Speeding

Defendant appealed a decision of the Trial Magistrate sustaining a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding). At trial, the officer testified that the radar device he used to measure the Defendant’s speed “was calibrated externally and internally.” He also testified that he was trained as an officer at the Police Academy, which included a radar certification. The Trial Judge asked the officer to clarify the issue of the “external calibration” of the radar device. The officer displayed a misunderstanding of the term, testifying that tuning forks are used for calibration “internally as in within the cruiser and externally from outside of the cruiser.” The Defendant presented public records as evidence that the officer’s radar device had not been calibrated since 2011, ten years before the incident. In response, the Trial Magistrate explained the difference between calibrating the device internally and externally, further explaining that the officer’s testimony that it had been externally tested with a tuning fork before and after his shift, if accepted, would be legally sufficient. The Trial Magistrate accepted the testimony of the officer as credible, held that it met the requirements of State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 39-40 (R.I. 1974), and sustained the charge against the Defendant. Defendant appealed.

Under Sprague, for a radar unit reading to be admissible at trial, the testifying officer must meet a two prong test – (1) that the unit was tested within a reasonable time by an appropriate method and (2) that the officer sets forth his/her training and experience in the use of the radar unit. Id. The Appeals Panel found that the officer’s testimony was sufficient to meet the boths prongs under Sprague because he testified that “prior to and after the shift, [his] radar was calibrated externally and internally” using a tuning fork, and he testified to his training as an officer at the Police Academy. The Appeals Panel found the Trial Magistrate did not err in finding the officer’s testimony satisfactory, denied the appeal, and sustained the violation.

 State of Rhode Island v. Aboh, Jr. No. T21-0029 (February 23, 2022).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a decision of the Trial Judge of the North Kingstown Municipal Court sustaining a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding). At trial, the officer testified that he was trained at the academy to detect speeding violations and in the use of radar devices. The officer also testified that he “clocked” the defendant at 63 miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone, and then “continued to do so for about a half a mile” before stopping the Defendant for speeding. The Defendant then testified, stating that he was not speeding and that the officer “only paced him for a few seconds” before stopping him. The Trial Judge found the North Kingstown officer’s testimony credible and found the Defendant guilty. The Defendant appealed.

On appeal, the Defendant argued the prosecutor failed to offer evidence of speeding. The Appeals Panel agreed, noting that it could not determine from the record whether the officer used a radar device or his speedometer to measure the Appellant’s speed. In either event, the Panel determined the officer’s testimony was insufficient to be admitted into evidence. In the case of a speedometer, the officer is required to testify about the “calibration” or “operational efficiency” of the device used to measure a vehicle’s speed for the testimony to be admissible. State v. Mancino, 340 A.2d 128, 132 (1975) (quoting State v. Barrows, 90 R.I. 150, 154, 156 A.2d 81, 83 (1959)). Here, because the officer failed to testify regarding the operational efficiency of the speedometer used to measure the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle, his testimony was insufficient under Mancino. If the officer used a radar device to measure the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle, the Appeals Panel found that his testimony failed to establish the operational efficiency of that equipment. Therefore, the officer failed to meet the first test requirement under Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 39-40 (1974), that “the operational efficiency of the radar unit was tested within a reasonable time by an appropriate method.” . While the officer’s testimony did meet the second requirement of Sprague regardingthe officer’s training and experience in the use of a radar unit, the Appeals Panel found it lacked the first requirement, was insufficient and, therefore, inadmissible. Because the Appeals Panel found the officer’s testimony inadmissible under Mancino and Sprague for either method of measuring a vehicle’s speed (speedometer or radar device), the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof and the Trial Judge’s decision was “clearly erroneous.” The Appeals Panel granted the Defendant’s appeal and dismissed the violation.State of Rhode Island v. Bretti No. M21-0008 (March 2, 2022).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed a Trial Judge’s decision sustaining a school zone speed enforcement violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-41.3-10. The Defendant, a rental car company, contested the speeding violation and the accuracy of the radar camera.  At the close of the evidence the Defendant made a motion to dismiss, claiming that the motorist had not been given notice of the radar and, therefore, could not fairly dispute the calibration of the radar unit. The Trial Judge denied the motion and found the Defendant guilty. The defendant appealed.

The Appeals Panel held that the Defendant did not have standing to bring this case to trial. The statute clarifies that the “registered owner of the motor vehicle shall be primarily responsible in all prosecutions brought pursuant to” its provisions, and further clarifies that “[t]he lessee of a leased vehicle shall be considered the owner of a motor vehicle for purposes of this section.”  The Panel held that the terms “renter” and “lessee” can be used interchangeably and found, therefore, that because of this the Defendant did not have standing to contest the violation. The Appeals Panel denied the appeal, but dismissed the underlying violation. 

 State of Rhode Island v. North American Auto Leasing LLC, No. M20-0009 (April 9, 2021).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation for speeding. A Sergeant testified to observing a vehicle moving at a high speed. The Sergeant obtained a moving radar reading of 88 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Additionally, he testified to his training in using a radar unit and  that he calibrated the unit that day and determined it to be in good working condition. The Sergeant identified the Defendant as the driver and cited him for going “65 miles an hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. The Defendant testified that he was not speeding and that he sped up when he noticed a vehicle that turned out to be the patrol car tailgating him. The Trial Judge sustained the charge and the Defendant appealed.

The Appeals Panel relied upon State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (1974), to support its finding that sufficient evidence had been submitted to show that Defendant was guilty of the charged violation. The Appeals Panel found that the Sargent had satisfied both prongs of the Sprague test when he testified as to his training in the use of the radar and testified as to the operational accuracy of the radar when he stated it had been calibrated and in good working condition. The Panel sustained the charged violation. 

 State of Rhode Island v. Adedamola Odunlami T20-0012 (April 29, 2021).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed a Trial Magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2, Prima facie limits. A Trooper for the Rhode Island State Police testified that he was at a fixed radar post when he observed a vehicle “traveling at a high rate of speed.” Further, the Trooper testified that his radar unit gave a speed of “ninety miles an hour in a marked fifty-five miles per hour zone”. After conducting a stop, he identified the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle. He issued a citation for speeding sixty miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour zone. The trooper testified as to his training in the use of radars and that the radar was “checked prior to shift, calibrated, and found to be in good working order.” The Defendant testified that he was initially questioned for having the wrong license plates and further argued that he was not speeding. Ultimately, the Trial Magistrate found the Defendant guilty. The Defendant appealed, arguing that “he was not speeding and was stopped for having improperly registered plates on his new vehicle.”

The Appeals Panel relied upon State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974), to support its finding that the Trooper had satisfied the elements required for admissibility of radar readings, as he had testified to checking the radar for “operational accuracy” and that the radar “was in good working order.” Further the Trooper also testified that he had been trained in the use of radar units thus satisfying both requirements of Sprague. The Appeals Panel refused to consider the Defendant’s argument as to the credibility of the witness, as it was without authority to do so, and did not address the Defendant’s argument about the basis for the traffic stop.  The Appeals Panel held that no error had been made and sustained the charged violation. State of Rhode Island v. Timothy Siem, No. T20-001 (April 21, 2021).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal trial court sustaining a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding – first offense). At trial, the testifying officer stated that he had received training in the use of the radar unit and that “prior to [his] patrol, it was calibrated both internally and externally, found to be in proper working order.” The Trial Magistrate asked the officer for clarification on when and how he tested the radar, to which he responded “we calibrated both internally and externally. Prior to my shift and after my shift, and found to be in proper working order.”  Under State v. Sprague, for a radar unit reading to be admissible at trial, the testifying officer must meet a two prong test – (1) that the unit was tested within a reasonable time by an appropriate method and (2) that the officer sets forth his/her training and experience in the use of the radar unit. Id. at 322 A.2d 36, 39-40 (R.I. 1974). The trial judge found that the testimony satisfied both prongs required by Sprague and, as such, the radar unit reading was admissible and the charge sustained. Defendant filed an appeal. The Appeals Panel found the trial judge correctly determined that the officer’s testimony was sufficient to meet both prongs of the Sprague analysis, denied the appeal and sustained the violation.State of Rhode Island v. Charles No. T21-0014 (October 27, 2021).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal trial court sustaining a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding – third offense). At trial, the officer testified that he used “an internal and external calibrated radio unit found in proper working order” to determine the Defendant’s speed.  He “did not testify as to the time frame in which the radar was calibrated, or to the specific method used to internally and externally calibrate the radar unit.” The defendant argued that the officer’s testimony should be stricken because he did not testify as to the method of calibration of the radar unit, citing Daniel Houle v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-58 (D.R.I. January 25, 2021). The Trial Judge denied the motion, stating that the Houle case is not binding on the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal because it was issued by the District Court and because, in the Trial Judge’s view, the case attempts to add a requirement to the two-element test found in State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 39-40 (R.I. 1974). Under Sprague, for a radar unit reading to be admissible at trial, the testifying officer must meet a two prong test – (1) that the unit was tested within a reasonable time by an appropriate method and (2) that the officer sets forth his/her training and experience in the use of the radar unit. Id. The defendant argued that, even under Sprague, the officer was required to testify as to the method of calibration of the radar unit and when it was calibrated and that, without that testimony, the prosecution failed to meet its burden. The trial judge disagreed and sustained the charge. The Appeals Panel found that the officer’s testimony was insufficient to meet the first prong under Sprague because he failed to state the radar unit had been calibrated by an appropriate method and within a reasonable time. Therefore, the Appeals Panel reversed the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the violation.State of Rhode Island v. Cinnamon No. T21-0015 (October 27, 2021).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant argued that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof because the testifying officer failed to state that she possessed training and experience in the use of a radar unit. In order for a radar unit reading to be admissible at trial, the testifying officer must state that the unit was tested within a reasonable time by an appropriate method, and the officer must set forth her training and experience in the use of a radar unit. State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 39-40 (R.I. 1974). The Appeals Panel held that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof because the testifying officer failed to state that she possessed training and experience in the use of a radar unit. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel reversed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Tayla Northup, No. T19-0016 (January 9, 2020).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). A state trooper observed Defendant speeding and subsequently issued the appropriate citation. At trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the charged violation on the grounds that the radar unit used to detect Defendant’s speed was not tested within a reasonable time. But the trial magistrate denied the motion to dismiss because the state trooper provided credible testimony which established that the radar unit had been internally tested using the dashboard test button which “calculates and tests the internal calculations of the radar unit itself.” On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because the evidence presented at trial established that the radar unit had not been externally calibrated within a reasonable time. Specifically, the evidence established that the radar unit had not been externally calibrated in four years.

To be admissible at trial, radar unit readings require testimony that establishes that the radar unit was “tested within a reasonable time and by an appropriate method.” See State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 39-40 (1974). Here, the Appeals Panel found that evidence presented at trial established that the radar unit had been tested within a reasonable time because the state trooper provided credible testimony demonstrating that the radar unit was internally tested by the dashboard test button. Notably, the Appeals Panel stated that Sprague did not conclude that the “by an appropriate method” standard is only met when a third-party tests the radar unit. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous because the Appeals Panel lacks the authority to assess witness credibility. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

*NOTE: The District Court reversed the Appeals Panel’s decision on the grounds that using the dash-mounted radar unit’s test button, standing alone, does not constitute calibration by an appropriate method.  An internal calibration establishes that the radar is providing internally consistent results.  Only an external calibration establishes that those results are accurate.  As such, the District Court held that the state failed to meet its burden under Sprague.

State of Rhode Island v. Daniel Houle, No. T19-0003 (August 26, 2019).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds). A police officer responded to a reported motor vehicle accident between Defendant and another driver. At trial, an accident reconstruction expert testified that, in his “best estimation,” Defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit. Moreover, based on a witness’s testimony, the trial magistrate found that Defendant passed the witness’s vehicle “at a much higher rate of speed” than the posted speed limit. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because § 31-14-1 cannot be sustained on its own without also charging §§ 31-14-2 or 31-14-3.

In State v. Campbell, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that § 31-14-1, standing alone, does not meet the constitutional test of reasonable certainty. See State v. Campbell, 196 A.2d 131-32 (R.I. 1963) (concluding that a complaint charging a driver with violating § 31-14-1 must also reference §§ 31-14-2 or 31-14-3 to satisfy the reasonable certainty test). But, in State v. Lutye, the Court found that a “third alternative for satisfying the certainty test is to charge that the speed was unreasonable because the operator could not so control his vehicle as to avoid colliding with persons or vehicles as particularized in the second sentence of § 31-14-1.” State v. Lutye, 287 A.2d 634, 637 (R.I. 1972).

Here, Defendant was accused of traveling at an unreasonable speed because a collision resulted. As such, the Appeals Panel held that it was not an error of law for the trial magistrate to allow a charge of § 31-14-1 to stand on its own. Nevertheless, the Appeals Panel remanded the matter on other grounds.

State of Rhode Island v. Tayla Delvecchio, No. T18-0025 (July 24, 2019).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds). A police officer responded to a reported motor vehicle accident between Defendant and another driver. At trial, an accident reconstruction expert testified that, in his “best estimation,” Defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit. Moreover, based on a witness’s testimony, the trial magistrate found that Defendant passed the witness’s vehicle “at a much higher rate of speed” than the posted speed limit. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred because the evidence on the record did not establish that Defendant violated § 31-14-1.

Here, the record contained sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant traveled at an unreasonable speed, but a driver is guilty of § 31-14-1 based upon a collision only when the other driver entered the roadway using due care. Although the trial magistrate found that the other driver did not operate recklessly, a finding that a driver did not drive recklessly is not equivalent to a finding that a driver exercised due care. As such, the Appeals Panel held that further factual findings were necessary as to whether the other driver exercised due care. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel remanded the matter to the trial magistrate to determine whether the other driver exercised due care.

State of Rhode Island v. Tayla Delvecchio, No. T18-0025 (July 24, 2019).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). At trail, Defendant explained that he was driving above the speed limit to get to the hospital in response to a family emergency. Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the speeding violation on those grounds. The Appeals Panel held that there was legally competent evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s decision because § 31-14-2 does not provide an emergency situation exception. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Domenick Connors, T18-0005 (August 6, 2018).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed a decision by a Trial Judge of the Woonsocket Municipal Court sustaining a charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (Prima facie limits). The citing officer observed Defendant traveling at what appeared to be a higher speed than the posted 25 mile per hour limit. The officer then used the speedometer in his cruiser to track Defendant’s vehicle speed at a constant 41 miles per hour over a quarter of a mile. He then conducted a motor vehicle stop and cited Defendant for traveling ten miles per hour over the speed limit. Finding the officer’s testimony credible, the Trial Judge sustained the charge.  The Appeals Panel reversed the decision after finding that the police officer at trial did not satisfy the preliminary evidentiary requirements regarding the operational efficiency of a device used by the officer to clock Defendant’s vehicular speed. Specifically, pursuant to the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Mancino, 340 A.2d 128, 132 (R.I. 1975), the Appeals Panel held that an officer must show that the speedometer used to clock a vehicle was tested against another speed-testing standard and that the speedometer was operating properly at the time of the alleged violation. Because the testifying officer failed to introduce such evidence, the charge could not be sustained. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel reversed the Trial Judge’s decision and granted Defendant’s appeal.

State of Rhode Island v. Momodou Cham, No. M17-0012 (April 24, 2018).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was “not based on any facts” because the Sergeant did not have the radar unit with him in court and never gave the Defendant a receipt of the radar speed. The Panel noted that the trial magistrate accepted the testimony of the Sergeant and was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err in sustaining the violation because his decision was supported by legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

Town of Glocester v. Vlash Mata, C.A. No. T14-0045 (April 3, 2015).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a) (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was not supported by evidence because the Officer did not testify that the radar unit was externally calibrated on the date at issue and the Certification Document was not sufficient to meet the standard in State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974). The Panel held that Sprague does not require radar units be tested externally, but rather that they be tested by “an appropriate method within a reasonable time.” The Panel held that because the Officer testified that the radar unit calibrates when turned on and was in good working condition, and because a calibration certification had been entered into evidence, there was sufficient evidence that the device was tested by an appropriate method in a reasonable time. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the violation.

Town of Westerly v. Daniel A. Buck, C.A. No. M14-0023 (March 4, 2015).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating without evidence of insurance), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-8-1 (operation of vehicles without evidence of insurance), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27.1-4 (aggressive driving), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-5 (turn signal requires), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in sustaining the speeding violation because “although the Officer testified to his training, there was no evidence presented as to how he estimated [the Defendant’s] speed or that the speedometer used to estimate [the Defendant’s] speed was tested.” Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial magistrate’s decision and dismissed the speeding violation.

City of Woonsocket v. Nathan Belisle, C.A. No. T15-0015 (August 27, 2015).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that she was driving at a low speed and that the Officer must have clocked another driver traveling in close proximity to her as the vehicle that was exceeding the posted speed limit.  The Panel noted that an officer must be trained to use a radar device and the device must have been calibrated within a reasonable time. Here, the officer testified that he had been trained in the use of a radar device at the Academy and that his radar device had been calibrated both internally and externally on the day the citation was issued.  Further, the Panel noted that the trial judge found the Officer’s testimony credible, despite his testimony that he could not recall if there were other vehicles in proximity to defendant’s at the time.  Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation against the defendant.

Town of Barrington v. Shirley Thurber, C.A. No. T13-0013 (August 8, 2013).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a), “prima facie limits.” At trial, the Officer testified that he initially watched two vehicles leave the South Beach parking lot, one traveling at sixty-eight miles-per-hour and the second (Defendant’s vehicle) traveling at sixty-two miles-per-hour, in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone.  Before stopping Defendant’s vehicle, however, the Officer pursued but lost the first vehicle.  The Officer then went back to locate Defendant’s vehicle, a silver Mitsubishi with “wavy graphic lines.” The Officer testified that by the time he reached Defendant’s vehicle, Defendant had slowed to a legal speed.  The Panel noted that the trial judge was satisfied that the Officer properly identified Defendant’s vehicle as the vehicle he initially saw speeding.  Additionally, the Officer testified that he had been properly trained in the use of radar equipment and that his radar equipment had been calibrated and was in good working order on the day of the citation.  The Panel held that the trial judge sustained the charge based on legally competent evidence.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Little Compton v. Joseph Noe, No. T12-0067 (August 8, 2013).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a) (prima facie limits).  Defendant argued that he was traveling at a reasonable speed and that because the Trooper could not recall how many vehicles were in vicinity of Defendant at the time the Trooper observed his vehicle, the violation should be dismissed.  The Panel noted that the Trooper was adamant in his testimony that he was certain the vehicle he recorded by radar was the Defendant’s vehicle.  The Trooper testified that the radar unit was calibrated before and after his shift on the day the citation was issued.  The Panel noted that the trial judge properly credited the Trooper’s testimony over that of Defendant and properly determined that it was irrelevant that the Trooper could not recall how many vehicles were driving in the vicinity of the Defendant’s vehicle when he determined the motorist’s speed.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Wolfhard Anim, C.A. No. T13-0006 (June 13, 2013).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Defendant did not deny that he exceeded the speed limit, but argued that trees were obstructing his view of the speed limit sign.  Defendant further argued that the stop was unwarranted because he was being targeted by the Bristol Police for brining his passenger home after her parents filed a missing person report.  Following State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 36 (R.I. 1974), the Panel explained that an officer must be trained to use a radar device and the device must have been calibrated within a reasonable time. Here, the officer testified that he had been trained in the use of a radar device at the Academy and that his radar device had been calibrated both internally and externally.  The Panel held that the defendant’s arguments were irrelevant to proving or disproving the elements of the charged violation.  Accordingly, the Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation.

Town of Bristol v. Allen P. Carpenter, C.A. No. M11-0023 (March 23, 2012).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  While not denying that his speed exceeded the posted speed limit, the Defendant argued the charge should be dismissed because the Officer testified at trial that no “engineering speed study” had been conducted on the section of road he was traveling as required by Section 2B-13 of the Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).  Without reaching this argument, the Panel noted the Officer did not testify to her training in the use of radar.  Therefore, the Panel held the State could not prove its case under State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974).  Accordingly, the Panel dismissed the charged violation.

Town of North Kingstown v. Christopher Foley, C.A. No. M12-0007 (December 27, 2012).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-3 (immediate notice of accident). Defendant claimed that the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous because the state failed to provide evidence sufficient to sustain either charge. The Court held that the defendant’s admission that he was driving and struck a light pole was not sufficient by itself to sustain the charge of § 31-14-1 because the officer did not provide any evidence that the defendant operated his vehicle in excess of the posted speed limit or that he faced any hazard which required him to reduce his speed. Further, the Court held that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain the violation of § 31-26-3 because the officer failed to provide a timeline of events and did not prove that the defendant failed to use the quickest means available to notify the police of the accident or that the defendant’s vehicle was so disabled as to prevent its normal and safe operation where the defendant drove the vehicle home after the accident and then called the police. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the violations.Town of North Kingstown v. James Almeida, C.A. No. T11-0028 (May 11, 2011).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  Defendant argued that trial judge’s decision was an error of law because the evidence at trial was insufficient to satisfy the standard for admissibility of speedometer readings, which require: (1) evidence showing that the speedometer used to clock the speed of a defendant was tested against another speed-testing device and that the speedometer was operating properly at the time of the alleged violation; and (2) that the speedometer had been tested by an appropriate method within a reasonable period of time from the alleged violation.  See State v. Mancino, 340 A.2d 128, 132 (R.I. 1975); and State v. Barrows, 156 A.2d 81, 83 (R.I. 1959).  The Panel reviewed the trial testimony and noted the Officer testified only that he “believed” the speedometer was calibrated but did not have the calibration with him.  Further, the Panel noted there was no testimony as to the operational efficiency of the speedometer, the method of testing, or the time of calibration.  The Panel held that the evidence at trial was insufficient to satisfy the standard of admissibility to introduce the speed of Defendant’s vehicle.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial judge’s decision was an error of law and dismissed the violation.

Town of North Smithfield v. Robert Pinardi, C.A. No. T10-0014 (April 14, 2010).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (reasonable and prudent speeds). The Court held that where the officers did not observe the defendant speeding, the witness testimony that the motorcycle was “accelerating” and performing a “wheelie” did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the defendant operated his motorcycle in a way that violated the statute. Accordingly, because the city failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not operate his vehicle at a reasonable and prudent speed, the Court reveresed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the violation.

City of Pawtucket v. Anselmo Depina, C.A. No.T10-0018 (November 23, 2010).pdf

Speeding

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Following State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36, 36 (R.I. 1974), the Court held that an officer must be trained to use a radar device and the device must have been calibrated within a reasonable time. Here, the officer testified that he had been trained in the use of a radar device at the Academy and that his radar device had been calibrated three months prior to the citation. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. George Philips, C.A. No. T09-0036 (August 18, 2009).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits), § 31-16-5 (turn signal required), and § 31-22-22 (safety belt use – child restraint). The Panel held that the trial judge erred in upholding the speeding charge because, although the Officer testified that his radar unit had been properly calibrated, he failed to testify that he was qualified to operate the radar unit. Accordingly, the Panel dismissed the speeding violation.

City of Cranston v. Krisel Baumet, C.A. T08-0134 (December 3, 2008).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the Officer’s testimony did not satisfy the standard set forth in State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974). Specifically, the Defendant argued that Sprague should be read to require that the prosecution introduce evidence describing the method used to calibrate the radar device and evidence showing that the operational efficiency of the device was certified on an annual basis. The Panel held that the Defendant’s arguments were unavailing because Sprague does not speak of such requirements. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. George Philip, C.A. T08-0126 (November 19, 2008).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that trial judge erred in finding that the Sergeant’s trial testimony satisfied the prevailing standard for admissibility of radar speed readings set forth in State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36  (R.I. 1974). The Panel held that although the Sergeant testified that “the operational efficiency of [his] radar unit was tested within a reasonable time by an appropriate method,” he failed to testify as to his “training and experience in the use of a radar unit.” Id. at 40. Accordingly, the Sergeant’s speed reading was inadmissible and the Panel dismissed the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Cindy Salazar, C.A. M08-0012 (September 10, 2008).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that a motorist has a right to inspect a police officer’s radar or laser unit immediately following a traffic stop for speeding and that he was denied his right when the Patrolman refused to show him the laser gun used to record his vehicle’s speed. The Panel held that the Defendant’s argument was unavailing because the Defendant did not cite and the Appeals Panel did not find any authority for the rule. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. James Devine, C.A. M08-0007 (July 16, 2008).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding), R.I.G.L. 1956 §31-15-11 (laned roadway violation), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-5 (failure to use a turn signal). The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in sustaining the speeding charge because there was no evidence that the devices used to ascertain the Defendant’s speed were accurate and in good working order. The Panel noted that for speedometer or radar evidence to support a speeding charge, “the operational efficiency” of the device must be “tested within a reasonable time by appropriate method” pursuant to State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1974). The Panel held that because there was no evidence to establish the accuracy of the Trooper’s speedometer or radar, the trial judge erred in sustaining the charge. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the speeding charge.

State of Rhode Island v. Robert Braddock, C.A. T08-0073 (July 30, 2008).pdf

Speeding

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(B) (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that he could not have been speeding because the time between his citation and the time listed on a store purchase receipt proved that it was impossible for him to violate the speed limit. Here, the Trooper testified that he used a calibrated radar unit to measure the Defendant’s vehicle speed and that he was trained in radar speed measurements. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err because his decision was based on the Trooper’s testimony and the Trooper’s testimony satisfied the criteria outlined in State v. Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1874), for admissibility of an accurate radar speed measurement. Accordingly, the Panel upheld that trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. David Barros, C.A. T08-0066 (June 11, 2008).pdf