defendant had two months to obtain the video and made no attempt to do so, and any video still in existence was unlikely to show the inside of Defendant’s vehicle.  At the time of the appeal, the Defendant still did not have possession of any video footage.  The Panel explained that the trial judge did not improperly exercise his discretion when denying the Defendant’s request for a continuance.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Woonsocket v. Ronald Ribero, C.A. No. M12-0020 (May 15, 2013).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs).  The Court held that it lacked the authority to judge the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence and that the trial court found the officer’s testimony credibille that the defendant failed to stop at a stop sign.  Also, the Appeals Panel held that the defendant’s contentions that he should be given additional time to present additional evidence was without merit, as the defendant had told the trial justice he was ready for trial; thus, waiving his right to more discovery time.  Furthermore, the defendant’s failure to call another witness or have counsel was not grounds for a new trial because the defendant could have called any number of witnesses and he had no right to counsel for a civil traffic violation.  Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision holding that the defendant had violated § 31-20-9.

Town of Middletown v. Teddy Maghuyop, C.A. No. M11-0022 (March 14, 2012).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  The Defendant argued that Rule 33 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure required the trial magistrate to dismiss the charge because the Defendant’s arraignment was not scheduled within two weeks of the date the citation was issued.  Here, the Defendant’s arraignment was scheduled three days after the two week period expired.  The Panel explained that although Rule 33 does require an arraignment be scheduled within two weeks of the date of citation, the rule does not require dismissal if the rule is violated.  The Panel noted that consistent with State of Rhode Island v. Ladieu, T10-0022 (2010), a dismissal based on an error in a summons is warranted only when the defendant is prejudiced by the error. In Ladieu, the panel noted that prejudice occurred when the police deliberately destroyed evidence after a six-week delay. Here, the trial magistrate asked the Defendant how the three day delay had prejudiced him, and the Defendant could not point to any facts demonstrating prejudice.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Kenneth Ribeiro, C.A. No. T11-0036 (November 4, 2011).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate was not mandated to recuse himself because the purpose of raising the defendant’s previous traffic offenses before trial was only to give notice to the defendant and her attorney.  The Court noted that nothing in the record suggested that the trial magistrate preconceived anything about the defendant’s guilt or innocence before the trial.  Thus, the Court held that recusal was not warranted and sustained the violation against the defendant.

Town of North Kingstown v. Michelle Mancini, C.A. No. T11-0008 (April 20, 2011).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial judge’s decision to proceed with the trial despite the defendant’s request for a continuance. The record did not show any abuse of discretion by the trial court when he denied the continuance, as defendant neither made a timely motion nor did he gave a compelling reason that showed the abuse of discretion by denying a continuance. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendanat.

Town of South Kingstown v. Frederick Channing, C.A. T.10-0060 (December 8, 2010).pdf

Procedure

Defendant appealed the decision of the Cranston Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). Pursuant to Rule 18 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, the Court held that the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to address the trail judge or magistrate before the imposition of a sentence. Since the trial court did not afford the defendant this opportunity, the Court remanded the case in order for the defendant to be given an opportunity to do so.City of Cranston v. Thomas Mercurio, C.A. No. M09-0009 (May 20, 2009).pdf

Procedure

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-5 (turn signal required) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use). The Defendant argued that because the prosecution failed to appear at trial, the trial abused his discretion by not dismissing the violation pursuant to Rule 17. Rule 17 reads that if the prosecution fails to appear for trial, the matter “may be dismissed.” The Panel held that the Defendant failed to prove that the trial judge’s decision was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations.

City of Providence v. Emilio Taylor, C.A. T08-0097 (November 5, 2008).pdf