Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of a Trial Judge at the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-18-3 (yielding to pedestrians). The Warwick Police Department conducted a traffic operation where officers, in plain-clothes, crossed a roadway at a crosswalk, monitored vehicles passing by, and cited those who did not yield for the plain-clothed officers. Defendant was cited for not yielding as part of this operation. In the instant case, the testimony established that the officer who issued and signed the citation did not observe the violation, but instead relied upon information provided by a fellow police officer. The Appeals Panel noted that R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 Section 31-27-12(a) provides that the observing officer of a violation of any statute or ordinance shall issue and sign the citation against a Defendant.  Nevertheless, the Appeals Panel held that the Trial Judge’s decision was proper because of the “fellow officer rule.” “Under the collective knowledge doctrine – also called the ‘fellow officer rule’ – the knowledge of one officer supporting a search or seizure may be imputed to other law enforcement officers acting in conjunction with the knowledgeable officer.” U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1986). The Appeals Panel further noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had also held that “a police officer is entitled to make a valid arrest on the basis of information obtained from another police officer[.]” State v. Austin, 641 A.2d 56, 58 (R.I. 1994)(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Appeals Panel sustained the trial court’s ruling.

State of Rhode Island v. William Peotrowski, No. T16-0030 (April 12, 2018).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of a Trial Judge at the North Providence Municipal Court sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding). Defendant argued that his due process rights were violated because the summons he was issued indicated an incorrect address for where the traffic stop happened. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that Rule 3 of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure clearly states that “[a]n error or omission in the summons shall not be grounds . . . for dismissal of the charged violation(s), or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his or her prejudice.” The Appeals Panel found that because Defendant received accurate information regarding the charged violation and Defendant had proper notice of the charge against him since he received the summons during the traffic stop. Because the defendant was not “misled to his prejudice,” the Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge’s decision was not made in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal was denied and the charged violation sustained.

State of Rhode Island v. Kenton Smith, No. M17-0006 (April 12, 2018).pdf

Summons

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of Department of Environment and Management Fish and Wildlife Regulation §20-1-12 (feeding wildlife prohibited).  The Defendant was issued a ticket for feeding geese in an apartment complex common area and was identified through an eyewitness account and video evidence.  The Defendant argued on appeal that the summons was not properly served upon the Defendant.  Specifically, the Defendant argued the summons was never handed to her, but instead to her granddaughter, and that she never signed the summons as required by Rhode Island law.  The Panel found that there was no legal requirement for signing the summons. The Panel found that personal service was satisfactorily met here, where the Defendant physically refused to receive the summons and the officer handed the summons to her granddaughter, who had been standing next to the Defendant inside the Defendant’s apartment and who remained after the Defendant walked away.  See Rosen v. Rosen, 404 A.2d 472, 474 (R.I. 1979).  Therefore, the Panel found the summons was properly served on the Defendant and the appeal was denied.

Department of Environmental Management v. Marilyn Sheldon, C.A. No. T15-0027 (February 3, 2016).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of a Pawtucket Municipal Court trial judge sustaining the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant argued that the speeding ticket was not properly notarized because the Officer did not sign the summons in the presence of the Notary Public. Following the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure Rule 3, the Appeals Panel held that summonses do not have to be notarized. Rule 3 of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure states that “the summons shall be signed by the issuing officer alleging the facts contained therein are true.” Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation against the Defendant. 

City of Pawtucket v. Talia Turco, No. M14-0039 (February 18, 2016).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining several violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 24-12-37 (“penalty for nonpayment of toll”). Defendant argued that he did not receive proper notice of his toll violations. Police had been investigating a toll avoider who, while driving a motorcycle through the toll at the Newport Bridge, covered his license plate with his hand. Police subsequently identified Defendant as the toll avoider. Citing Ryan v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham, 656 A.2d 612 (R.I. 1995), the Appeals Panel held that the appearance of the defendant’s attorney at the hearing operated as a waiver of the need to prove notice. However, the trial court’s decision was reversed on other grounds.

State of Rhode Island v. John McCarthy, No. T14-0046 (August 18, 2016).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (“stopping for school bus required”). Defendant argued that the charge could not be sustained because the address of the offense listed on the summons did not match the address of the offense displayed in the video from the school bus. The Appeals Panel concluded that the information on the summons complied with the requirements of Rule 3 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, providing proper notice of the charge and the court date. In the absence of any evidence of prejudice, the Appeals Panel found no basis for dismissal and affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the violation.

City of Providence v. Chelo J. Espaillat, No. 14-0035 (June 9, 2016).pdf

Summons

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (operating without evidence of insurance), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-8-1 (operation of vehicles without evidence of insurance), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27.1-4 (aggressive driving), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-5 (turn signal requires), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign), and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in sustaining the violations for turn signal required, obedience to traffic control devices, and obedience to stop sign because the summonses misidentified the vehicle and the summonses were given to the Defendant after the motor vehicle stop. The Panel held that the procedure was not unlawful because, although the summonses mislabeled the vehicle, the Defendant was not misled by the error. The Panel further held the procedure was not unlawful where the summonses were properly served to the Defendant’s residence. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations because the procedure was not unlawful and the Defendant’s substantial rights had not been violated.

City of Woonsocket v. Nathan Belisle, C.A. No. T15-0015 (August 27, 2015).pdf

Summons

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-1 (failure to maintain control). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the laned roadway violation was made upon unlawful procedure because the Defendant’s counsel was unaware of the charge and information regarding the charge should have been presented to his counsel during discovery. The Panel held that the Defendant had sufficient notice of the violation because he received a summons listing the laned roadway violation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the laned roadway violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Ramel Shaw, C.A. No. T14-0060 (September 25, 2015).pdf

Summons

Town of Middletown v. Kyle DeCosta, C.A. No. M13-0020 (February 25, 2014).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a) (prima facie limits).  Defendant argued that the charge should be dismissed because the Trooper who signed the summons was not the Trooper who witnessed and recorded the Defendant’s vehicle exceeding the speed limit.  The Trooper that signed the summons testified that he did not have personal knowledge that the Defendant was speeding, but rather that his partner recorded Defendant speeding and relayed that information and that he then stopped the Defendant and issued the citation.  The Panel explained that an error in a summons warrants dismissal only when the error misleads or prejudices the defendant.  The Panel noted that at trial, both Troopers testified to the events that led to the charge, one of whom was the Trooper that observed and recorded the Defendant speeding.  The Panel held that the mistake here did not mislead or prejudice defendant.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Linda Perrotti, C.A. No. T12-0048 (December 18,2012).pdf

Summons

The state appealed the decision of the trial magistrate dismissing the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-9 (throwing debris on highway-snow removal). The Court held that the evidence was clear that the defendant violated the statute.  Also, the Court held that the officer not having the original summons at trial did not mislead or prejudice the defendant.  Thus, the Court found the defendant guilty of violating the statute and the reversed the decision of the trial magistrate

Town of North Providence v. Frank Manfredi, No. T11-0023 (October 11, 2011).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the decision of the Middletown Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use). The Court held that a defect in the summons did not preclude the Court from sustaining the charge against the defendant. Furthermore, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge may uphold the secondary offense charge of a seat belt violation where the summons contained the relevant statute and name of the secondary offense but failed to state the underlying primary offense. The Court stated that since the defendant was only charged with the secondary offense and not the underlying offense, he was afforded adequate notice of the only charge against him. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charge against the defendant.

Town of Middletown v. John McNulty, C.A. No. M09-0025 (November 18, 2009).pdf

Summons

Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-24-1 (times when lights required). The Defendant argued that his due process rights were compromised because the traffic citation was not signed on the back, which deprived him of notice of his court date and an opportunity to be heard. The Panel noted, however, that Rhode Island courts have consistently recognized that a mere defect in the traffic citation does not preclude a court from sustaining the charged violation, except where the error misled the defendant to his or her prejudice. Here, the Panel was satisfied that the Defendant was fully and fairly appraised of the offense and was not prejudiced because, even in the absence of the Officer’s signature, the information contained in the citation was sufficient to inform the Defendant of the necessary arraignment details. Accordingly, the Panel held that the charged violation should be sustained.

Town of Lincoln v. Richard McKee, C.A. No. T08-0128 (December 10, 2008).pdf